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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Criticism of health care in the United States usually focuses first and 
foremost on the millions of Americans who lack health insurance of any kind.  
But the uninsured are not the only Americans whose welfare should concern 
policymakers.  Because of the way private health services are financed on the 
one hand and dispensed on the other, the U.S. health care system burdens 
lower- and middle-income premium payers for the benefit of providers and 
high-income consumers.  In this article, we seek to show the nature—and to 
suggest the cumulative magnitude—of the many regressive tendencies of the 
financing, regulatory, and legal regime governing the private side of U.S. health 
care.1  Parts II and III chart some of the numerous pathways through which too 
 
 1. Although we focus on the private sector in this article, there are important distributive justice 
issues on the public side as well.  To be sure, progressive redistribution appears in many programs of 
public subsidies and financing—the Medicaid program in particular.  But many aspects of Medicare are 
not so progressive.  Thus, less than a third of Medicare’s funding in 2004 came from general revenues 
raised through progressive taxation. See SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE BD. OF TRS., STATUS OF THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2005 ANNUAL REPORTS (2005) 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html (showing breakdown of 2004 income of 
the Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance trust funds).  A much larger share (fifty-
four percent) was yielded by a 2.9% flat tax on the wages, salaries, and self-employment income of 
current workers—a tax that, because it applies only to earned income, is less equitable than a true flat 
tax.  See also infra note 48.  Moreover, if one views Medicare only as a pay-as-you-go program, this tax 
appears to be an enormous intergenerational transfer, taking large amounts from today’s workforce to 
provide health services for today’s retirees.  If Medicare is viewed as social insurance, however, the 
unfairness is less clear because, up to now at least, each generation has gotten substantially more out of 
the program than it has put in.  See Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90 
J. PUB. ECON. 257 (2006).  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this pattern will continue.  It depends, after 
all, not only on continuing upward trends in both health care costs and life expectancy but also on the 
willingness of the next generation of workers to pay the taxes needed to support the elderly population 
in the same generous way.  There are good reasons, it would seem, to question the fairness of 
Medicare’s payroll tax to today’s workers. 
Medicare’s intragenerational fairness can also be questioned—and is actively in dispute.  It is at 
least an open question, it appears, whether, having made larger payments into the program, higher-
income individuals may enjoy more than proportionately greater benefits from it.  This could happen 
because higher-income individuals both live longer under the program and make more intensive use of 
its nominally equal entitlements.  (We examine the latter matter at length infra notes 121–127 and 
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much money flows or appears to flow from the pockets of the less-than-affluent 
to the benefit of elite interests.  Part IV observes how the legal and regulatory 
environment of U.S. health care has been structured according to the 
perceptions and preferences of these same elites, thus raising costs for everyone 
who seeks health coverage; because the marginal benefits of more and better 
health care are, of necessity, valued less by people with lower incomes and 
other unmet needs,2 significant social-justice issues are raised by the American 
legal system’s many ways of making families of modest means, if they want 
health coverage, pay for especially costly versions of it. 
Our explicit concern in writing this article is that, for whatever reasons, the 
health care system’s systematic exploitation of the many for the benefit of the 
privileged few has been either overlooked, underestimated, or conveniently 
ignored by analysts and policymakers.  We will also suggest, however, that the 
regressive tendencies we observe are no accident, but result from a combination 
of ideology and the political economy of health care.  Specifically, we see a 
seemingly well-meant but essentially destructive policy bias—assiduously 
cultivated by the health care industry and shared by many commentators and 
policy analysts—in favor of more and better health care for all with only 
nominal regard for how much it costs or who bears the burden.3  Because 
 
accompanying text).  For the latest (conflicting) findings on whether Medicare, taken as a whole, is a 
regressive or progressive program, compare McClellan & Skinner, supra (using average incomes within 
zip codes as proxies for beneficiaries’ incomes and finding net wealth transfers from lower- to higher-
income beneficiaries), with Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?, 
90 J. PUB. ECON. 277 (2006) (using educational attainment as a proxy for income and finding net 
transfers from higher- to lower-income beneficiaries). 
In view of this mixed record of distributive justice, one might wonder why Medicare is so rarely 
criticized by those concerned about the welfare of lower-income Americans.  But see Jonathan Skinner 
& John E. Wennberg, Exceptionalism or Extravagance: What’s Different About Health Care in South 
Florida?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-372, W3-374 (“On equity grounds, we have 
problems with the idea of single working mothers in Nebraska (often themselves lacking health 
insurance) footing the bill for gold-plated health care provided to high-income Medicare enrollees in 
Miami.”). 
 2. For a fuller discussion of the income elasticity of demand for health services and its significance 
for our thesis, see infra note 101 and text accompanying note 209. 
 3. A good example of this pervasive bias can be found in the stated primary mission of the $9 
billion Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF): “To improve the health and health care of all 
Americans.” RWJF ANN. REP. 2004, at 1 (2004).  The Foundation’s ambivalent attitude toward cost as 
a relevant consideration in its grant making has recently been documented—notably, in a publication 
sponsored by the Foundation itself.  Carolyn Newbergh, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 
Efforts to Contain Health Care Costs, in TO IMPROVE HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE, VOLUME VII: 
THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION ANTHOLOGY 57–80 (2004).  Although the Foundation 
has not entirely ignored cost in its activities, it was only in 1998, twenty-six years after its founding, that 
it recognized cost considerations at all in its mission statement—as one of four subsidiary goals: “To 
assure that all Americans have access to basic health care at reasonable cost.”  Id. at 64.  In 2003, it 
substituted the word quality for basic, indicating that the objective of more and better health care still 
dominates.  See id. at 80 n.2.  Not only is the notion that costs must be subjectively “reasonable” little 
more than lip service to an obvious public concern, but, whenever the Foundation has acknowledged 
high costs as a problem, it has mostly seen them only as an obstacle to achieving its main mission, not as 
a possibly unwarranted burden on those who pay them.  See, e.g., Goals Update, in RWJF ANN.  REP. 
1996, at 141 (1997) (“[C]ontrolling costs was clearly an essential prerequisite for our other goals . . .”).  
Newbergh describes how Steven Schroeder, M.D., RWJF’s president from 1990 to 2002, downgraded 
interest in cost to a “half goal.”  Newbergh, supra, at 63.  Finally, it is significant that most of the 
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unwillingness to view health care as an economic good accords so well with 
illusions about health care in the public mind, it has been easy for industry and 
other interests to manipulate people’s thinking about health care issues, both as 
consumers and as voters.  In particular, we emphasize how policies effectively 
hiding the true cost of health coverage from the consumer-voters who 
ultimately bear them4 enable elite interests to have their way in the political 
process, thereby maintaining a system that is rigged against the true interests of 
the political majority.5  Contrary to the assumptions of many observers, 
ordinary Americans are not well served by health policies and practices 
founded on the premise that health care should be beyond price. 
We hope, at least, that this article’s demonstration of serious and systematic 
unfairness in the American way of financing, regulating, and dispensing health 
care will stimulate further research on distributional issues, including the scope, 
existence, and quantitative significance of the numerous specific injustices we 
have tried to identify.6  But we believe that, even without precisely quantifying 
 
Foundation’s activities relating to cost containment that Newbergh describes involved sponsoring 
community, governmental, or industry-wide cooperative initiatives (for example, an RWJF program 
focused on Medicaid managed care, its “Community Programs for Affordable Health Care,” and its 
“Physician-Directed Program to Improve Medical Care Services and Control Costs”) rather than 
promoting ways of making costs and quality negotiable in the marketplace.  See id. at 62. 
 4. Crucial to our claim that premium payers are overburdened is the proposition, stoutly 
defended by most economists, that, even though employers purchase most health coverage, its cost is 
ultimately borne virtually in full by employees, principally in the form of reduced wages.  Logically, 
employers are primarily concerned about a worker’s total compensation and are largely indifferent 
about the forms in which that compensation is paid.  Empirical studies support the economists’ 
prediction.  See generally Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market 55 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6762, 1998) (reviewing the empirical literature and concluding that 
“the results that attempt to control for worker selection, firm selection, or (ideally) both, have 
produced a fairly uniform result: the costs of health insurance are fully shifted to wages”).  Individual 
studies have found that real wages fall after government-mandated increases in the cost of insurance 
and when health costs rise, especially for high-consumption groups.  See Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. 
Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers’ 
Compensation Insurance 1 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 279, 1990) 
(finding that areas and industries with high workers-compensation costs led to a corresponding 
reduction in wages); Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. 
REV. 622 (1994) (finding that the mandated expansion of health insurance coverage in the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 led to reduced wages); Louise Sheiner, Health Care Costs, Wages, and 
Aging (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1999/199919/199919pap.pdf  (finding relatively lower wages for 
older workers and workers with family coverage in areas with high medical prices). 
 5. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wanna Fix Health Care? Stop Hiding the Cost!, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 13, 2004, at A17. 
 6. The only extensive overall examination of distributional issues that we have found is a 1992 
study, John Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Who Pays for Health Care in the United States? Implications 
for Health System Reform, 29 INQUIRY 231 (1992).  Undertaken to inform efforts at major health 
reform, that study was mostly concerned with showing how the overall burden of paying for health care 
was then distributed among income classes in order to provide a baseline for evaluating any new plan 
or proposal.  To be sure, that study found that “the distribution of the financing burden is regressive.”  
Id. at 244.  But, as Christopher Conover shows in this volume, this characterization is not helpful or 
accurate for present purposes because it depends upon an artificial and unrealistic definition of 
regressivity—in terms of the proportion of income that a given class spends on health care in general, 
including its own, rather than only the proportion that is diverted to essentially public purposes or to 
meeting regulatory requirements. Christopher J. Conover, Distributional Considerations in the 
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the cumulative extent of regressivity in U.S. medical care, we have shown 
enough actual and probable unfairness to the sub-affluent majority to suggest 
the desirability of shifting definitively to a health care system in which “you get 
what you pay for,” no less as well as no more, but also in which substantial 
public subsidies funded by progressive taxation ensure that inability or 
unwillingness to pay plays only a marginal role—a crucially important marginal 
role, to be sure—in allocating resources to health care.  Of course, others might 
reasonably view the same injustices as pointing in the direction of less reliance 
on markets and more direct government intervention.  In any event, in a time of 
justifiable concern about widening income disparities in American society,7 it is 
important to recognize that the health care sector offers a unique opportunity 
for society to mitigate a very large inequity—and, in so doing, to put the 
nation’s resources to more appropriate uses, thereby enhancing aggregate 
welfare, productivity, and competitiveness rather than diminishing them as 
other redistributive measures are often thought to do. 
II 
OVERSPENDING ON HEALTH CARE—WHO PAYS? WHO BENEFITS? 
There are numerous reasons to believe that the United States spends too 
much of its considerable wealth on health care.  A comparison with other 
developed nations, for example, suggests that excessive spending on health care 
in the United States amounts to several whole percentage points of gross 
domestic product (GDP)—possibly more than half a trillion dollars each year.8  
 
Overregulation of Health Professionals, Health Facilities, and Health Plans, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 181, 183 (Autumn 2006).  Moreover, the method employed by Holahan and Zedlewski in 
identifying cost burdens—estimating the average burden borne by individuals in each income decile—
did not reveal the particular burden borne by lower- and middle-income premium payers to which we 
call attention in this article.  Indeed, because each higher decile almost certainly included a greater 
number of persons having health coverage, the average cost calculated for each decile effectively 
obscured differences in the burdens borne by insured and uninsured individuals, both within each 
decile and across the board.  Thus, whereas Holahan and Zedlewski’s data inadvertently made it 
appear that individuals in each higher income decile bore higher insurance costs than those with lower 
incomes, we hold it unlikely that insurance costs for those actually having insurance vary greatly 
according to income. 
 7. From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, the share of aggregate personal income received by the 
middle fifth of the population fell from 17.2% to 16.2%, while the income of the top fifth increased 
from 42.1% to 45.4%.  JARED BERNSTEIN ET AL., PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 
OF INCOME TRENDS xi (2000).  The poorest quintile likewise fell further behind the high earners.  
Thus, incomes at the twentieth percentile were 16.8% of incomes at the ninetieth percentile in 1989 and 
15.9% of such incomes ($18,556 versus $116,472) ten years later.  CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002 26, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-221.pdf. 
 8. See generally Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Health 
Data, chart 4-5 (June 5, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/13/34966969.pdf.  In 2003, when health 
spending in the United States represented 15% of GDP, no other nation spent more than 
(Switzerland’s) 11.5% of its GDP on health care in that year, and the median level of expenditure 
among all thirty OECD nations was 8.6% of GDP.  If Switzerland’s 11.5% of GDP devoted to health 
care is converted into “purchasing power parity international dollars” (PPP$), the OECD data can be 
read to show that Switzerland in fact spent only 67% as much per capita on health care in 2003 as the 
United States ($3,781 versus $5,635).  See Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an 
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In this Part II we ask who benefits most, in their own terms, from this 
extraordinarily high level of spending and show that it is not just the economy 
in general that is overburdened but also, disproportionately, ordinary working 
Americans.  Even if we have overstated the annual amount of misspent dollars 
by a hundred billion or so, it would still be a very heavy cost to impose 
unnecessarily on working families that are finding it increasingly difficult to pay 
energy bills, to raise and educate their children, and to save for an uncertain 
retirement.  To be sure, excess spending yields some offsetting benefits in the 
form of improved health status, reassurance, and security.  But paying for some 
of those benefits might be seen as an extravagance by those with pressing needs 
of other kinds.  Moreover, only a fraction of the health care premiums paid by 
insured working Americans goes to defray the costs of their own health care.  
Instead, as we will show, much of the money they contribute as premiums is 
spent on services for persons other than themselves.9 
Health care costs in the United States were projected to reach $2.16 trillion 
in 2006 approximately $7100 per capita and 16.5 percent of GDP.10  The annual 
premium for an average family’s health coverage reached $10,880 in 2005, 
equivalent to nearly 19 percent of the median household’s income.11  While 
burdensome to all but the most affluent families, this level of spending can be 
deemed excessive, in policy terms, only if either (1) the prices paid to providers 
and suppliers are too high—that is, significantly in excess of competitive 
prices—or (2) patients regularly receive services or products of such little 
benefit that the human and capital resources expended could have been better 
employed in providing other goods or services.  In fact, U.S. health care appears 
to present both of these problems: both supracompetitive prices and 
inefficiently high levels of consumption, particularly in the intensity of care 
delivered.12  Thus, there is reason for concern not only about the excessive cost 
 
International Context, HEALTH AFF., May–June 2004, at 10 (using this methodology to derive similar 
estimates).  Treating as “excessive” all U.S. health spending over this percentage provides a basis of 
sorts for the eye-catching number suggested in the text as a possible measure of the magnitude of U.S. 
overspending.  The extreme outlier status of the United States also appears from a comparison of its 
2003 health spending of 5,635 PPP$ per capita with median per capita spending of 2,161 PPP$ among all 
OECD nations.  See id.  To be sure, the income-elasticity of demand for health care is such that richer 
nations naturally spend higher percentages of their national income on it.  See infra note 101.  But this 
article shows not only that the level of spending in the U.S. results from a unique combination of 
dysfunctional markets and misguided public policies but also that it is working-class Americans, and not 
the affluent, whose money is being spent excessively on health care—without anything resembling their 
informed consent. 
 9. In addition, working Americans bear much of the cost of the largely pay-as-you-go Medicare 
program through a payroll tax of questionable fairness.  See supra note 1. 
 10. Christine Borger et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2015: Changes on the Horizon, 
2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W61, W62 exh. 1. 
 11. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, 
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 16 (2005) (estimating the average annual 
premium for family health insurance coverage in 2005 as $10,880); U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
NOTICE PDR-2005-01 (2005) (estimating median family income in 2005 as $58,000). 
 12. Wasteful spending might also take the form of excessive administrative costs, which many think 
they see in the U.S. private sector.  See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein, Steffie Woolhandler & Sidney M. 
Woolf, Administrative Waste in the U.S. Health Care System in 2003: The Cost to the Nation, the States, 
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burden itself but also about how both the burden and the benefits of excessive 
spending are distributed among different income classes.  The two sections of 
this Part II call attention to the immense, regressive redistribution of wealth 
that results from public policies and industry practices that cause lower-income 
workers with health coverage both (1) to overpay for many health-related 
goods and services and (2) to consume more than they would freely choose to 
consume.  Part III then observes how these same overcharged families may be 
regularly disadvantaged on the receiving end as well, getting both less and 
lower-quality health care than higher-income participants in the same health 
plans get for the same money. 
A. Excessive Prices: Overpaying Providers and Suppliers 
Prices paid for health care goods and services in the United States are quite 
high in comparison with similar prices in other developed nations.13  Likewise, 
prices paid to suppliers and providers by U.S. private payers significantly 
exceed comparable payments under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.14  In 
each case, the explanation may be simply that government-controlled health 
systems, here as well as abroad, exercise their buying (monopsony) power to set 
prices below fair, competitive levels.15  But the substantially higher prices 
observed in the U.S. private sector may also be a consequence of weak 
competition and unchecked monopoly or market power.  To whatever extent 
prevailing prices exceed competitive levels and cannot be justified as 
appropriate rewards for inventive or entrepreneurial success, they can be 
deemed an unfortunate redistribution of income from consumers to various 
 
and the District of Columbia, with State-Specific Estimates of Potential Savings, 34 INT’L J. HEALTH 
SERVICES 79 (2004).  Although a decentralized, competitive industry will inevitably incur certain costs 
that could be avoided in a system run by government, those added costs are usually justified by a 
competitive market’s better incentives for improved performance and greater ability to satisfy differing 
consumer needs and preferences.  To the extent that the nominally decentralized U.S. health care 
system does not deliver these benefits (as we later suggest it largely fails to do), any higher costs it 
entails may be counted as unjustified burdens imposed on consumers for the benefit of the insurance 
industry and other interests.  Rather than centralizing administration in government’s hands, however, 
the better way to address inefficiency of this kind might be to enable, and encourage, health insurers to 
realize the usual benefits of competition.  See Clark C. Havighurst, Why Preserve Private Health Care 
Financing?, in AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM 87 (1993) (arguing that 
private health plans are hard to defend unless they are allowed to offer, and do offer, consumers a full 
range of health care options, including economizing opportunities). 
 13. Reinhardt et al., supra note 8; Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United 
States Is So Different from Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2003, at 89.  Comparisons of care 
in the United States with care in other OECD nations suggest that American health care consumers do 
not receive generally better quality but are simply paying more for comparable goods and services.  See, 
e.g., Peter S. Hussey et al., How Does the Quality of Care Compare in Five Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 
89 (2004). 
 14. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) reports that although hospital 
payment-to-cost ratios for private payers declined fairly steadily through the 1990s, dropping from 
approximately 130% to 115%, comparable ratios for Medicare and Medicaid were substantially lower.  
MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 62 fig.2B-1 (2002).  For physician services, Medicare 
payments were only eighty-three percent of private payments in 2004.  MEDPAC, MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 81 (2006). 
 15.  See infra note 34. 
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elements of the health care industry.  Of course, merely redistributing income 
does not affect aggregate wealth.  In this case, however, the unjustified gains 
enjoyed by the winners appear large enough that it is important to know just 
who the losers are and whether there are ways to reduce their losses. 
1. How Health Insurance Exacerbates the Redistributive Effects of 
Monopoly 
Even though rewarding providers handsomely does not itself lessen total 
wealth, aggregate welfare does suffer when the economy’s capital, labor, and 
other resources are not used to their maximum advantage.  In economic theory, 
high monopoly prices can result in “deadweight loss” (from “allocative” 
inefficiency) because they discourage consumption of the monopolized good, 
thus diverting productive resources to other sectors and away from their best 
use.16  Strikingly, this misallocative tendency of monopoly is not a significant 
problem in health care because of health insurance, which enables consumers to 
pay inflated prices rather than being discouraged by them from consuming the 
overpriced item.17 
But at the same time that health insurance reduces the danger that any 
monopolized good or service it covers will be underproduced, it exacerbates the 
other objectionable consequence of monopoly pricing: its regressive 
redistribution of income from consumers to producers.18  It does this by enabling 
monopolists to set substantially higher prices than they could set if consumers 
were exposed to actual prices.19  Because insureds face only deductibles, co-
 
 16. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 65–78 (1988) 
(outlining the distortions and inefficiencies associated with monopoly in economic theory).  For reasons 
why economists are chary of basing policy prescriptions on claims that their adoption will increase 
allocative efficiency, see note 212 infra. 
 17. Thus, health insurance eliminates most of the “deadweight loss triangle” that appears under the 
demand curve in textbook illustrations of monopoly’s misallocative effect.  See Arti K. Rai, The 
Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in 
the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 202–09 (2001) (observing that “providing access to 
insurance is a low-cost mechanism for reducing deadweight loss”); Martin Gaynor, et al., Are Invisible 
Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets, 108 J. 
POL. ECON. 992 (2000) (considering offsetting allocative effects of insurance-induced moral hazard and 
supracompetitive prices for health services).  For a graphic presentation of deadweight loss, see 
TIROLE, supra note 16, at 67. 
 18. Most economists take no professional position regarding the distribution or redistribution of 
income because it has no effect on aggregate welfare (that is, efficiency) unless one makes certain 
assumptions about the marginal utility of income to different individuals.  See generally Daniel A. 
Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791 (2003) 
(reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002), extensively 
examining arguments in law and economics).  But monopoly’s redistributive effects can be a potent 
political issue—as we suggest they should be in the current state of U.S. health care. 
 19. In the normal monopoly case, there is a trade-off between allocative inefficiency and 
redistribution.  Thus, while more elastic demand makes high prices more likely to discourage desirable 
consumption, it also means that there is less consumer surplus (see infra note 54) available for a 
monopolist to capture; likewise, to whatever extent a monopolist is able to practice price 
discrimination, consumption is facilitated and deadweight loss is reduced—but the monopolist earns 
greater profits at consumers’ expense.  Strikingly, this reciprocal relationship between monopoly’s 
misallocative and redistributive effects does not generally hold in the U.S. health care market.  As the 
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insurance, or co-payments, the pricing decisions of monopolists selling insured 
products or services are only slightly constrained by the limits of consumers’ 
willingness or ability to pay.20  By effectively steepening the demand curve a 
monopolist faces, health insurance enhances the monopolist’s pricing freedom 
and ability to exploit consumers, enabling it to charge even more than the 
theoretical “monopoly price.”21 
Because health insurance so greatly dilutes the individual consumer’s price-
consciousness as a check on provider pricing freedom, price competition in 
health care depends heavily on private insurers’ acting as knowledgeable, 
aggressive purchasing agents for their insureds.  Indeed, large private insurers 
and health plans are often thought to exercise substantial buying power vis-à-vis 
providers.22  But even though health plans certainly make competition more 
effective in potentially competitive markets (because of their superior skill in 
searching the market and their ability to reward low-price providers by steering 
substantial business their way), they are largely helpless in confronting true 
 
text in this and the next section explains, once U.S.-style health insurance and a few other factors 
(specifically, the peculiar incentives and conduct of nonprofit firms) are added to the mix, monopoly 
may generate excessive rather than suboptimal consumption.  And this misallocation of resources (if it 
occurs as we hypothesize), instead of being offset in some sense by a reduction in monopoly’s 
redistributive effect, is simply an additional burden on the economy. 
 20. The differences among different forms of cost sharing are important in this context.  In health 
plans with so-called tiered benefits, payment of a fixed co-payment usually entitles the insured to full 
coverage of the remaining cost of “medically necessary” care and medications. In other plans, stop-loss 
provisions entirely eliminate co-insurance at some point.  In both cases, once the initial deductible or 
other cost-sharing requirement is met, the sky may be almost literally the only limit on the monopolist’s 
pricing freedom.  To be sure, the amount of pricing freedom enjoyed by sellers of patented, 
therapeutically unique prescription drugs has not been quite so great because, until fairly recently, a 
large proportion of the population lacked extensive coverage for these products, and Medicare 
generally did not cover them (even though its beneficiaries were particularly heavy users).  But, 
according to one survey, seventy-three percent of non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries aged 
sixty-five or older had some form of public or private (Medigap or retiree) coverage of prescription 
drugs in 2003.  Dana G. Safran et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and Seniors: Findings from a 2003 
National Survey, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-152.  Also, coverage for the rest of the 
population expanded rapidly from the late 1980s.  See Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health 
Insurance and the Growth in Pharmaceutical Expenditures, 45 J. LAW & ECON. 587 (2002).  The finding 
by Danzon and Pauly that the rapidly rising share of the national health dollar claimed by prescription 
drugs during the period in question reflected improved insurance coverage is consistent with the 
hypothesis that monopolistic sellers found it increasingly profitable to price their products in the range 
where demand was especially inelastic due to health insurance.  In any event, our observations about 
how monopoly and health insurance interact appear to have important (though as yet unrecognized) 
implications for the implementation of the new Medicare prescription drug benefit.  See generally 
Jennifer Bowman et al., Access to Cancer Drugs in Medicare Part D: Formulary Placement and 
Beneficiary Cost Sharing in 2006, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1240 (2006). 
 21. A typical monopolist seeking maximum profit sets its unit price so that “marginal cost” (the 
cost of producing one additional unit) does not exceed the additional (“marginal”) revenue generated 
by that price across all units.  Because higher prices generally reduce the number of units that can be 
sold, there is normally a finite point beyond which a higher price per unit will net the monopolist a 
lower total profit, not a higher one.  With health insurance helping consumers pay the monopolist’s 
price, however, marginal cost and marginal revenue will equate at a higher level.  In other words, with 
insurance in the picture, the monopolist’s profit-maximizing price will be significantly higher, and the 
redistribution of income it causes will be significantly greater. 
 22. See generally Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining 
Ventures: An Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989 (2004). 
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monopolists.  It is highly unlikely, for example, that an afflicted enrollee would 
easily accept a plan decision to forgo purchasing a monopolized service or 
product on his behalf simply because its price was too high.  By hypothesis, 
there would be no close substitute for the monopolized service or product as a 
treatment for certain health problems, and enrollees facing those problems 
could be expected to protest, even sue, if the plan refused to purchase it for 
them.23  Although it is possible to imagine health plans whose enrollees agree in 
advance to let the plan make benefit-cost trade-offs in designing coverage and 
purchasing for the group, insurance of that kind has not been accepted in the 
U.S. market.24  In the absence of insurer competition focused on giving subsets 
of consumers optimal value for their health care dollars (rather than merely 
easy access to all “medically necessary” services and products), private health 
insurance enables providers and suppliers possessing advantageous market 
positions to parlay them into unusually large profits earned at premium payers’ 
expense. 
 
 23. For truly stunning examples of the price-increasing and profit-generating effects of combining 
U.S.-style health insurance and monopoly, see Geeta Anand, The Most Expensive Drugs (pts. 1–4), 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2005, at A1 (quoting one drug company executive as saying, “I never dreamed we 
could charge that much”); WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at A1; WALL ST. J., DEC. 1, 2005, at A1; WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2005 at A1.  This series of articles reports that insurers are paying amounts up to, and 
even in excess of, $600,000 per patient per year for drugs needed to treat a relatively small number of 
individuals with rare chronic conditions.  Purveyors of these drugs, which generally cost relatively little 
to produce, enjoy exceptionally strong protection against competition for their drugs and biologics 
under the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).  Although other health-
sector monopolists, even patent monopolists, may not possess the same market dominance as firms 
protected by the Orphan Drug Act, the insurers with which they deal have few tools with which to 
resist paying quite high prices for often small or debatable incremental benefits.  See infra notes 24 & 
27. 
 24. See Rai, supra note 17, at 208 (“The extent to which plans can engage in price/quality 
competition based on true cost-benefit tradeoffs . . . is still limited by the structure of contract and tort 
law.  Limitations on quality that emerge from limitations on beneficial coverage will be difficult to 
implement in our current system.”).  One of the instant authors has consumed much ink in trying to 
make the world safe for such economizing contracts.  See, e.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH 
CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995) [hereinafter 
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES].  The legal system and the market have been largely 
unwilling to embrace them, however.  See generally Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology, 
24 HEALTH AFF. 1523 (2005) (recognizing lack of contractual freedom as a reason why costs of new 
technology are uncontrolled); Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 67–74 (Autumn 2002) [hereinafter Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell 
Short].  Indeed, managed health care ran into a political firestorm in the 1990s when it began to appear 
that health plans might invoke their contracts to ration arguably beneficial care.  See generally id. at 64–
100; Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
427 (2005) (reviewing and explaining the dramatic decline in health plans’ efforts to actively manage 
health care costs); see also Michael E. Chernew et al., Barriers to Constraining Health Care Cost 
Growth, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 122 (reporting post-backlash interviews with health plan 
administrators and finding unwillingness to constrain technology-driven cost increases).  Evidence of 
insurers’ lack of either the will or the means to limit their insureds’ access to costly treatments on the 
basis of well-calibrated benefit-cost comparisons appears in their difficulty in resisting paying even the 
staggering prices demanded by firms with monopolies under the Orphan Drug Act.  See Anand, supra 
note 23, pt. 1 at A1 (reporting, however, that, in the face of Orphan Drug Act monopolies, “employers 
and insurers are now pushing back” but only by “excluding coverage of certain orphan drugs [or] 
requiring employees to pay as much as half the cost of the pricey medicines”). 
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While many health care markets feature reasonably effective price 
competition for health insurers’ business, there are many others in which health 
insurance appears to facilitate price gouging by monopoly sellers.  Antitrust 
enforcement, although actively pursued since the 1970s, has been relatively 
unsuccessful in preventing hospital mergers and consolidations that increase 
already high levels of market concentration.25  Also, despite some success in 
preventing providers from nakedly combining for the purpose of bargaining 
collectively with payers, antitrust agencies have not been able to stop the 
formation of integrated single-specialty medical groups with substantial pricing 
freedom in their local markets.26  In fact, in many health-care markets and 
 
 25. “[S]ince 1981, the Commission and DOJ have challenged relatively few hospital mergers, in 
some instances seeking relief only for part of the transaction. . . .  From 1994 through 2000[,] . . . when 
there were approximately 900 hospital mergers, the Agencies and state antitrust enforcers lost all seven 
cases they litigated.”  FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A 
DOSE OF COMPETITION ch. 4, at 1 (July 2004).  See generally id. at 1–33; Cory S. Capps et al., Antitrust 
Policy and Hospital Mergers: Recommendations for a New Approach, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 677 (2002).  
On the price-increasing effects of mergers and consolidations, see David Dranove, THE ECONOMIC 
EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 122 (2000) (“I have asked many providers why they 
wanted to merge.  Although publicly they all invoked the synergies mantra, virtually everyone stated 
privately that the main reason for merging was to avoid competition and/or obtain market power.”); 
Jack Zwanziger & Cathleen Mooney, Has Price Competition Changed Hospital Revenues and Expenses 
in New York?, 42 INQUIRY 183 (2005) (finding that mergers undermined price- and cost-reducing 
effects of hospital competition following deregulation); Cory Capps & David Dranove, Hospital 
Consolidation and Negotiated PPO Prices, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 175; Martin Gaynor & 
William B. Vogt, Competition Among Hospitals, 34 RAND J. ECON. 764, 764 (2003) (“During the 
second half of the 1990s, a dramatic wave of hospital consolidation occurred in the United States. . . .  
[M]any local markets, including quite a few large cities such as Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, 
have come to be dominated by two or three large hospital systems.  Not surprisingly, many health plans 
have complained about rising prices as a result of this consolidation.”).  On the courts’ special tolerance 
for anticompetitive mergers of nonprofit hospitals, see infra note 41. 
 26. On enforcement policy toward the formation of large medical groups and physician networks, 
see Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statements of Enforcement Policy in Health Care 61–
105 (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.pdf.  See also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, ch. 2, at 34–41.  The agencies’ enforcement policy guidelines take the 
view that physician joint ventures must involve a substantial degree of “integration”—either financial 
risk-sharing or close cooperation in clinical matters—before the agencies will deem them anything 
other than naked price-fixing if they facilitate collective bargaining with payers over prices.  See, e.g., 
letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John J. Miles (Feb. 19, 
2002) (MedSouth advisory opinion), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/adops/medsouth.htm (giving 
tentative approval, subject to re-examination in light of actual experience, to a potentially large 
physician joint venture in Denver that promised some clinical efficiencies in coordinating care provided 
by independent medical practices).  In the MedSouth matter, the FTC staff neglected to consider that 
the venture, if truly procompetitive, should not need price-fixing to succeed because the promised 
efficiencies and improvements, if realized, should make participating physicians especially attractive to 
payers and thus, presumably, able to command higher compensation in individual, rather than 
collective, negotiations; also, the FTC has reported no follow-up examination of the MedSouth joint 
venture to verify that its consequences were not anticompetitive.  More generally, one commentator 
has observed that 
the federal enforcement agencies have been slow to challenge physician or other provider 
networks . . . .  Generally, they have targeted only near-monopolies and outright cartels.  
Further, the agencies’ advisory opinions in many cases have generously extended the safe-
harbor limits contained in their own policy statements.  Consequently, many private attorneys 
advise clients that it is a relatively low risk proposition to form networks that encompass large 
segments of a market.  In sum, agencies’ failure to back up their advisory opinions with 
enforcement actions may have undermined the prophylactic potential of their advisories. 
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submarkets (or niches) significant monopoly or market power exists and is 
uncontestable under the antitrust laws because it arises solely from market 
circumstances, technological causes, or regulation.  For example, natural-
monopoly conditions, entry barriers, network effects, exclusionary licensure or 
certificate-of-need requirements, significant product differentiation, tacit 
coordination among oligopolists, valid patents, trade secrets, or first-mover 
advantages all can bestow de facto market power.27  In addition, providers and 
suppliers may have undue pricing freedom simply because insurers lack strong 
incentives to drive hard price bargains with providers even when there are 
opportunities to do so.  For example, if purchasers of health insurance are 
themselves less than fully cost-conscious (as we later argue is the case28) and 
therefore tend to overvalue such things as unrestricted access to providers or 
small increments of arguable quality, provider prices will be supracompetitive. 
Where lawful or uncontested power over price exists, private health 
insurance—at least the kind currently found in the United States—not only 
provides inadequate countervailing bargaining power but positively facilitates 
the translation of market power into a major redistribution of income from 
consumers to providers or suppliers.  Indeed, the recent renewal of health care 
cost escalation after several years of relative stability appears directly 
attributable in part both to increasing supply-side market power as a result of 
hospital consolidations and the growth of provider organizations and to reduced 
purchasing discretion of health insurers following the backlash against managed 
health care in the 1990s.29  It is also no accident that prescription drugs and 
 
Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, 
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 185, 190.  Even when enforcement occurs, the sanctions are generally 
prospective cease-and-desist orders, the threat of which creates little deterrent to future violations by 
other physician groups. 
 27. Monopoly and market power, defined as the ability to charge prices higher than marginal cost, 
are always matters of degree, of course.  Thus, many pharmaceutical products, including those with 
patent protection, have reasonably close substitutes, limiting their sellers’ pricing freedom.  Yet price 
competition in markets for prescription drugs is often less than robust even after generic substitutes 
enter the market.  See Atanu Saha et al., Generic Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry 
(May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.analysisgroup.com/AnalysisGroup/ 
uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Generic%20Competition%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Pharmaceutical
%20Industry.pdf (finding that “each additional [generic] entrant on average is associated with a 0.2% 
decline in brand price.  Nevertheless, unless the number of generic competitors is large, brand prices 
continue to rise in absolute terms.”); see also Alex Berenson, A Cancer Drug’s Big Price Rise Disturbs 
Doctors and Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at A1 (reporting large price increases of unpatented, 
single-source drugs for small market segments and pressure on insurers to cover such drugs).  For 
present purposes, it suffices to understand that the pricing freedom of firms with market power is 
frequently greatly enhanced by health insurance even though in some circumstances insurers 
strengthen price competition. 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 90–92. 
 29. See supra notes 25 & 26; see also MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 57 (2005) (noting 
that insurers’ use of selective contracting “has been limited by both hospital consolidation and 
consumers’ reluctance to accept limitations on their choice of providers”); Hall, supra note 24 
(describing how the backlash against managed care weakened health plans’ discretion in dealing with 
powerful providers).  As a practical matter, hospitals’ monopoly power does not appear to be exercised 
so much by raising the price of individual services for which there is no close substitute (geographically 
or otherwise) as by resisting insurer demands for steeper discounts from arbitrarily set list prices for its 
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medical devices (both areas in which patents and trade names can confer 
valuable market power) have been important contributors to recent cost 
increases.30  Because premium payers appear to bear a particularly heavy 
burden due to supracompetitive prices in health care markets, there is reason to 
examine the fairness of the resulting redistribution of income. 
Its exceptional redistributive effects aside, the combination of monopoly 
and U.S.-style health insurance also contributes in a different way to allocative 
inefficiency.  Although health insurance diminishes the usual tendency of 
monopoly to discourage consumption, the prospect of extraordinary profits that 
health-sector monopolists can hope to earn by virtue of health insurers’ inability 
to negotiate prices can be expected to influence firms to pursue such profits 
aggressively, often in ways that are not socially productive.  Richard Posner has 
hypothesized that, even in the general economy, monopoly’s most important 
misallocative effects flow not from discouraging marginal consumption but from 
inducing firms to make excessive investments in seeking to gain, hold onto, or 
increase market power.31  Indeed, Posner observes that there is no certainty that 
a successful monopolist will not dissipate most of its monopoly profits, earned 
at consumers’ expense, in such endeavors.  To be sure, some efforts to gain and 
retain market power, especially by technological and other innovation, are 
socially beneficial.  But the prospect of monopoly profits also induces conduct 
that is purely rent-seeking, such as lobbying for and exploitation of protectionist 
regulation, spurious product differentiation, uninformative advertising and 
other promotional activities, erecting entry barriers, and other monopolistic 
conduct.  Precisely because U.S.-style health insurance makes health-sector 
monopolies more profitable than monopolies of other kinds, Posner’s 
recognition of the social waste potentially generated by the prospect of 
 
full range of services; thus, for example, a hospital may be able to charge an insurer $5 for an aspirin 
tablet because it has a powerful position in the market for open-heart surgery.  For insights on how 
hospitals usually negotiate their prices, not service-by-service but by agreeing to across-the-board 
discounts for a bundle of services, see Christopher P. Tompkins, Stuart H. Altman & Efrat Eilat, The 
Precarious Pricing System for Hospital Services, 25 HEALTH AFF. 45 (2006).  Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to quantify hospitals’ market power except by noting that hospitals’ revenues from private 
sources tend to exceed allocations of fully distributed costs (not necessarily the true costs of treating 
patients insured by such private sources) by substantially greater margins than their revenues from 
public sources.  See id. at 47.  Although hard data on hospitals’ monopoly profits are lacking, we see no 
reason to doubt our conceptual hypothesis that, although insurers keep prices well down for many 
things, they still enable true monopolists to charge exorbitant prices that premium payers ultimately 
pay. 
 30. See Bradley C. Strunk, Paul B. Ginsburg & John P. Cookson, Tracking Health Care Costs: 
Declining Growth Trend Pauses in 2004, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-286 (finding a 
7.2% increase in prescription drugs spending from 2003 to 2004, accounting for 21% of the overall 
increase in health care costs in 2004); see also Katharine Levit et al., Health Spending Rebound 
Continues in 2002, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 147 (noting that spending on prescription drugs 
increased to 11% of total health care expenditures in 2002 from 7% in 1997 and that drugs accounted 
for 16% of the total increase in health expenditures in 2002); Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20.  A study 
by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that drugs and medical devices together accounted for 22% of 
premium increases from 2001 to 2002.  PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The Factors Fueling Rising 
Healthcare Costs, at tbl.1 (April 2002). 
 31. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 13–18 (2d ed. 2001). 
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monopoly profits is especially significant for health policy.  There are, 
unfortunately, few guarantees that the extraordinary profits earned by health-
sector monopolists will induce only investments beneficial to the economy as a 
whole, let alone to the premium payers who bear the ultimate cost.32 
2. Cross-subsidies: One Consequence of Providers’ Insurance-Enhanced 
Market Power 
Even though U.S.-style health insurance exacerbates the income-
redistributive effects of monopoly, not all of the extraordinary monopoly profits 
earned by health care monopolists end up, as such, in private pockets.  Many 
health care institutions, especially nonprofit hospitals, plow excess earnings 
back into the health care enterprise, using them to cross-subsidize activities that 
the market would not otherwise support.33  Therefore, much of the high cost of 
health care in the United States appears not in monopoly profits accruing to 
providers and suppliers, but as the cost of activities in which certain industry 
members are financially able to engage only because of the way health 
insurance and monopoly interact. 
Among the costs that are frequently covered out of surpluses earned on 
providers’—especially hospitals’—other business are those that result when 
prices paid by government for services rendered under Medicare or a state 
Medicaid program add up to less than the costs the provider incurs in caring for 
that program’s beneficiaries.34  In addition, legal and regulatory requirements 
 
 32. See infra notes 45 & 59. 
 33. Besides hospitals, private payers and providers of other kinds sometimes cross-subsidize 
services for which individuals pay either nothing at all or less than the cost of the services or coverage 
they receive.  See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (describing, and upholding against a claim of federal preemption, a complex 
New York statutory scheme, since repealed, designed to preserve the ability of Blue Cross, as well as 
some private hospitals, to finance care for individuals who would otherwise be uninsured or 
uninsurable); see also IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying 
federal tax exemption to health maintenance organization in part because it failed, unlike some other 
HMOs, to cross-subsidize indigent care, education, or research); see also In re Health Care Admin. Bd., 
415 A.2d 1147 (N.J. 1980) (upholding a regulation requiring nursing homes to reserve a reasonable 
number of their beds for indigent persons as a condition of licensure). 
 34. To be sure, a responsible government monopsonist would pay suppliers and providers enough 
to ensure continuing supplies of needed goods and services of appropriate quality—which would be in 
jeopardy if potential new entrants could not expect investment returns at least comparable to what they 
could earn elsewhere.  Nevertheless, it appears that government does in fact sometimes fail to 
compensate providers, particularly hospitals, generously enough for them to break even in caring for 
their government-financed patients.  See Stuart H. Altman, David Schactman & Efrat Eilat, Could U.S. 
Hospitals Go the Way of U.S. Airlines?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 11, 14 (2006) (“[I]n 2003[,] Medicaid 
reimbursed hospitals at 92 percent of costs, and Medicare, at 95 percent.”).  Medicaid appears to be the 
worst offender in this regard, since state Medicaid budgets are generally tight and legislatures often find 
it easier to resist provider lobbies and welfare advocates than to raise taxes.  See generally Jason S. Lee 
et al., Medicare Payment Policy: Does Cost Shifting Matter?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) 
W3-480, W3-485 (quoting view of long-time observer that “the big cost shifter is Medicaid” and 
presenting graphic evidence of significant cost shifting by both Medicare and Medicaid from 1987-
1992).  Since 1992, hospitals have, on average, had positive margins on their Medicare inpatients but 
have lost money on outpatients.  MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 78–79, fig.3A-7 and tbl.3A-
2 (2004) (showing that inpatient margins followed a bell-shaped trajectory from 1% in 1993, to a peak 
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frequently force providers to incur costs (for example, in their emergency 
departments) for which government makes no restitution and that cannot be 
charged directly to some private payer.35  Moreover, most major medical centers 
voluntarily engage in extensive research and educational activities only partly 
paid for by grants, contracts, tuition payments, or government subsidies for 
professional education.36  Finally, hospitals render a great deal of 
uncompensated health care, estimated at $30–$35 billion in 2003, to the millions 
who have no or incomplete health coverage.37  Although much of the cost of 
maintaining this safety net for those who cannot pay is paid ultimately by 
taxpayers at different levels,38 hospitals themselves are stuck with a significant 
 
of approximately 16% in 1997, to 4.7% in 2002, while outpatient margins from 2000 to 2002 were 
consistently below zero, fluctuating between -12% and -6%). 
 35. The prime example of such an “unfunded mandate” is the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2003) [hereinafter EMTALA], which requires that any hospital 
that both maintains an emergency department and takes Medicare money must screen every patient 
(not just Medicare patients) coming to the emergency room and must stabilize any emergency medical 
condition found, all without regard to the patient’s ability to pay.  Although a hospital is free to close its 
emergency room and escape this costly obligation (and a significant number have done so), most 
hospitals believe that their mission requires them to maintain money-losing services of this and other 
kinds.  See infra note 40.  Other examples of care that is mandated but not paid for by government 
include laws prohibiting “discrimination” against the disabled and handicapped.  See, e.g., In re Baby 
“K”, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d on other grounds, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding 
several statutory duties of hospital to treat hopeless case); see also E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism, 
Exoticare, and Coerced Altruism: The ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 883 (1995).  
Another example is the “free-care” obligation imposed at one time on hospitals pursuant to the Hill-
Burton Act.  See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983).  See also Methodist Med. 
Ctr. v. Ingram, 413 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1980) (holding the state’s police power “sufficient to justify, in 
proper circumstances, uncompensated deprivation of . . . property”). 
 36. For an estimate that health-profession education costs hospitals $20–25 billion annually, see 
Bruce C. Vladeck, Paying for Hospitals’ Community Service, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34, 38 (2006). Medicare 
allowances to hospitals frequently contain upward adjustments for “indirect medical education” and 
“direct medical education” (totaling $3.7 billion and $2.2 billion, respectively, in 1999).  Lee et al., supra 
note 34 at 485.  See also SEAN NICHOLSON, MEDICARE HOSPITAL SUBSIDIES: MONEY IN SEARCH OF 
A PURPOSE 7–24, 55 tbl.3 (2002).  In considering the issue of distributive justice in U.S. health care, it is 
appropriate to question the practice of forcing taxpayers or premium payers, or both, to subsidize the 
training of individuals for lucrative careers as physicians or other health professionals. 
 37. Vladeck, supra note 36, at 37, exh. 1.  Although hospitals are not generally compelled to create 
money-losing services, a hospital that chooses to maintain an unprofitable service, such as a burn, 
shock-trauma, or neonatal intensive care unit, or to become a regional referral center, is legally 
obligated to serve all comers without regard to ability to pay.  EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g) (2000). 
 38. State and local governments directly support public and community hospitals and community 
health centers both by direct subventions and by exempting them from various taxes.  The Medicare 
and Medicaid programs also provide extra payments to hospitals with a “disproportionate share” of 
nonpaying patients.  See The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector: Hearing before the Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (Statement of Mark McClellan, Administrator, Centers of Medicare and 
Medicaid Services), available at http://www.cms.gov/media/press/testimony.asp?Counter=1476  
(“Preliminary data show that during 2004, Medicare DSH payments amounted to about $8.5 billion, 
while Federal and State Medicaid DSH payments totaled nearly $17.2 billion.”); see also NICHOLSON, 
supra note 36, at 25–35.  Medicare is also especially generous to certain kinds of rural hospitals, and 
allowances paid to teaching hospitals in recognition of their educational functions, see supra note 36, 
are also viewed as supporting the safety net, as well as the training of health professionals.  It is relevant 
for present purposes that Medicare payments to hospitals are financed almost entirely by a flat tax on 
wages and salaries, not from general revenues.  See infra text accompanying notes 47 & 48. 
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portion of the bill in the form of bad debts and uncompensated care.39  This 
burden comes on top of hospitals’ burdens from Medicare and Medicaid 
underpayments, unfunded governmental mandates, and activities they elect to 
cross-subsidize, all of which add up to a very large cost burden40 with the 
misallocative and distributional consequences noted immediately below. 
Most observers of the health care industry find it entirely appropriate that 
most of the monopoly profits earned in providing health services are used to 
defray other health-related costs.41  But in the absence of either market 
discipline or effective political oversight, there is no assurance that easily gained 
revenues will not be squandered in low-priority activities, in overpaying for 
 
 39. For an estimate that that for 2001 the net cost to hospitals for uncompensated care was $1.5–3 
billion, see Jack Hadley & John Holohan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who 
Pays for It?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-66, W3-76.  This relatively low estimate of 
hospital uncompensated-care costs, derived by upwardly adjusting reports from uninsured patients 
themselves, was seemingly provided to suggest that the new public cost of covering the uninsured 
would be small.  The hospital industry understandably reports a much higher burden from bad debt and 
uncompensated care.  See First Hearing in a Series on Tax Exemption: Pricing Practices of Hospitals, 
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(statement of David Bernd, Chairman of the Board of the American Hospital Association) (reporting 
that hospitals incurred $22 billion in uncompensated care costs in 2002).  See also Altman et al., supra 
note 34, at 14 (“[G]eneral hospitals provide a sizable amount of uncompensated care—an average of 
5.5 percent of total general hospital costs, or about $25 billion, in 2003.”).  The rapid increase in the 
number of the uninsured is putting increased pressure on hospital budgets. 
 40. See Vladeck, supra note 36, at 37 (estimating hospitals’ total community service costs at $80-95 
billion in 2003).  This is not to say there is an actual “cost-shift,” at least in the strict sense that, say, a 
cutback in government payments or an increase in the hospital’s uncompensated-care burden translates 
directly into a compensating increase in prices charged to private payers.  Indeed, economists are quick 
to point out that a firm possessing market power in any market would normally exercise that power to 
the fullest, whatever its other costs or obligations in other markets might be.  See Michael A. Morrisey, 
Cost Shifting: New Myths, Old Confusion, and Enduring Reality, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCLUSIVES) W3-489.  In the real world, however, there are influences that appear to keep some 
hospitals, particularly nonprofit ones, from maximizing profits.  See generally Allen Dobson, Joan 
DaVanzo & Namrata Sen, The Cost-Shift Payment “Hydraulic”: Foundation, History, and Implications, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 22 (2006); Paul B. Ginsburg, Can Hospitals and Physicians Shift the Effects of Cuts in 
Medicare Reimbursement to Private Payers?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-472 
(suggesting that some hospital boards might deem their mission to include some obligation to charge 
fair prices).  On the other hand, managers of nonprofits have a strong interest in expanding the firm’s 
size and maximizing its output as a way of enhancing their own authority, prestige, job satisfaction, and 
perquisites.  The principal way they can do this is by earning excess profits whenever possible and 
either reinvesting them in bricks and mortar or using them to cross-subsidize activities that the market 
will not support.  Price discrimination (that is, charging different prices to different buyers based on 
differences in ability or willingness to pay) is therefore common in nonprofit firms, even to the extent 
of charging below-cost (even zero) prices for some activities—a practice that would normally be 
irrational for a for-profit monopolist.  Strictly speaking, such price discrimination is not cost shifting, 
because the hospital is rationally pursuing its own objectives, rather than being forced into involuntary 
spending.  See Morrisey, supra.  However, the burden on premium payers is the same. 
 41. The belief that nonprofit monopolies are largely benign appears to account for the antitrust 
agencies’ lack of success in challenging mergers bestowing market power on nonprofit hospitals.  See 
Barak D. Richman, The Corrosive Combination of Nonprofit Monopolies and U.S.-Style Health 
Insurance: Implications for Antitrust and Merger Policy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 142–43 
(Autumn 2006) (observing the significance for antitrust policy of this article’s emphasis on the 
extraordinary pricing freedom enjoyed by monopolists, nonprofit as well as for-profit, selling services 
covered by U.S.-style health insurance). 
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inputs, or simply through managerial slack.42  Indeed, tax-exempt monopolists in 
health care markets are committed by their corporate charters and the tax code 
to pursuing only “charitable” purposes,43 with the result that any surpluses they 
generate are essentially trapped in the health sector and unavailable for use 
elsewhere in the economy—even if they would yield greater welfare gains in 
alternative uses.  Thus, hospital and other nonprofit monopolies suck large 
amounts of cash out of the economy either to support ongoing health-related 
activities or to create new health facilities or new health-sector monopolies.  
Over time, this one-way flow of capital into the health sector has built 
enormous enterprises that can legally use their untaxed income and assets only 
for health-related activities, whatever the economy’s or the public sector’s or 
premium-paying individuals’ other needs.  Too little attention has been given, 
we submit, to the involuntary flow of substantial funds from premium payers 
into the coffers of powerful private institutions that are largely unsupervised 
and unconstrained with respect to their use of those resources.44  It is ironic that, 
while health insurance eliminates monopoly’s usual threat to allocative 
efficiency—the danger that monopolized goods or services will be 
 
 42. See also infra note 45.  It is well established that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-
profits to offer unprofitable services.  See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Corporate Ownership Matter? Service 
Provision in the Hospital Industry 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11376, 2005) 
(also observing that nonprofits are more likely than government hospitals to offer highly profitable 
services).  But, even though many believe that this fact alone establishes that nonprofits are in all 
respects socially beneficial, there remains the possibility that nonprofits frequently exercise market 
power and invest the resulting profits in activities to which the public would ascribe relatively little 
value. 
 43. Nonprofit corporations can be exempt from various federal, state, and local taxes if (1) their 
earnings accrue only to the firm and not to any private interest (which might reinvest them outside the 
health sector) and (2) their resources, surpluses, and other assets are used exclusively for charitable 
purposes, variously defined.  Nonprofit hospitals, which generate supracompetitive returns in many 
lines of business even when the whole institution seems to struggle, have been treated with special favor 
under federal law, which accepts “the promotion of health” in a community as a purpose charitable 
enough for tax exemption without regard to the amount of indigent care provided.  Rev. Rul. 69-545, 
1969-2 C.B. 117. 
 44. Such attention as these firms receive nearly always focuses only on similarities and differences 
in the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit firms and on the appropriateness of tax exemptions for the 
former.  See, e.g., Mark Schlesinger & Bradford Gray, How Nonprofits Matter in American Medicine, 
and What to Do About It, 2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W6-287 (reviewing empirical 
literature comparing the behavior of nonprofits and for-profits in the health sector); David A. Hyman 
& William M. Sage, Subsidizing Health Care Providers Through the Tax Code: Status or Conduct?, 2006 
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W6-312 (suggesting that nonprofits’ tax subsidies be tied to 
quantifiable measures of performance).  This article emphasizes significantly larger issues, particularly 
the unfairness of systematically financing costly public services by undue impositions on premium 
payers rather than out of public funds.  See Clark C. Havighurst, The Debate over Health Care Cost-
Containment Regulation: The Issues and the Interests, in INCENTIVES VS. CONTROLS IN HEALTH 
POLICY: BROADENING THE DEBATE 9 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1985) (opining that, at least in the mid-
1980s, “cross-subsidies in the health care industry . . . may constitute the most entrenched, most 
extravagant, and least closely-supervised government-tolerated use of private monopoly to generate 
revenues for public purposes anywhere in the U.S. economy”).  Many hospitals enjoy much of their 
market power solely because of regulatory protection (under so-called certificate-of-need laws) against 
competition that would undermine their ability to generate revenues needed for seemingly worthy 
purposes.  Regulation that confers monopoly power on private interests as a quid pro quo for providing 
publicly approved services has been characterized as “taxation by regulation.”  Richard A. Posner, 
Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971). 
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underproduced—it conduces, in combination with other incentives and 
circumstances in the American system, to allocative inefficiency of precisely the 
opposite kind: too much of a good thing.45 
Even if hospitals and other entities in the health care sector cross-subsidized 
only activities of indisputable value to the general public, it would be no less 
objectionable to see those activities financed by means of extraordinary 
monopoly overcharges to private payers.  The buck obviously does not stop 
with the payer.  Instead, the heavy costs of activities unrelated to the care of the 
payer’s own patients are inevitably passed on to working Americans more or 
less in proportion to the health insurance premiums that employers largely pay 
on their behalf.  The result is a well-entrenched method of financing important 
health-related activities, many of uncertain value, through what amounts to a 
hidden “head tax.”  True to the nature of such a tax, the burden is distributed 
more or less equally across all premium payers rather than in proportion to 
their wealth or income.46  In view of the magnitude of the burden thus imposed 
on lower- and middle-income premium payers, the regressivity resulting from 
the corrosive combination of nonprofit monopolies and U.S.-style health 
insurance should be a matter of specific public concern. 
A telling final point is that, to the substantial extent that hospitals are 
compensated by the Medicare program for their various unremunerative 
undertakings (and thus do not have to finance them out of monopoly profits 
earned at premium payers’ expense),47 the burden still falls unfairly—though 
less unfairly than a head tax—on working Americans.  Such Medicare 
subventions to hospitals are financed almost entirely by a 2.9 percent payroll tax 
on all current workers, including those without health coverage of their own.  
Because this tax applies to all earned, and no unearned, income, it is regressive 
in a way that even a true flat tax is not.48 
 
 45. But see infra note 212.  To be sure, monopoly’s extraordinary profitability in the health sector 
can also induce allocative inefficiency in the form of less-good things, including wasteful spending in 
pursuit and defense of market dominance.  See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 32.  Examples of 
such rent-seeking behavior in the hospital industry include advertising, see Robert J. Town & Imran 
Currim, Hospital Advertising in California, 1991-1997, 39 INQUIRY 298 (2002); advocacy and 
exploitation of protectionist certificate-of-need regulation, see infra notes 156 & 157 and accompanying 
text; anticompetitive mergers; and restrictive agreements with actual or potential competitors. 
 46. Although cross-subsidization is sometimes analogized to a system of taxation, its unfair 
regressivity as a kind of head tax is generally not observed.  E.g., Dobson et al., supra note 40, at 30–31 
(likening the cost shift to a premium tax without observing its regressivity); Holahan & Zedlewski, 
supra note 6, at 236 (treating uncompensated care “as a kind of premium surtax for families with 
private insurance that is transferred to those who receive uncompensated care”). 
 47. Such subsidies represent roughly twelve percent of total Medicare payments for hospital 
inpatient care.  NICHOLSON, supra note 36. 
 48. See supra note 1.  An additional inequity results to the extent that higher-income employees 
contribute higher percentages of their earnings to tax-favored retirement plans, thereby escaping 
payroll taxes that, unlike deferred income taxes, are not recaptured when plan accumulations are 
distributed. 
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Recently, attention has been directed to hospitals’ attempts to recoup 
otherwise unrecovered costs by overcharging—of all people—the uninsured.49  
Contrary to a widespread impression, many uninsured are not impecunious, and 
hospitals have not been shy—at least until the practice was recently 
spotlighted—about charging their full list prices to patients for whom no insurer 
has negotiated a discount from those prices.50  Because list prices are set 
arbitrarily (mostly to establish a favorable baseline for negotiating with 
insurers), hospital bills rendered to patients without insurance can be literally 
outrageous.  Nevertheless, it does not seem likely that very much of hospitals’ 
community service burden is borne by the relatively small number of uninsured 
individuals unlucky enough to be hit with both a catastrophic health need and a 
staggering bill for treating it.  As demonstrated by the large number of personal 
bankruptcies caused by health-care-related liabilities,51 many such charges go 
unpaid.  In any event, because those who actually pay the big bills are 
demonstrably wealthier than those who do not, hospitals’ discriminatory pricing 
practices do not have regressive distributional implications of the kind focused 
upon in this article.52  It is nonetheless striking to see firms claiming to operate 
for charitable purposes using their market power and extreme price 
discrimination to punish those who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, have no 
insurance coverage.53 
3. Innovation Incentives: Technological Progress at Whose Expense? 
In the special case of monopolies (including patent monopolies) resulting 
from valuable innovation, it is arguable that the greater profits that health 
insurance enables monopolists to earn are justifiable as rewards for past 
innovations and inducements for future ones.  Indeed, Darius Lakdawalla and 
Neeraj Sood have cogently observed that whereas incentives for innovation are 
systematically suboptimal in most markets (because even patent-protected 
innovators cannot hope to capture the full potential value of their inventions to 
consumers54), health insurance can, in theory at least, create near-optimal 
 
 49. See Tompkins et al., supra note 29; Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: 
Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2006). 
 50. For a review of legal and other issues raised by such discriminatory pricing by hospitals, see 
Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay for: Legal Responses to Consumer-
Driven Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 161–65 (Autumn 2006). 
 51. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over 
Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001); David U. 
Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury As Contributors to Bankruptcy, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCLUSIVES) W5-63. But see David Dranove & Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth 
versus Fact, 2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W74 (finding earlier estimates of frequency of 
bankruptcies caused by health costs to be exaggerated). 
 52. See also Hall, supra note 50, at 163 (reporting that hospitals are rapidly reducing their efforts to 
“tax” at least the lower-income uninsured). 
 53. On class-action litigation challenging such discriminatory pricing and other alleged neglect of 
nonprofit hospitals’ charitable mission, see id. at 162–63. 
 54. In economic theory, the usual monopolist’s potential rewards are limited to the “consumer 
surplus” (measured by the maximum prices that individual consumers would pay, as reflected in the 
demand curve) that consumers would enjoy if they could purchase the service or product at a 
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incentives for developing valuable medical technologies.55  According to their 
argument, a health insurer can set its co-payment requirement so that anyone 
able to pay the marginal cost of a new product or service can purchase it, thus 
avoiding the deadweight loss usually associated with monopoly pricing.  At the 
same time (the theory goes), the insurer, by paying the remainder of the 
monopolist’s price, can reward the monopolist with the full value of the 
innovation to the insured group.  The result, if one could assume universal 
health insurance with such characteristics, would be near-optimal incentives for 
innovation.56 
A possible implication from the work of Lakdawalla and Sood is that, 
because health insurance is substantially less than universal (and incentives for 
innovation therefore substantially suboptimal), the extraordinary rewards that 
innovators can hope to gain from insured consumers in the U.S. market should 
be valued as socially beneficial inducements to potential innovators.57  
Nevertheless, the practical difficulties that U.S. health plans would face in 
attempting to curb their members’ demand for a monopolized product or 
service (in order to bargain more effectively with the monopolist) leave us still 
 
competitive price.  In reality, given the difficulty of price discrimination (that is, charging different 
prices to different buyers, depending on where they appear on the demand curve), ordinary 
monopolists cannot hope to capture all consumer surplus, let alone the value of any positive 
externalities the product may yield.  Incentives to pursue valuable innovations are therefore suboptimal 
in the absence of insurance.  The innovation literature leaves no doubt that suboptimal investments are 
made in basic scientific research, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific 
Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1959), although there is some disagreement over whether investments 
in applied research and development of specific goods and services are also suboptimal.  See generally 
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992). 
 55. Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Insurance and Innovation in Health Care Markets (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11602, 2005). 
 56. For a theoretical demonstration, using different assumptions about pricing than those used by 
Lackdawalla and Sood, that universal health insurance, even with optimal copayments, may yield 
excessive incentives for innovation, see Alan M. Garber, Charles I. Jones & Paul M. Romer, Insurance 
and Incentives for Medical Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 12080, 2006). 
 57. A series of studies by such researchers as David Cutler and Frank Lichtenberg show large 
social gains from investing in new medical and pharmaceutical technology.  See infra note 68.  Such 
studies appear to justify all spending on technology development because the consumer surplus 
generated by life-saving and health-improving technologies is so large, easily exceeding the social costs 
incurred.  Indeed, the authors’ seeming lack of concern about marginal trade-offs in the adoption of 
new technologies, see infra note 68, appears to be attributable to their sense that, in general, innovation 
incentives are seriously suboptimal.  Certainly, the case for valuing R&D very highly is strong, 
particularly if one takes an international perspective.  See, e.g., Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Impact of 
New Drug Launches on Longevity: Evidence from Longitudinal Disease-Level Data from 52 Countries: 
1982-2001 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9754, 2003) (attributing forty percent 
of world-wide decline in mortality in the period studied to the introduction of innovative drugs).  
(Many health problems in third-world nations would yield to new technologies, yet those nations are 
too poor to offer innovators much incentive to produce them, and strict price controls on many health-
related technologies in other developed nations would seem to unduly diminish incentives for R&D, 
making the U.S. market the principal source of such incentives.)  The potentially large social benefits of 
health-related R&D notwithstanding, however, it is far from clear to us that those benefits should be 
given full weight in assessing U.S. health policy and used to justify imposing their heavy costs on lower- 
and middle-income premium payers in U.S. health plans.  See infra note 154 (discussing and 
questioning so-called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which permits gains to winners to justify imposing costs 
on others without regard to distributional consequences). 
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concerned about unjustified wealth transfers.  The imperfections in U.S.-style 
health insurance put patentees and other innovating monopolists in a position 
to capture, systematically, more from insured consumers than their innovations 
may be worth to those consumers,58 with the result that too much of the cost of 
inducing socially beneficial innovation is borne—once again as a kind of “head 
tax”—by lower- and middle-income payers of health insurance premiums.59  Just 
as the burden of hospitals’ cross-subsidies of activities that are arguably socially 
beneficial should not fall equally across the premium-paying population, it is 
unfair to finance or induce technological progress by “taxing” insured 
Americans in proportion not to their wealth or income, but to the insurance 
premiums they pay. 
We have offered here the perception that, as a class, lower-income payers of 
health insurance premiums are probably net losers, not net gainers, from 
whatever valuable technological innovations they indirectly finance.  Our 
concern is warranted not only by the argument that U.S.-style health insurers 
generally cannot resist paying true monopolists virtually any price they ask, but 
also by our later argument that lower- and middle-income premium payers are 
unable, under current legal, regulatory, and market conditions, to opt for low-
cost coverage that limits their potential access to new or other high-cost 
technologies.60  However, even if evidence can be found to refute our contention 
 
 58. See Garber et al., supra note 56, at 14 (illustrating how, even with well-designed insurance, 
“profits earned by [a] pharmaceutical company can exceed the consumer surplus associated with the 
drug treatment”). 
 59. As in the analogous case of hospital cross-subsidies, we are reluctant to accept the argument 
that large social benefits justify maintaining innovation incentives, without regard to who bears the cost 
burden, in large part because of Richard Posner’s observation that the prospect of large monopoly 
profits can induce wasteful as well as productive behavior.  See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 32.  
For example, there is a significant literature on the wasteful expenditures that the patent system can 
induce—even without the prospect of extraordinary monopoly profits of the kind that U.S.-style health 
insurance makes possible.  See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent 
Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308 (1992) (“The defect of the system is that if multiple inventors 
expend resources in competition for the patent monopoly, the benefit to society of having the invention 
will be dissipated by the cost of numerous, redundant, development efforts.”).  See also Yoram Barzel, 
Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. STATISTICS 348, 349 (1968) (“[C]ompetition among 
potential innovators may deprive innovations of all their special economic value.”).  In addition to the 
wastefulness of so-called “patent races,” the social value of innovations may be further dissipated in 
promoting, attacking, defending, and inventing around valuable patents.  In the health care sector, for 
example, one sees extensive efforts to create and heavily promote relatively modest product 
improvements and to differentiate brand-name products from nearly equivalent generics by heavy 
investment in direct-to-consumer advertising.  In particular, there is evidence that the decreased price 
elasticity of demand for brand-name drugs following the expansion of insurance coverage for 
prescription drugs in the 1990s increased manufacturers’ expected returns from promotional efforts, 
many of which are socially unproductive.  Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20. 
 60. See infra Part IV.C.  The importance of the practical inability of consumers to purchase health 
insurance providing only selective coverage of costly technology has recently been recognized by 
economist Mark Pauly.  Pauly, supra note 24.  See also Donald W. Moran, Whence and Whither Health 
Insurance? A Revisionist History, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1415, 1423 (2005) (predicting that, with the advent 
of so-called consumer-directed health care, see infra text accompanying notes 93–98, consumer cost-
consciousness and competitive pressure on health plans to control big-ticket items “will push back 
strongly against manufacturers’ pricing flexibility.  Increasingly, the question of whether a high-cost 
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that health insurers are unable as a practical matter to limit their payments to 
monopolists to the true consumer surplus that their insureds enjoy from unique 
innovations, it would not invalidate our larger claim that U.S-style health 
insurance generally enables health-sector firms with dominant market 
positions—most of which are not gained or retained principally by “superior 
skill, foresight, and industry”61—to exploit consumers unduly. 
4. Financing the Health Sector by Means of a Regressive “Head Tax” 
Foregoing discussion has characterized in two ways the extraordinary profits 
that health-sector firms with market power are able to earn because of 
dysfunctional aspects of U.S.-style health insurance.  First, such profits may be 
seen, as monopoly profits often are, simply as a redistribution of income from 
consumers to producers; although such redistributions are not troublesome as a 
matter of economic efficiency, the manner in which health insurance enhances 
the profitability of monopoly should be a matter of concern from the standpoint 
of equity.  Second, because health-sector profits may either subsidize or induce 
activities having some, perhaps substantial, social value, they may be viewed 
and evaluated as a kind of tax levied in support of these activities.  Both in the 
case of cross-subsidization by nonprofit firms and in the case of profits serving 
as incentives for socially desirable innovation, we have analogized the burden 
borne by premium payers to a “head tax,” which falls on individuals without 
appreciable correlation to wealth, income, or ability to pay.  In neither case 
does the manner in which the proceeds are used appear to rectify the apparent 
regressivity. 
Likening to a kind of tax the extra charges, in excess of their costs, that 
health care monopolists can impose on payers of private health insurance 
premiums is quite helpful for the purposes of this article.  In addition to inviting 
attention to the burden’s incidence and fairness (our particular concerns), the 
analogy provides a warrant for comparing monopoly overcharges with explicit 
taxes in terms of the political accountability of those imposing the burden and 
spending the resulting revenue.  Not only are health industry monopolists 
relatively free to set their own prices, but they are subject to very little political 
accountability in choosing how to use the surpluses they generate.62  Thus, many 
of the activities that nonprofit providers cross-subsidize from monopoly profits 
would not, we submit, be found worthy of public financing if they were subject 
to the usual public processes for levying explicit taxes, appropriating funds, and 
 
technology is covered at all by an insurance plan will become the most important determinant of 
product economics.”). 
 61. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (famous antitrust opinion by 
Learned Hand, J., acknowledging that even a powerful monopoly might be lawful if gained and 
maintained by “superior skill, foresight, and industry” and not by unlawful “monopolizing” behavior).  
See supra text accompanying notes 25–27 on the wide variety of factors, many of them fortuitous, that 
may explain why a seller is free to set unduly profitable prices in health care markets. 
 62.  See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
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authorizing their expenditure.63  Moreover, any projects that public lawmakers 
would be willing to support would almost certainly be financed in less regressive 
ways. 
Similarly, given clear choices in the marketplace, a substantial majority of 
consumers might rationally elect to pay substantially less for their health 
protection even if it meant somewhat reducing both their access to costly new 
products of health care R&D and the likelihood that more such products or 
services would eventually be produced.  To be sure, consumers economizing on 
their own health coverage may, as free riders, be counting on others to support 
R&D from which they hope eventually to benefit, leading to even greater 
underinvestment in R&D. But this is the nature of all so-called public goods.  
That public or philanthropic investment would otherwise be needed to achieve 
appropriate levels of spending on new technology is not a persuasive argument 
for forcing a subset of consumers to support R&D through an unfair tax, or 
against giving health care consumers a wider range of choice.  In fact, most 
consumers would probably choose coverage that, while being somewhat 
selective about covering technologies at any price, would provide ample 
incentives for valuable future R&D. 
Finally, having noted how the heavy burdens of health-sector cross-subsidies 
and R&D spending fall regressively on lower-income premium payers, we also 
observe how the benefits of these same expenditures accrue disproportionately 
not only to well-off suppliers and providers of medical goods and services but 
also, less directly and less obviously, to high-income consumers of health care.  
The latter are benefited, in the first instance, by having the needs of the 
uninsured, the production costs of a wide variety of quasi-public goods 
(including R&D), and other arguable public responsibilities met by means other 
than equitable taxes.  Moreover, high-income users of the health system also 
appear to benefit from having their own health insurance premiums, which they 
pay to obtain access to the costly new technologies they particularly covet, 
substantially reduced by the involuntary contributions of other, less privileged 
premium payers.64  To be sure, it is easy to assume that more and better health 
care services and products are equally good for everyone.  But the convenient 
assumption of industry and economic elites that the spending and other 
 
 63. Cf. Posner, supra note 44.  One justification often given for exempting certain private entities 
from public taxation is that they assume burdens that the public would otherwise have to bear in 
educating children or caring for the uninsured sick.  See, e.g., Utah County v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 278 (Utah 1985) (denying state tax exemption to hospitals in the absence of 
“the essential element of gift to the community, either through nonreciprocal provision of services or 
through the alleviation of a government burden”).  This “burden theory” is usually invoked, however, 
without any determination that, but for the private entity’s efforts, the public sector would in fact incur 
costs equivalent to the tax relief granted.  In other words, a judge or public official inclined to favor 
government generosity in general or public support for the particular activity in question (e.g., health 
care) might confer a tax exemption under the burden theory even if, had it come to a vote, the 
legislature would not have been so generous.  Reasonable minds differ over whether, in an ostensible 
democracy, such spending choices should be made exclusively by elected officials. 
 64. This apparent (though unproven) inequity is discussed at length in Part III. 
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priorities of ordinary Americans with respect to health care coincide with their 
own preferences has never been put to a fair test in either the marketplace or 
the political process. 
5. In Sum 
In the foregoing discussion we have made four important and somewhat 
original observations: First, U.S.-style private health insurance, by greatly 
weakening price elasticity of demand as a constraint on monopoly pricing by 
health care providers and suppliers, facilitates the latter’s exercise of market 
power, producing profits substantially exceeding the usual returns to lawful 
monopoly.65  Second, such monopoly profits fuel a great deal of otherwise 
unremunerative health-sector spending, mostly by tax-exempt nonprofit firms, 
that society has in no economically or politically reliable way validated as 
appropriate uses of its scarce resources.  Third, it is questionable whether 
inducing even highly valuable technological innovations in the diagnosis and 
treatment of disease justifies forcing lower- and middle-income premium payers 
to pay the extraordinarily high monopoly prices that insurance enables true 
monopolists to charge.  And, fourth, the burden of overpaying providers and 
suppliers is imposed more or less equally, as if by a head tax, on all Americans 
having private health coverage, thus regressively impacting all premium payers 
below the high end of the income spectrum. 
It has not escaped our notice that these observations about the 
consequences for the United States of combining monopoly and health 
insurance could be cited to support either a shift to a single-payer health system 
or extensive administrative regulation of prices, especially for hospital services 
 
 65. We have not found in economics literature anyone expressly hypothesizing, as we do, that U.S.-
style health insurance, by substantially increasing actual and anticipated returns to both nonprofit and 
for-profit monopolies in the health sector, not only adds to monopoly’s redistributive effects but also 
induces allocative inefficiencies both different from and more troublesome than those usually 
associated with monopoly.  But see Garber et al., supra note 56 (2006 working paper demonstrating that 
health insurance “creates incentives for a monopoly provider of a pharmaceutical to charge far more 
for its product than it otherwise would”).  Reasons why economists may be less concerned than we are 
about monopoly’s effects in the health care sector include their sense that deadweight loss is not a 
serious problem, see supra note 212, and their professional agnosticism about the welfare implications 
of redistributing income, supra note 18.  In addition, they may assume that unlawful monopoly is both 
rare and a matter for antitrust enforcement when it does occur and that lawful monopoly is either a 
natural phenomenon or a transient reward for entrepreneurial endeavor.  In any event, our concern is 
not about monopoly as such but about how it and health insurance interact.  Here the problem is that 
economists do not always appreciate the significance (see Part IV.C.) of de facto and de jure limits on 
insurers’ willingness and ability to optimally counteract moral hazard.  See, e.g., Gaynor, et al., supra 
note 17 (considering whether, in theory, imperfect competition in medical markets might, by raising 
prices, offset the misallocative tendencies of moral hazard, but answering the question only on the 
assumption that, contrary to our observation, the insurance industry “is competitive [and] chooses 
insurance policies . . . that maximize consumer welfare”).  But see Pauly, supra note 24.  The articles we 
have found that are at all close to our theme include Danzon and Pauly’s demonstration of how 
broader insurance coverage and new technologies reciprocally induce each other.  Danzon & Pauly, 
supra note 20 (observing that insurance increases inelasticity of demand and may thus “may affect . . . 
the launch price of new drugs”).  See also Garber et al., supra note 56 (demonstrating that health 
insurance facilitates pricing of pharmaceuticals in ways that, in theory, may create excessive incentives 
for innovation). 
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and prescription drugs.  But private health insurance does not inevitably 
produce the consequences described here and might be reconfigured to allow 
consumers to make real economizing choices, thereby restoring price elasticity 
as a constraint on monopolists’ pricing.  As discussion in Part IV of the article 
will show, the problems we have identified in U.S.-style health coverage have 
roots in public policies and private practices that could be easily adjusted to 
enable lower-income consumers to escape many burdens the current system 
imposes. 
B. Excessive Costs: Undercompensating for Moral Hazard 
The most commonly noted market distortion caused by private or public 
health insurance, more familiar than its facilitation of the exercise of providers’ 
and suppliers’ market power, is the inefficiency that flows from so-called moral 
hazard—that is, the tendency of insurance to induce consumption that would 
not otherwise occur.66  Indeed, the fundamental lesson of health economics is 
that insulating patients and providers from the direct cost of health services at 
the time they are consumed guarantees that, without countermeasures, health 
services will be consumed in excessive quantities, generating costs that, at the 
margin, are greater (in theory, at least) than the extra services’ contribution to 
well-being.  This potential for excessive spending worsens over time, moreover, 
as incentives for innovation tend to invite cost-increasing improvements more 
than cost-saving ones.67  Achieving efficient resource allocation in the face of 
such powerful distortions is obviously a daunting task.  Even conducting a 
 
 66. See, e.g., 2004 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. DOC. 108-145 (2004), 24, 189 
(“Over-reliance on health insurance as a payment mechanism leads to an inefficient use of resources in 
providing and utilizing health care.”).  See generally CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 325 
(2003) (describing moral hazard as the “induced demand due to the health insurance coverage”). 
 67. Recent work by Amy Finkelstein estimates that the spread of health insurance from 1950 to 
1990 (including the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid) accounted for at least forty percent of 
the dramatic increase in per capita health spending during that period.  Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate 
Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11619, 2005).  Although public and private insurance provided both 
valuable financial security and subsidized access to essential health services, the moral-hazard effect 
detected by Finkelstein is substantially greater than economists had previously detected in studies of 
individual behavior under various insurance arrangements (for example, the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment).  In contrast to the earlier studies, Finkelstein’s long time horizon enables her to detect 
long-term market-wide effects induced by the substantially steeper demand curves that sellers 
increasingly faced as health insurance spread.  These effects include greatly altered styles of medical 
practice and strong incentives to create and use technologies that would not pass most people’s benefit-
cost test.  Finkelstein and others have also shown that Medicare, which provided only very limited 
coverage for prescription drugs, did not appreciably stimulate pharmaceutical innovation.  Daron 
Acemoglu et al., Did Medicare Induce Pharmaceutical Innovation? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11949, 2006). 
For looks at the other side of the same coin, observing that markets with large HMO market shares 
featured slower diffusion of new technologies and correspondingly lower health care expenditures, see 
Laurence C. Baker, Managed Care and Technology Adoption in Health Care: Evidence from Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 395 (2001); see also Laurence C. Baker et al., The 
Relationship Between Technology Availability and Health Care Spending, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCLUSIVES) W3-537, W3-547–48 (acknowledging slowing the rate of availability of technology may 
slow the spending growth rate). 
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constructive debate over health policy is practically impossible because of the 
difficulty of focusing on health care’s marginal, rather than its aggregate, 
contributions to welfare.68 
To be sure, the cost-increasing effects of moral hazard are arguably only an 
abstract, theoretical problem at the “macro” level, where allocative efficiency is 
the principal concern.69  But excessive consumption also has substantial 
consequences at the “micro” level of household budgets.  Although the cost of 
 
 68. Precisely because health care generates such large amounts of consumer surplus compared to 
other industries (because the value of its benefits to individuals—when it yields benefits—can be so 
great, perhaps the difference between life and death), it is difficult to think about health care at the 
margin, where costs are apt to be large and benefits small, especially in probabilistic terms.  Occasional 
studies seek to justify large and increasing expenditures on health care by noting the huge benefits 
obtained in recent years from improving life expectancy for, say, victims of heart disease or afflicted 
neonates.  E.g., DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 63 (2004) (“On the basis of low-birth-weight-infant- and 
cardiovascular-disease-care alone, therefore, the benefits of medical care are about equal to its costs.”); 
David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth It?, HEALTH AFF., 
Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 11 (examining five new technologies and concluding from these examples that 
“medical spending as a whole is clearly worth the cost” (emphasis added)); Lichtenberg, supra note 57; 
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their Cost? Evidence from the 1996 
MEPS, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 241; Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
Mortality Reduction, and Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6569, 1998) (concluding that “a one-time R&D expenditure of about $15 billion subsequently saves 1.6 
million life-years per year, whose annual value is about $27 billion”).  Such studies divert attention 
from the all-important margin, however.  See Jonathan S. Skinner, Douglas O. Staiger & Elliott S. 
Fisher, Is Technological Change In Medicine Always Worth It? The Case of Acute Myocardial 
Infarction, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34 (2006) (questioning Cutler and McClellan, supra, on cost-justifications 
for increased spending on cardiovascular disease after 1996; also noting, from regional data, lack of 
correlation between spending increases and improvements in survival rates); see also Havighurst, How 
the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 80 n.89 (criticizing Cutler & McClellan, supra).  Many 
investments in R&D produce little, if any, useful knowledge, and many new technologies represent 
only marginal improvements, at best, over earlier, cheaper treatments.  The crucial fact remains that 
the system lacks accepted mechanisms for comparing marginal benefits and costs, especially in cases in 
which a patient hoping for relief naturally demands heavy spending on his own behalf.  See supra note 
24.  Indeed, because the public resists any recognition of tradeoffs, it is politically dangerous even to 
suggest in a public forum that people might be better off with less rather than more health care.  
Moreover, any policymaker concerned that health care may be claiming too large a piece of the 
economic pie must also reckon with the political strength of the health care industry.  And, finally, it is 
hard to argue with the industry’s consistent ability to attract capital and create jobs in an otherwise up-
and-down economy or with its seemingly miraculous technical accomplishments.  Largely for these 
reasons, it is only rising health care costs that ever trigger political concern.  Whatever its magnitude, 
inefficiency that is already embedded in the economy is simply never going to be viewed as a problem 
by the political class.  See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 89–92 (putting 
high and rising health care costs in political and economic perspective). 
 69. To the extent that health insurance reduces the apparent price of the insured service below its 
marginal cost, it introduces a welfare-loss triangle comparable to the deadweight-loss triangle it helps to 
eliminate in the case of monopoly.  See supra note 17.  This triangle lies above the service’s demand 
curve, however, and represents not underconsumption, but arguable overconsumption, of services—
specifically, services that consumers would not have found worth purchasing at marginal cost (the 
competitive price).  But see infra note 212 (expressing caveat about relying too mindlessly on demand 
curves as indicators of welfare).  The case of patented pharmaceuticals is anomalous because their 
marginal cost of production is usually very low.  Even a co-insurance payment of twenty percent might 
therefore exceed it, creating at least a modest deadweight loss of the usual kind.  As a substitute for 
insured (and therefore underpriced) hospital and other medical care, it seems likely that drugs are used 
less in therapy than they would be under an efficient pricing system—that is, if everything were priced 
at marginal cost. 
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such overutilization is distributed more or less equally across premium payers at 
all levels of income, consumers with lower incomes are likely to attach less 
value than their upper-income counterparts (at least, in the sense of their 
willingness to pay) to insurance giving them easy access to all arguably 
beneficial health care.70  Forcing working families who want health coverage to 
bear, unnecessarily, the cost of rampant moral hazard could seriously diminish 
their welfare.  This second section of Part II focuses on health care costs and 
utilization rather than on prices alone and shows how insurers’ suboptimal 
attention to the moral-hazard problem not only misallocates resources but also 
severely overburdens ordinary premium payers for the benefit of the health 
care industry and elite consumers of health services.71 
1. Conceding the Benefit-Cost No Man’s Land 
Although insuring health care inevitably increases spending on it, not all of 
the added spending thus induced is necessarily inefficient.  After all, consumers 
choose to buy health coverage specifically to enable themselves to purchase 
services they might otherwise not be able to afford; added spending resulting 
from consumer choices of this kind is efficient to the extent that it is an 
unavoidable cost of valuable financial protection.  Likewise, although health 
coverage can be administered to curb the effects of moral hazard, it is often 
more cost-effective to tolerate those effects than to incur the administrative 
costs necessary to avoid them; once again, to the extent that moral-hazard costs 
are incurred as a necessary cost of desired protection against risk, there is no 
inefficiency from either an individual or a social point of view.72 
Despite the acceptability of some higher costs as a necessary price of 
avoiding financial risks, third-party-financed spending on health care could be 
seriously inefficient for either of two reasons: (1) because payers are artificially 
inhibited, by law or otherwise, from taking cost-effective steps to counter moral 
hazard; or (2) because health coverage is not designed in the first instance with 
a view to striking a suitable balance between financial protection and moral 
hazard’s potentially huge costs.  Unfortunately, U.S.-style health insurance 
generates inefficiency on both scores, as health plans have not had, or even 
sought, all the de facto and de jure authority they would need to efficiently 
counteract the cost-increasing effects of moral hazard.73  Indeed, the U.S. system 
appears to be rigged to give moral hazard nearly full sway.  Thus, custom, 
practice, law, and regulation all appear to be premised on the not-quite-explicit 
 
 70. See infra text accompanying note 209. 
 71. The article we have found that comes closest to expressing insights on the latter issue that are 
similar to our own is Daniel Shapiro, Why Even Egalitarians Should Favor Market Health Insurance, 15 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84 (1998). 
 72. By the same token, it is inefficient, strictly speaking, for health insurance to cover a service that 
easily passes a benefit-cost test in a particular case if covering it generally would generate moral-hazard 
or administrative costs reversing the benefit-cost calculation.  See infra note 75. 
 73. Part IV of this Article focuses more directly on the legal system’s responsibility for the 
regrettable state of U.S. health care, including its effects in raising the costs of resisting moral hazard. 
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notion that, subject only to modest cost-sharing requirements,74 unlimited access 
to all arguably efficacious health services that a physician is willing to prescribe 
is an inalienable right of all Americans having health coverage of any kind.  To 
be sure, this entitlement is not universal because many millions have no 
coverage at all.75  The principal focus of this article, however, is on the many 
millions more who pay excessive premiums to support a style of medical care 
that serves the interests of the health care industry and elite consumers far 
better than their own. 
Even in the heyday of managed health care, health plans were not truly in 
the business of legitimately administering coverage with a view to giving 
premium payers optimal value in purchasing health services—by establishing, 
mediating, and enforcing mutually agreed-upon limits on the right of individual 
insureds to draw upon the premium pool.  Instead, virtually all health plans 
have long undertaken to pay for all “medically necessary” care, thereby making 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness (in comparison with other measures of equal 
efficacy) the only issues in most coverage disputes.76  In effect, U.S. health 
insurers concede to the moral-hazard enemy virtually the entire no man’s land 
of benefit-cost tradeoffs, where the battle against inefficient spending must be 
fought if it is ever to be won.77  Since managed health care abruptly fell out of 
 
 74. On the regressive consequences of cost sharing as a method of counteracting moral hazard, see 
infra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
 75. The nation’s failure to provide health coverage for the uninsured is in large measure a 
consequence of the high and (currently) uncontrollable moral-hazard costs that such coverage would 
certainly entail.  Even so, it would be hard (in both senses of the word) to argue that present policy 
toward the uninsured is, on this basis, actually “efficient.”  See supra note 72.  Our point instead is that 
the insurance gap exists and widens over time largely because U.S. health insurers are unduly limited 
by custom, law, and regulation in what they may or can do to contain moral hazard.  Indeed, our main 
argument is that these de facto and de jure restraints on health insurers’ ability to administer their 
premium pools are part of a larger pattern of health policies that, whether intentionally or not, burden 
middle- and lower-income Americans in order to serve other interests.  That they also contribute 
heavily to the plight of the uninsured, while in some respects a separate matter, should certainly be of 
equivalent concern.  For a study showing the various ways in which rising health insurance premiums 
are adversely affecting lower-wage workers, see Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Labor 
Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11160, 2005) (estimating that a 10% increase in health insurance premiums results in a 1.6% 
reduction in the aggregate probability of being employed, an increase of 1.9% in the likelihood that a 
worker will be employed only part-time, and 2.3% decrease in wages for those who remain employed 
with employer-sponsored health insurance; for hourly workers, such a premium increase will reduce 
hours worked by 1% and reduce the probability of being offered health insurance by 3.8%; also finding 
it likely that workers covered by employer insurance will “bear the full incidence of increases in health 
insurance premiums”).  See also Michael Chernew et al., Increasing Health Insurance Costs and the 
Decline in Insurance Coverage, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1021, 1034 (2005) (finding that rising health 
insurance premiums accounted for over half of the decline in health insurance coverage during the 
1990s). 
 76. See generally Timothy P. Blanchard, “Medical Necessity” Determinations—A Continuing 
Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599 (2003); William Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea: 
Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 
DUKE L.J. 597 (2003); Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology 
Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525 (1996). 
 77. The no-man’s-land metaphor is explained graphically in Clark C. Havighurst & James F. 
Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 NW. U.L. 
REV. 6, 15–20 (1975).  See also HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 93–96. 
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political and consumer favor in the late 1990s, U.S. health insurers have had 
even less room to counteract moral hazard by administratively discouraging 
consumption that fails any kind of benefit-cost test.  The limits of health plans’ 
ability to refuse payment for particular prescribed services on benefit-cost 
grounds help to explain not only the overutilization of health services of all 
kinds but also the extraordinary profits (noted previously) that private 
monopolists can generate in health care markets.78 
The magnitude of overspending on health care occasioned by moral hazard 
in the United States is ultimately an empirical question, of course, and it has 
been suggested that the United States does not in fact greatly overuse resources 
because its utilization rates for many services are comparable to those in other 
nations.79  Such a comparison is largely pointless, however, because the moral-
hazard problem is universal and foreign systems may handle it almost as badly 
as we do; also, it would be more informative to compare foreign consumption 
patterns to the rates at which services are used by insured Americans—
especially (for our purposes) by Americans with private coverage.80  In any 
event, there is evidence that even much heavier spending on health care in 
some parts of the United States correlates poorly, and sometimes inversely, 
with improvement in health outcomes.81  In addition, many studies have 
revealed heavy spending that is wasteful even by professional standards of 
medical necessity, let alone by comparison with consumer preferences about 
how their personal resources should be deployed.82  To be sure, such studies, 
 
 78. Although not labeled as such in earlier text, the extra pricing freedom that health insurance 
confers on monopolists is itself a manifestation of moral hazard, flowing as it does from the removal of 
consumers’ price-consciousness in purchasing insured services. 
 79. Anderson et al., supra note 13; Reinhardt et al., supra note 8. 
 80. See infra note 197. 
 81. See Jonathan Skinner, Elliott Fisher & John Wennberg, The Efficiency of Medicare, in 
ANALYSES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (D. Wise, ed., 2005); Elliot S. Fisher et al., The Implications 
of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 
138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 273 (2003); Elliot S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional 
Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 288 (2003); Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, the Physician 
Workforce, and the Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W4-184. 
 82. Studies to show inappropriate utilization were common in the 1980s and early 1990s, many of 
them conducted under the auspices of the RAND Corporation.  See, e.g., MARK R. CHASSIN ET AL., 
INDICATIONS FOR SELECTED MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
RATINGS OF APPROPRIATENESS: CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT SURGERY (1986); Robert H. 
Brook et al., Predicting the Appropriate Use of Carotid Endarterectomy, Upper Gastrointestinal 
Endoscopy, and Coronary Angiography, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173 (1990); Lucian L. Leape et al., 
The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery in New York State, 269 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 753 (1993); Lee H. Hilborne et al., The Appropriateness of Use of Percutaneous 
Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty in New York State, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 761 (1993); Steven J. 
Bernstein et al., The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Angiography in New York State, 269 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 766 (1993).  In order to ensure acceptance by the medical profession, the earlier RAND 
studies relied heavily on professional opinion without asking physicians to compare benefits and costs, 
yet still found numerous surgical and other procedures to be significantly overused.  See, e.g., ROLLA 
EDWARD PARK ET AL., PHYSICIAN RATINGS OF APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS FOR SIX MEDICAL AND 
SURGICAL PROCEDURES 6 (1986).  In later studies, in order to identify spending of truly marginal 
benefit, the researchers asked physicians to focus, not just on medical necessity or appropriateness, but 
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while certainly suggestive of a systematic failure to compare benefits and costs, 
are really little more than anecdotal evidence of inefficiency since they take no 
account of costs that would have to be incurred to achieve a more efficient 
result.  But there is, in any event, one feature of the American system that 
clinches the argument that the current U.S. spending level is highly inefficient—
namely, the unlimited tax subsidy for employer-purchased health coverage, the 
pernicious effects of which are described immediately below.83 
2. How the Tax Subsidy Aids the Moral-Hazard Enemy 
The ultimate reason why sellers and purchasers of health coverage have not 
designed it in the first instance to balance the value of financial protection to 
consumers against the costs of moral hazard is the substantial tax subsidy that 
government has long provided to encourage employers to purchase private 
health insurance.  This subsidy takes the form of an exclusion of employer-
sponsored health plan premiums from employee income subject to federal and 
state income and payroll taxes.84  Its principal effect over time has been to 
induce employers to be casual about efficiency in the health coverage they 
procure on their employees’ behalf.  Thus, instead of seeking optimal insurance 
for various subsets of their workers, they bought generous, comprehensive 
coverage with minimal cost sharing for everyone in order that as many health 
care bills as possible could be paid with untaxed dollars.85  Amplified by 
uncontrolled moral hazard, such overinsurance causes an apparently severe 
misallocation of the economy’s resources. 
Many observers think they detect regressivity in the tax subsidy simply 
because of its greater apparent value to higher-bracket taxpayers and those with 
the costliest coverage—frequently one and the same.86  Yet the unfairness here 
 
on “cruciality,” producing an even more troublesome picture.  See, e.g., PAUL P. LEE ET AL., 
CATARACT SURGERY: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RATINGS OF APPROPRIATENESS AND 
CRUCIALITY 48–50, 163–274 (1993).  These studies and their findings are discussed in some detail in 
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 254–62. 
 83. PHELPS, supra note 66, at 356–57 (1997) (estimating, based on empirical estimates of demand 
for insurance, that “employer-group health insurance premiums would be only about 55 percent as 
large today if the tax subsidy were not in effect”; “it seems possible that the health sector would be at 
least 10 to 20 percent smaller without the tax subsidy for health insurance”). 
 84. See generally Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical 
Economy, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 629 (1986).  A complementary subsidy allows deductions for health 
insurance premiums paid by self-employed individuals.  The total 2004 cost, in revenue forgone, of the 
various federal and state “tax expenditures” subsidizing privately purchased health insurance has been 
estimated at $209.9 billion. John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 
2004, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W4-106.  Other tax subsidies with possible implications 
for fairness include the deduction allowed (for itemizers) for out-of-pocket health expenses above 7.5% 
of adjusted gross income and the favorable tax treatment of health spending through flexible spending 
accounts.  On new tax breaks for health savings accounts, see infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 85. For employees in the highest federal and state tax brackets, the saving achievable may exceed 
fifty percent. 
 86. E.g., MADISON POWERS & RUTH FADEN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY 132–33 (2006).  It is estimated that 26.7% of the economic 
benefit they confer accrues to the 14% of taxpayers with annual incomes of at least $100,000; likewise, 
“only 28.4 percent of all [these] tax expenditures will go to families with incomes below $50,000, even 
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may be more apparent than real.  Indeed, the regressive tax consequences 
would be entirely offset if, as is arguably the case, the government replaces the 
revenue it loses through such tax expenditures by taxing other income at higher 
progressive rates.87  Thus, the tax subsidy may do no more for high-bracket 
taxpayers, directly, than give them with one hand what the government 
simultaneously takes away with another.  But, even though this aspect of the tax 
subsidy provides, at best, only weak evidence of the pervasive injustice we 
observe in U.S. health care, there are other, more indirect ways in which the 
subsidy disproportionately benefits economic elites at the expense of the less 
affluent. 
A particularly important effect of the tax subsidy for employer-purchased 
health coverage has been to make employers—rather than consumers, acting 
individually or in other, more homogeneous groups—responsible for designing 
or selecting most of the private health coverage that Americans enjoy.  
Although seemingly serving as purchasing agents for their employees, 
employers have agendas of their own and will inevitably make choices that 
benefit some (usually higher-income) employees more than others.88  It is at this 
point that the greater value of the tax subsidy to higher-income workers has 
distributional consequences, by biasing employers in the direction of buying 
costlier coverage than even a median-income employee would choose for 
himself under a more equitable subsidy.89 
Perhaps the most important and pervasive effect of the tax subsidy and 
employer purchasing induced thereby is a subtle one.  By making health 
coverage a largely undisclosed part of employees’ overall compensation, 
employer purchasing effectively hides the true cost of coverage from those who 
 
though this group contains 57.5 percent of all U.S. families.”  Sheils & Haught, supra note 84, at 110.  
But for this substantial regressivity, characterizing the exclusion from taxable income as a “subsidy” 
might not be appropriate at all, since a taxing authority might simply find it fairer to tax individuals’ 
income only after certain basic necessities were provided for.  But the subsidy here is decidedly not 
limited to encouraging the purchase of only basic coverage.  See Lawrence Zelenak, Of Head Taxes, 
Income Taxes, and Distributive Justice in American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 113 
(Autumn 2006). 
 87. For a study showing awareness of this point, see Holahan & Zedlewski, supra note 6, at 235, 
240 tbl.6 (in estimating total health care cost burdens borne by various deciles of consumer-taxpayers, 
“we calculate income and payroll taxes that are required to finance the employer-paid health benefit 
tax exclusion”).  Many believe that tax expenditures—exclusions and deductions designed to achieve 
substantive policy objectives—are generally unwise as a matter of tax policy because they shrink the tax 
base, thus requiring higher marginal tax rates on other income to produce the same amount of revenue.  
These higher rates, it is believed, adversely affect overall productivity.  In any event, it is unclear that 
higher-income Americans need any subsidy at all to encourage their purchase of essential health 
coverage. 
 88. See Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 70 (“[Because] only a 
generous plan sends workers the message most employers want to convey about their concern for 
worker welfare . . . and also because health benefits are useful in attracting and keeping workers with 
the best chances of being hired by someone else, employee health plans are likely to be costlier than 
even the average worker would demand (even with tax subsidies enhancing his purchasing power).”). 
 89. See infra text accompanying note 100. 
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ultimately bear most of that cost in the form of reduced take-home pay.90  
Precisely because their costs are hidden from them, employees are more likely 
to demand and expect expensive health care even when their true interest 
would be served by economizing.91  The entitlement mentality induced by 
consumers’ inability to see the connection between their pocketbooks and the 
many macro health-care choices that others make on their behalf plays out not 
only in employment groups but also in explicitly political arenas where 
legislative and regulatory policies with large consequences for the cost of care 
are made.92  Discussion in Part IV of this article will show that hiding health care 
costs from those who pay them is a key element in the systematic exploitation of 
ordinary consumers in U.S. health care law and policy. 
The impact of the tax subsidy for employer-purchased health coverage may 
change somewhat in the near future as a result of recent legislation extending 
favorable tax treatment to the funding of health savings accounts (HSAs).  
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act 
of 2003,93 consumers (or employers on their behalf) are permitted, within limits, 
to fund HSAs with untaxed dollars if the HSA is coupled with a high-deductible 
health plan (HDHP) meeting certain requirements.94  This legislation is widely 
heralded as the centerpiece of a movement toward “consumer-directed” health 
care (CDHC), which aims to correct the tax-induced tendency toward 
overinsurance and thereby to restore a degree of cost-consciousness to 
individuals’ consumption and purchasing decisions.  Arguably, the new tax 
break for funds that consumers set aside to pay future health care bills offsets 
the previous tax-induced bias in favor of comprehensive insurance coverage and 
against the use of substantial cost sharing to counter moral hazard.  Although a 
better way to achieve this objective would have been to cap the tax subsidy or 
 
 90. See supra note 4.  Employers only rarely offer their workers more than one health care option 
with the employee required to pay the full additional cost above the cost of the lowest-price plan.  See 
Alain C. Enthoven, The Fortune 500 Model for Health Care: Is Now the Time to Change?, 27 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 37 (2002); see also infra note 119. 
 91. The only time that consumers may actually see the true cost of health coverage is in choosing 
between jobs that do and do not carry health benefits.  See MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT 
WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 
(1997); see also supra note 4.  Although wage differentials between otherwise similar jobs have been 
noted, such all-or-nothing choices, with health care as only one of many considerations being weighed, 
are not clearly reliable expressions of consumer preferences with respect to marginally beneficial care. 
 92. The political consequences of the tax subsidy are rarely recognized, even by scholars.  But see 
Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 78–86. 
 93. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 94. The HDHP must have an annual deductible anywhere from $1000 to $5000 for single coverage 
or from $2000 to $10,000 for families, in which event untaxed dollars may be contributed to the 
individual’s HSA each year in amounts up to the lesser of $2250 for an individual ($4500 for a family) 
or the HDHP’s deductible.  (Because the stated amounts are indexed for inflation, they are understated 
here).  HSAs, which may be maintained with either a financial institution or an insurer, can then 
accumulate investment earnings tax-free.  Account owners may draw on these funds at any time, 
without tax on the distribution, to pay a broad range of “qualified medical expenses,” broadly defined.  
See infra note 96.  For arguments for expanding the scope of HSAs even further, see Michael F. 
Cannon, Health Savings Accounts: Do the Critics Have a Point?, POL’Y ANALYSIS (CATO INST., 
Washington, D.C.) May 30, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6395. 
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to replace it with government-issued vouchers of a limited, perhaps means-
tested value, such reform ideas have not been well received in the political 
world.95  The CDHC agenda has therefore been implemented, not by cutting 
back the tax benefits of buying health services through an insurance plan, but 
by creating an equivalent tax break for out-of-pocket (or, more accurately, out-
of-HSA) spending.96 
The CDHC reforms’ leveling of the playing field of health insurance choices 
should in due course cause a shift toward health coverage that is less 
significantly bedeviled by moral hazard.  Indeed, under the reforms, moral 
hazard’s costs, though they can never be eliminated, should eventually become 
merely an inherent cost of insuring against undue financial risks, no longer 
inflated by over-broad coverage designed primarily to exploit a tax loophole.  
Moreover, the availability of funds in HSAs that can be used to pay amounts 
that an individual’s health plan is not obligated to pay should make it more 
tolerable for health plans both to require more than nominal cost sharing and to 
deny coverage for services that fail contractual tests requiring comparisons of 
benefits and costs.97  To be sure, the tax subsidy will continue to affect 
substantially the margin at which employers and consumers face trade-offs, 
ensuring high levels of consumption.  But the CDHC reforms may in time 
change many employer calculations that have heretofore allowed moral hazard 
far too much room in which to operate.98 
 
 95. See Pauly, supra note 84; see also infra note 217 (suggesting limited, refundable tax credits as a 
more practical and equitable way to subsidize and universalize basic coverage). 
 96. It is relevant to our thesis in this article that the strategy chosen creates, whether by accident or 
design, an important new tax shelter for the well-to-do. Lower-bracket taxpayers will not, it seems 
certain, be in a position to take equivalent advantage of this new tax break because, in addition to 
deriving smaller tax savings than those with higher incomes, they will find it harder to deposit the full 
amounts allowed.  Wealthier taxpayers, on the other hand, not only can afford to deposit more untaxed 
money in their HSAs but also can elect to spend after-tax dollars on their medical care, leaving their 
HSA funds to accumulate tax-free, as in a tax-favored retirement plan.  (After an HSA owner attains 
age sixty-five, any funds remaining in the HSA may be either withdrawn as taxable income or rolled 
over into a tax-favored retirement account for further tax deferral.)  The effect is to give higher-bracket 
taxpayers yet another means of deferring taxes on present income and of escaping payroll taxes 
altogether.  See Eric Dash, Wall Street Senses Opportunities in Health Care Savings Accounts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at A1, A16 (“Not since the creation of the individual retirement account in the 
mid-1970’s has such a potentially huge mountain of money landed in the lap of the financial services 
industry.”).  A very strong tax-equity argument can be made for making earnings on HSAs taxable with 
individuals’ other income. 
 97. The need to manage health benefits and moral hazard will be essentially unaffected by the 
CDHC reforms because the great majority of health care spending occurs in cases that would quickly 
consume the contemplated deductibles.  See generally Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving 
Managed Health Care with Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1490–91 (2005) (arguing 
that “combining managed care with HSAs can help to re-legitimize managed care in the public eye by 
clarifying the respective decision-making responsibilities of health plans and patients. . . . Specifically, 
the availability of HSAs should make it clearer to most people that plans’ denials of coverage are not 
meant to ration health care itself but only to limit the availability of third-party financing.”). 
 98. See also infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
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3. Who Benefits (Most) from Uncontrolled Moral Hazard? 
The high costs that Americans incur in overconsuming health care yield 
greater benefits for some people than for others.  Obviously, the economic well-
being of the health care industry and the some twelve million individuals it 
employs has come to depend on the excess resources that flow into the health 
care enterprise because of uncontrolled moral hazard and the unchecked 
market power exercised by many of the industry’s components.99  Of course, not 
all elements of the industry are excessively rewarded for their efforts, and, as 
noted earlier, much of the excess profit that some providers and suppliers are 
able to earn because of entry barriers, weak competition, and so forth is used to 
support a variety of seemingly (though far from clearly) worthwhile activities.  
Nevertheless, many industry participants are enriched unduly, often for 
performing services that the public has in no reliable way decided are worth 
paying for.  Moreover, although the beneficiaries of the various cross-subsidies 
and investments in innovation are difficult to trace, it is unlikely that they are all 
equally needy or deserving.  In general, the health care system’s inefficiencies 
support a huge, politically powerful industry whose claims on the nation’s 
wealth and premium payers’ incomes have not been validated either through a 
well-functioning, well-informed political process or by consumers’ informed 
choices in unrigged markets. 
Less obvious beneficiaries of public policies abetting moral hazard are those 
consumers who especially prefer, even at high cost, health coverage that puts 
few obstacles in their way in consuming health services and few limits on their 
access to costly technology.  In particular, affluent Americans, because they are 
less daunted by extravagant price tags and more heavily subsidized by the tax 
system, especially want their employers to select a health plan that will pay for 
virtually everything their physicians prescribe.  Moreover, they are in a strong 
position to have this preference honored because the tax subsidy’s dilution of 
cost-consciousness inclines lower-income employees in the employment group 
also to favor health coverage of this expensive kind.100  High-income Americans 
are thus well served by a system that, by effectively hiding the cost of coverage, 
 
 99. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Resource Allocation in Health Care: The Allocation of Lifestyles to 
Providers, 65 MILBANK Q. 153 (1987) (emphasizing the extent to which consumer savings from 
enhanced price competition would come at the direct expense of industry insiders).  Although many 
people admire the health care industry for providing numerous secure, well-paying jobs and for being 
relatively recession-proof, these features are a direct consequence of a financing system that denies 
consumers easy opportunities to economize when family budgets are squeezed.  Moreover, the 
reciprocal effect of the health sector’s relative stability is greater instability in the rest of the economy, 
including lessened job security for those who work outside the health sector but pay tribute to it 
through their health insurance premiums.  This is simply one more unrecognized way in which U.S. 
health policy hurts working Americans while benefiting stakeholders in the health sector. 
 100. To be sure, generous health benefits are also found in plans that some employers maintain only 
for lower- and middle-income, usually unionized, workers.  Labor unions’ persistent demands for 
especially generous benefits do not disprove, however, our contention that rich health plans are 
contrary to the true interests of middle-income workers.  Instead, they prove only that, like politicians, 
union leaders (another elite) know how to exploit, in their own interest, workers’ mistaken belief that 
the employer alone bears the cost of their health benefits. 
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induces employees of all incomes to favor the costliest variety.  “Other Ranks” 
often pay more so that the elite classes can be assured of health care suiting 
their elevated tastes. 
III 
ARE LOWER-INCOME PREMIUM PAYERS 
SHORTCHANGED ON THE RECEIVING END AS WELL? 
Affluent Americans may benefit at the expense of their lower-income 
coworkers in another, more direct way.  To be sure, it would not necessarily be 
unfair if higher-income employees generally enjoyed somewhat more and better 
health care than those with lower incomes;101 they also drive safer cars, eat 
 
 101. For recent journalism implying both surprise and concern that health services often vary 
according to the patient’s income, see Janny Scott, Life at the Top in America Isn’t Just Better, It’s 
Longer, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at A1.  But demand for much health care is income-elastic, meaning 
that people naturally spend more on it as their incomes increase.  See also Renee Mentnech et al., An 
Analysis of Utilization and Access from the NHIS: 1984-92, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. Winter 1995, at 
51, 55–56 (concluding from National Health Interview Survey data that among patients in relatively 
good health, higher income increases the probability of a physician visit); see generally PHELPS, supra 
note 66, at 148–49.  Studies of individuals under full insurance indicate that income elasticity is positive 
but rather small.  See EMMETT B. KEELER ET AL., THE DEMAND FOR EPISODES OF MEDICAL 
TREATMENT IN THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1988) (data from RAND experiment 
showing relatively small income effects, elasticities of about 0.2).  Income elasticities estimated from 
time series data, which capture the effects of new medial technologies, are higher and approach unity.  
See Martin Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 60 AM. ECON. 
REV. 853–72 (1971); Catherine McLaughlin, HMO Growth and Hospital Expenses and Use: A 
Simultaneous-Equations Approach, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 183–202 (1987) (finding an income 
elasticity of 0.7 using data from 1972 to 1982).  Although proper measurement of income elasticity 
would focus on permanent income, most correlation studies use data reflecting transitory income, thus 
diluting the apparent effect of income on health expenditures if households encountering sudden 
sickness both earn below their normal income and increase their consumption of health care.  In any 
event, studies show that, for many health services, income elasticity exceeds unity, which means 
percentage increases in income translate into even greater percentage increases in spending on those 
services.  See, e.g., Ronald Andersen & Lee Benham, Factors Affecting the Relationship Between Family 
Income and Medical Care Consumption, in H.E. KLARMAN, EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN HEALTH 
ECONOMICS (1970) (finding income elasticity greater than unity for dental care); Fred Goldman & 
Michael Grossman, The Demand for Pediatric Care: An Hedonic Approach, 86 J. POL. ECON. 259 
(1978); Marian E. Gornick, Disparities in Medicare Services: Potential Causes, Plausible Explanations, 
and Recommendations, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. Summer 2000, at 23 (citing data on physician visits 
and medical procedures); Carol L. Jenkins, Resource Effects on Access to Long-Term Care for Frail 
Older People, 13 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 35 (2001) (presenting data on nursing home care). 
In our view, the income elasticity of demand for health care makes much of the recent concern over 
disparities in the care received by different racial, ethnic, and income groups, see infra note 111, 
unrealistic, reflecting a too-casual assumption that consumption of health care should be equal for all 
groups and classes.  Such equality, in addition to being unrealistic as a practical matter—which is not to 
say that it should not be actively promoted in specific contexts—would be achievable at reasonable cost 
only by leveling down, thus radically denying people the freedom to spend more on health care than 
others choose or are able to spend.  Cf. Chaoulli v. Quebec, 2005 S.C.C. 35, 29272, [2005] S.C.J. No. 33 
QUICKLAW (June 9, 2005) (Canadian Supreme Court’s invalidation of Quebec law prohibiting 
purchase of private health insurance for services covered by Canada’s national health program, on the 
ground that adverse health consequences resulting from national program’s waiting lists made 
prohibition unconstitutional).  Moreover, while equality has great symbolic value for many, maintaining 
it as a goal hampers efforts to ameliorate the specific inequities we identify in this article. 
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healthier food, and live in safer, less-polluted neighborhoods.102  But it should 
certainly be a cause for concern if consumption patterns vary greatly and 
positively with income—rather than with health needs alone—in situations 
where everyone pays the same premium for the same health coverage.  This 
appears to be the case in many U.S. health plans, since higher-income 
employees seem to make greater use of their coverage, demanding and 
receiving more and costlier services at plan expense than their lower-income 
coworkers.103  Although appearances may be deceiving, in many employment 
groups it certainly looks as if health insurance premiums paid on behalf of 
lower-income members go to subsidize the costly consumption habits of those 
with higher incomes.  If this perception of systematic inequity in the purchase 
and distribution of benefits within individual health plans is accurate, it would 
represent yet another unfairness to working Americans—on top of the other 
regressive features of the U.S. system observed in previous discussion.  Once 
again, the tax subsidy is the ultimate source of the problem.  By causing health 
coverage to be purchased in heterogeneous employment groups (including 
individuals with disparate, income-correlated preferences and consumption 
patterns), it creates conditions in which lower-income premium payers may be 
paying—unwittingly—costs incurred by their more demanding, affluent, and 
influential coworkers.  The unfairness would only be compounded by the 
circumstance that lower-income persons often are in generally poorer health 
and have greater health care needs. 104 
The most obvious factor that could be expected to cause income-correlated 
differences in the consumption of health services by individuals in the same 
health plan is cost sharing.  Most studies of cost sharing focus only on whether it 
unduly discourages consumption of health services by less-affluent patients.105  
 
 102. In general, society treats health care as a merit good, not to be rationed solely by ability and 
willingness to pay.  At the margin, however, spending on health care provides only limited value for 
money spent—perhaps only hope or a slightly reduced probability or imminence of a bad outcome—
making it (presumably) socially acceptable for persons with higher incomes to receive services that 
others cannot afford.  Such persons are in a position to put a higher valuation on their well-being, 
ascribing higher costs to sick days and higher value to healthy ones, and to substitute away from time-
intensive investments in health, such as bed rest, in favor of paying for medical interventions. 
 103. This tendency was dramatized for one of the authors when, in the 1970s, his employer, in a 
seemingly progressive move, combined two similar health plans it maintained for hourly-paid and 
higher-paid salaried workers, respectively, with the result that the former’s premium contributions rose 
while the latter’s declined. 
 104. See generally James P. Smith, Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual Relation Between 
Health and Economic Status, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 145 (1999) (illustrating that socioeconomic status 
tends to positively correlate with health status).  Even if it should appear that a health plan’s 
expenditures were the same per capita for both high- and lower-income members, it could be argued 
that the poorer health status of the latter group should entitle them to additional, not just equal, 
spending; in any event, a finding of such equality would belie the usual assumption that, in employee 
health plans, the healthy wealthy substantially subsidize the low-wage sick.  Although we suspect that it 
may be the other way around, the picture is more complicated to the extent the health status of lower-
income workers is worse.  For a fuller exposition of the possibility that the predominant redistribution 
is as generally assumed, see Hall, supra note 50, at 165–68.  See also infra note 116. 
 105. The classic study was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment.  See JOSEPH NEWHOUSE ET 
AL., FREE FOR ALL?  LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993).  See also 
02__HAVIGHURST_RICHMAN.DOC 3/7/2007  3:53 PM 
Autumn 2006] DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE(S) IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 43 
Our concern, however, is not that health care is rationed or distributed 
unequally but the likelihood that conditioning eligibility for insurer payments 
on patients’ willingness to make certain out-of-pocket payments causes lower-
income participants in employee health plans to get disproportionately fewer 
benefits than their more affluent coworkers receive in return for equivalent 
premiums; similar effects might also occur in health plans offering such point-
of-service choices as the option of spending more to see a non-network 
physician or to use a brand-name drug.106  Likewise, as employers pursue the 
increasingly popular strategy of funding health savings accounts and enrolling 
their workers in high-deductible health plans, it is possible that greater 
emphasis on cost sharing to contain moral hazard will cause insurers’ premium 
pools to be allocated even more disproportionately to the care of the affluent.107  
Although these matters do not appear to have been specifically studied by 
others, we hypothesize that many common forms of employee health coverage 
allow those who are better able to pay various up-front fees to enjoy 
disproportionately large insurance benefits at the expense of others.108 
Still another possible cause of income-correlated disparities in the volume 
and quality of health services received by participants in the same health plan 
may be physicians’ and health plans’ different approaches and attitudes in 
treating different patients.  According to one observer, “[w]ell-off and 
influential patients tend to link up with elite academic and private physicians, to 
 
JULIE HUDMAN & MOLLY O’MALLEY, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, 
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND COST SHARING: FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH OF LOW 
INCOME POPULATIONS (2003); Mitchell D. Wong et al., Effects of Cost Sharing on Care Seeking and 
Health Status: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1889 (2001); Avi Dor 
& William Encinosa, Does Cost Sharing Affect Compliance? The Case of Prescription Drugs (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10738, 2004). 
 106. The apprehended unfairness would not occur if, as we believe is only rarely the case, the plan 
charged patients who choose the more expensive option its full incremental cost.  Cf. infra notes 119 & 
120.  It is also notable—although our point here is somewhat different—that using more or costlier 
services, out-of-network providers, or non-formulary drugs may frequently produce better health 
outcomes.  Thus, those who are most discouraged by additional charges may get poorer service while 
still seemingly subsidizing higher-quality care for those whose consumption choices are less affected.  
See, e.g., Dor & Encinosa, supra note 105 (showing that co-insurance and, to a lesser extent, fixed co-
payments unduly discourage patients from taking efficacious preventive medicine). 
 107. This would occur if, as seems likely, lower-income individuals are more reluctant than higher-
income participants in the same HDHPs to spend their HSA funds to satisfy deductibles and other cost-
sharing prerequisites for tapping insurance funds.  Indeed, the raison d’etre of the CDHC reform 
strategy is to encourage use of heavier cost sharing to counteract moral hazard, displacing the arguably 
more even-handed rationing methods employed by managed-care organizations.  See Hall & 
Havighurst, supra note 97, at 1492 (“[T]he strategy of causing consumers to set aside assets for 
spending on their own health care should inspire at least some economizing behavior of the sort that 
has been systematically missing with comprehensive first-dollar coverage.”).  The empirical issue, not 
yet studied (as far as we are aware), is whether and how much HSAs will affect the income-elasticity of 
demand for health services.  See supra note 101. 
 108. Intuition suggests that such effects will occur under any insurance plan providing ostensibly 
equal benefits for both high- and low-income enrollees.  Although we have found no studies attempting 
to detect actual regressive effects in individual employment groups, data from the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment clearly showed that, in a controlled setting, cost sharing had noticeably greater 
effects on middle-income consumers than on higher-income ones. NEWHOUSE, supra note 105, at 46.  
This is just the effect we believe causes systematically regressive effects in employee health plans. 
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sustain their relationships with these physicians, and to benefit from these 
physicians’ sponsorship and advocacy in hospital and other institutional 
settings.  Middle-class patients tend to access a lower level of sponsorship and 
advocacy . . . .”109  It would also be natural for physicians and other 
decisionmakers, perceiving that more educated patients have especially high 
expectations concerning their health care, to strive to accommodate those 
expectations, whatever the patient’s nominal entitlement.  Moreover, insured 
individuals who are more Internet-savvy, articulate, assertive, or demanding can 
frequently get their physicians or health plans to prescribe more or better 
services for them than other patients normally receive.110  Thus, in addition to 
the economic incentives associated with cost sharing, a number of other factors 
generally correlated with income also suggest that affluent patients may 
systematically get more out of their health plans than they pay for while others 
get less.111 
Some economists may be hard to persuade that lower-income members of a 
health plan actually subsidize their higher-income coworkers even though the 
latter, as a class, take greater advantage of collectively purchased health 
benefits.  To be sure, economists are generally comfortable with the idea that 
employees, not employers, ultimately bear the cost of their health coverage.112  
But they could plausibly argue that it is artificial to treat an employee’s pro rata 
share of the employer’s total premium as the actual cost that the individual 
 
 109. M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 95, 108 (2001). 
 110. A suggestive example of how some patients can “work the system” appears in a notable recent 
case: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (finding no obstacle in federal law to 
enforcing Illinois statute requiring so-called external review of HMO denials of coverage).  The 
plaintiff, having been clever enough to find an out-of-state surgeon offering an especially aggressive 
treatment for her neurological condition, was able to persuade her HMO doctor (though he disclaimed 
any expertise) to opine that the surgery was medically necessary—contrary to several other medical 
opinions supporting the HMO’s more conservative approach.  She was also able to travel out of state 
twice, pay nearly $100,000 to have the procedure done, and hire a lawyer to take her case through 
several courts to obtain reimbursement of that amount.  It is virtually certain that other members of the 
HMO, though paying the same premiums as Ms. Moran, would not have received similarly costly 
treatment for a similar problem. 
 111. Researchers are currently paying a great deal of attention to disparities that correlate with 
patients’ racial and ethnic characteristics.  See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: 
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE (2003); Symposium, Racial & 
Ethnic Disparities, 24 HEALTH AFF. 316 (2005).  Some of these disparities may be attributable in whole 
or in part to considerations of the kind mentioned in the text.  Although most studies of the matter 
have focused only on inequality as such, several can be cited in support of our hypothesis that 
physicians resonate to income-correlated patient expectations.  E.g., Michelle van Ryn & Jane Burke, 
The Effect of Patient Race and Socio-Economic Status on Physicians’ Perceptions of Patients, 50 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 813 (2000) (examining physicians’ attitudes toward patients and revealing that lower-SES 
patients are viewed as less independent, less rational, less responsible, and less intelligent than their 
wealthier counterparts); S. Willems et al., Socio-Economic Status of the Patient and Doctor-Patient 
Communication: Does It Make a Difference?, 56 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 139 (2005) 
(reviewing literature finding that patients from lower social classes receive less-effective 
communication and exert less control over their consultations with their physician).  Evidence from 
countries in which health insurance status is equal for all patients also suggests that low-SES patients 
tend to receive fewer services at health-plan expense.  See infra note 121 & 122. 
 112. See supra note 4. 
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bears.  Indeed, strictly speaking, the true cost of health coverage to an 
employee is the opportunity cost of forgoing alternative employment that pays 
more but lacks equivalent health coverage.  In light of this fact, an economist 
might suggest that employers unconsciously adjust the amount of wages they 
are willing to pay to different classes of worker to reflect the class’s propensity 
to utilize employer-financed health benefits—in which case it might be incorrect 
to hypothesize that lower-income workers actually bear costs incurred by 
higher-income, higher-utilizing participants in the same plan.113 
Despite the plausibility of these alternative hypotheses, the question is 
ultimately an empirical one on which little evidence has been collected.  
Moreover, the notion that there is no regressivity depends on heroic 
assumptions about employee and employer perceptions, rationality, and the 
smoothness of the market’s operation.  Thus, workers’ decisions about which 
jobs to take turn on many factors besides the implicit value of particular health 
coverage.  Furthermore, employers probably think only rarely in terms of total 
compensation packages, perhaps even administering employee benefits and 
cash compensation in separate cost centers.114 In any event, although we cannot 
be certain that labor market forces do not ameliorate the situation we 
apprehend, it would be ironic if defenders of the health care system, most of 
whom customarily reject all economic theorizing as unrealistic, were to cite such 
market forces in arguing that, despite appearances in many health plans, lower-
income insureds do not in fact subsidize the health care of the rich. 
Our concern about possible regressive redistribution in employer-sponsored 
health plans would be obviated if employers generally offered their employees 
separate plans, each designed for a different income group.115  In each such plan, 
 
 113. Under this hypothesis, the employer referred to in supra note 103 would be expected to adjust 
wages (upward) and salaries (downward) in subsequent years to eliminate the seeming inequity.  But 
proving that such adjustments actually occurred would be difficult if, rather than being made explicitly, 
they took the form of unconscious responses to labor market conditions. 
 114. One apparent exception—that nevertheless may only help to prove the general rule—is the 
lower wages paid by employers to obese workers, which have been convincingly attributed in part to 
such employees’ greater demands on the employer’s health insurance.  Jay Bhattacharya & M. Kate 
Bundorf, The Incidence of the Healthcare Costs of Obesity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 11303, 2005).  As to employees in general, however, unless an employer is self-insured, it is 
unlikely to have good information on how heavily various employee subgroups use their health 
benefits; indeed, because the researchers in the cited study did not distinguish between self-insured and 
other employers or show that employers knew what wage adjustments to make, they could not rule out 
the possibility that the reduced wages of obese workers reflected only assumptions or general prejudice.  
In any event, it does not follow from the treatment of obese employees that the salaries of high-
utilizing, high-income employees would be similarly reduced.  On the other hand, if the market does 
adjust wages downward for high utilizers, it should also, presumably, adjust them favorably for 
employees using fewer services.  But few would expect to find that employees on the wrong side of 
widely noted racial disparities are receiving compensatorily higher wages. 
 115. This suggestion that insurance pools should be subdivided flies in the face of the conventional 
view that large, heterogeneous pools are socially desirable because they seem to cause healthier, 
wealthier insureds to subsidize the care of less healthy, lower-paid enrollees.  See supra note 104.  
Although not finally proven, the hypothesis we offer in the text suggests not only that such progressive 
redistribution is not necessarily the rule but also that most employment groups provide, not social 
insurance, but what might be called “anti-social” insurance, with subsidies actually running in regressive 
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members would be similarly, rather than dissimilarly, affected by cost sharing 
and other factors affecting consumption, thus minimizing income-correlated 
differences in access to the premium pool.  Moreover, benefits in each plan 
could be designed with particular regard to the group members’ financial 
circumstances.  For example, lower-wage workers, with fewer discretionary 
funds available in a health crisis, would presumably prefer lower cost sharing 
for essential services; on the other hand, for higher-paid personnel, optimal 
protection against moral hazard would require higher out-of-pocket payments.116  
Of course, a plan with lower cost sharing—if it were meant to optimally serve 
lower-income workers—would have to economize in other ways, perhaps by not 
undertaking to cover everything deemed “medically necessary” and instead by 
obtaining contractual authority to compare benefits and costs in resolving 
coverage issues.  Plans for higher-income workers, on the other hand, could be 
more generous.  In any event, if employers did provide such explicitly different 
coverage to different income groups, there would be little basis for concern 
about regressive redistribution because take-home pay for members of each 
group could then be reasonably presumed to reflect their respective health 
benefits.  More economical coverage would also materially enhance the welfare 
of the lower-income group.117 
Our impression is that today’s employers, rather than creating different 
health plans for different folks, regularly include all workers in the same 
insurance pool.118  To be sure, many employers offer their employees a menu of 
health plan choices.  But many such arrangements appear to exacerbate, rather 
than eliminate, the potential for regressive results.  Thus, in the great majority 
of instances, the employer pays more for those who choose costlier options—
rather than, as Alain Enthoven has convincingly advocated, making them pay 
 
directions.  It is probable, to be sure, that large insurance groups organized in employment settings do 
benefit incidentally those whose recurrent health problems and serious chronic conditions might make 
them uninsurable, or insurable only at prohibitive cost, in an insurance market in which individuals 
seek to pool their health risks only with others facing similar risks.  In any event, analyzing these 
matters is obviously complicated by the possibility, discussed in the text, that the labor market 
ultimately causes wages and salaries to reflect the actual burdens that various income classes impose on 
the employer’s health plan. 
 116. In theory, optimal cost sharing is a function of several factors, including the insured’s ability to 
bear financial risk and the slope of the group’s demand curve for the service in question (which reveals 
whether it is viewed as a discretionary service or a vital one in most cases).  Indeed, but for the high 
cost of administering finely tuned coverage, coinsurance rates would be set separately for each discrete 
service rather than, as is the general practice, applied across the board to all services (a notable 
exception being the generally higher coinsurance rates charged for outpatient psychiatric services, 
imposed in the belief that such services are especially discretionary).  The problem might be addressed 
in part, of course, by offering different plans with different cost sharing so that lower-income persons 
could purchase coverage more suitable for their situations. 
 117. See Shapiro, supra note 71. 
 118. On the case of employers dealing with labor unions, see supra note 100.  The usual 
explanations given for large risk pools are that they can command lower premiums for actuarial reasons 
and can drive harder bargains with providers.  Although such considerations introduce tradeoffs that 
might tilt the balance in some cases, the alternative explanation we offer suggests that some such 
benefits, even if real, may come at the expense of distributional fairness. 
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the full additional cost.119  In these cases, there is reason to fear that those 
choosing the cheaper package are indirectly bearing some of the costs incurred 
by those who choose (and get) more costly care.120  Once again, of course, the 
question is an empirical one, but we will not be easily persuaded that 
regressivity all comes out in the wash—that is, that salaries and wages are lower 
or higher for particular subgroups depending upon the coverage members of 
the group tend to select.  As usual, the unlimited tax subsidy, both by 
empowering employers to make the crucial choices and by hiding the true (or 
marginal) cost of coverage from the rank-and-file, is the main culprit—the 
reason why both rank-and-file and higher-income employees tend to be 
included in the same insured groups, creating environments in which cost-
sharing requirements and other factors can naturally cause the regressive effects 
that concern us. 
Although we have found little empirical research confirming (or rejecting) 
our hypothesis that employer-sponsored health plans in the United States are 
rife with regressive redistributions of wealth, significant inequities in the 
distribution of benefits in other countries’ national health systems are 
suggestive of similar effects in U.S. health plans.  Thus, a study in Canada found 
that “patients with higher incomes and education levels were significantly more 
likely to have been referred for coronary angiography . . . , cardiac 
rehabilitation . . . , and to a cardiologist . . . following discharge from . . .  
hospitalization [for acute myocardial infarction].”121  Similarly, data from the 
British National Health Service indicate that “[m]ore deprived individuals (in 
terms of income, education and employment) have lower than expected use of 
 
 119. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, 
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY 63, exh. 4.7 (2004) (reporting that only 
nineteen percent of employers offering employees a choice of plan—and the same percentage of the 
largest employers as well—make the same dollar contribution regardless of plan chosen); see Enthoven, 
supra note 90.  Regressivity would not be a significant problem under Enthoven’s prescription—
assuming that incremental costs are calculated actuarially, with appropriate awareness of different 
groups’ propensity to use their coverage. 
 120. Indeed, we speculate that employers pool all their nonunionized employees for purposes of 
health coverage in part because the unwitting contributions of lower-income workers make it cheaper 
for them to provide the benefits that high-income employees particularly desire.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 88 & 89.  Under the hypothesis that employers prefer arrangements under which 
the rank-and-file subsidize the coverage of more affluent employees, one would expect most employers 
to resist—as they have—Enthoven’s proposal to equalize contributions for each employee.  Also, 
employers could be expected to be slow—as they have been—to adopt the CDHC approach, under 
which HSAs must be funded equally for all employees.  Gary Claxton et al., What High-Deductible 
Plans Look Like: Findings from a National Survey of Employers, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCLUSIVES) W5-434 (finding less than four percent of employers offered HSA/HDHP coverage in 
2005). 
 121. David A. Alter et al., Socioeconomic Status, Service Patterns, and Perceptions of Care Among 
Survivors of Acute Myocardial Infarction in Canada, 291 J.A.M.A. 1100, 1103–04 (2004); see also 
Norman Frohlich et al., Health Service Use in the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority: Variations 
Across Areas in Relation to Health and Socioeconomic Status, HEALTH MGT. FORUM, Supplement 
(Winter 2002) 9–14 (presenting additional Canadian data). 
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health services.”122  These regressive distributional results presumably flow from 
factors similar to those we believe cause disproportionate allocations of 
insurance funds to higher-income participants in health plans sponsored by U.S. 
employers. 
Experience under the Medicare program is also consistent with our 
impression that, even when a health plan creates equal entitlements for a large 
population, wealthier participants will prove more equal than others.123  To be 
sure, the principal reason why wealthier beneficiaries consume more than an 
equal share of Medicare-financed services is the shorter life spans of lower-
income beneficiaries, who, despite having paid Medicare taxes throughout their 
working lives, do not live long enough, on average, to derive as much value 
from the program as wealthier beneficiaries.  But wealthier beneficiaries also 
consume Medicare services at higher rates during their years in the program—
even though beneficiaries lower on the income scale tend to have poorer health.  
Thus, several studies by Jonathan Skinner and co-authors have found Medicare 
spending on beneficiaries residing in zip codes where incomes are highest to be 
substantially greater than spending in other areas—except where incomes are 
lowest but beneficiaries have not only the poorest health but also special 
assistance from Medicaid in paying out-of-pocket costs.124  Another study found 
 
 122. M. Sutton et al., Allocation of Resources to English Areas: Individual and Small Area 
Determinants of Morbidity and Use of Health Care Resources, Report to the Department of Health 
(Edinburgh: Information and Services Division, 2002); see also Max Exworthy et al., Evidence into 
Policy and Practice? Measuring the Progress of U.S. and U.K. Policies to Tackle Disparities and 
Inequalities in U.S. and U.K. Health and Health Care, 84 MILBANK Q. 75, 79 tbl.1 (2006).  For data from 
Australia, see Anthony Scott et al., Is General Practitioner Decision Making Associated with Patient 
Socio-economic Status?, 42 SOC. SCI. MED. 35 (1996) (finding patients of high socioeconomic status 
more likely to be tested for illnesses and less likely to receive a prescription, suggesting the visit was 
unnecessary). 
 123. See Karen Davis & Roger Reynolds, Medicare and the Utilization of Health Care Services by the 
Elderly, 10 J. HUM. RESOURCES 36 (1975) (finding significant income effects on the number of 
physician visits by Medicare beneficiaries with a similar health status); Marian E. Gornick et al., Effects 
of Race and Income on Mortality and Use of Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 335 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 791 (1996) (showing a positive correlation between Medicare beneficiaries’ income and their 
utilization of certain physician services, including screenings); Charles R. Link et al., Equity and the 
Utilization of Health Care Services by the Medicare Elderly, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 195 (1982) 
(concluding that income affects the number of physician visits by those on Medicare when controlling 
for health status); Gornick, supra note 101.  On the regressivity of Medicare’s financing—that is, the 
question of who pays as opposed to who benefits (the subject of discussion here)—see supra notes 1 & 
48.  On the larger question of Medicare’s net distributional effects, see supra note 1. 
 124. Their more recent data suggests that lower-income households began to account for higher 
levels of spending in the mid-1990s.  See McClellan & Skinner, supra note 1; Julie Lee, Mark McClellan 
& Jonathan Skinner, The Distributional Effects of Medicare Expenditures (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6910, 1999); Jonathan Skinner & Weiping Zhou, The Measurement and 
Evolution of Health Inequality: Evidence from the U.S. Medicare Population (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 10842, 2004).  But see Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 1. 
Query whether similar distributional effects may occur under the new Medicare prescription-drug 
benefit once it is finally implemented.  See supra note 20.  This benefit, enacted in 2003, includes a so-
called “doughnut hole”—that is, a lack of coverage for any annual expenditures between $2250 and 
$3600 that applies only after an initial government outlay of seventy-five percent of all expenditures up 
to $2250 (after a $250 deductible) and that a beneficiary must cover himself before new catastrophic 
drug coverage kicks in.  The up-front benefit, covering easily budgetable expenditures, was obviously 
adopted so that the (Republican) proponents could represent to voters that the bill, while generally 
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that in the second and third years prior to death, average Medicare spending 
was greater for beneficiaries living in areas with the highest median income.125  
Mark McClellan and Skinner, considering such evidence in 1999, concluded that 
“lower-income beneficiaries who are not eligible for Medicaid [are] the income 
group that fares least well in terms of net benefits in traditional Medicare,” and 
that Medicare’s intragenerational transfers are largely from lower-income to 
higher-income households.126 
Unfortunately, Medicare data provides only weak support for our thesis 
that, all else being equal, higher-income beneficiaries of a single health plan will 
get significantly more out of it.  Because higher-income Medicare beneficiaries 
are more likely to have Medigap coverage, they face lower financial barriers to 
using Medicare benefits.127  Their higher utilization rates therefore do not finally 
establish that nominally equal entitlements alone do not guarantee income-
neutral distribution of benefits.  Even in the absence of definitive U.S. evidence, 
however, our hypothesis is supported by appearances, intuition, and experience 
in analogous settings.  On this basis, we are prepared, pending further 
investigation, to make our allegation of regressivity an additional count in our 
indictment of U.S. health care as, in several important respects, a fraud on the 
working class.  Together with the many other unfairnesses we detect in 
American health care, the regressive tendencies we adumbrate here invite 
attention to reforms that would enable people to purchase, collectively or 
individually, only the health care they want and are willing, with the help of 
public subsidies (up to a point), to pay for. 
 
confusing, would immediately benefit all beneficiaries, not just the minority with very high drug costs.  
But this representation hid the doughnut hole, which could present a problem for many lower-income 
beneficiaries, with the result that higher-income users of the system are likely to claim a 
disproportionate share of total benefits. 
 125. Lisa R. Shugarman et al., Differences in Medicare Expenditures During the Last 3 Years of Life, 
19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 127 (2004).  Note that focusing on consumption in years prior to death, 
rather than on consumption by age cohorts, may be a good way to ensure comparisons of consumption 
by individuals with a similar health status. 
 126. Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, Medicare Reform: Who Pays and Who Benefits?, 
HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 48, 59.  The authors observe, however, that Medicare’s overall 
unfairness was mitigated by legislation in 1994 removing the earlier ceiling on the amount of salaries 
and wages subject to the Medicare tax.  Another study, adding some irony to consumption disparities, 
finds that much of the higher utilization is explained by the more inpatient-based and specialist-
oriented patterns of care that are typical of high-spending regions and that this additional consumption 
does not appear to improve quality of care, access to care, satisfaction with care, or health outcomes.  
Fisher et al., supra note 81. 
 127. See Rezaul K. Khandker & Lauren A. McCormack, Medicare Spending by Beneficiaries with 
Various Types of Supplemental Insurance, 56 MED. CARE RES. REV. 137 (1999) (finding that Medicare 
beneficiaries who enjoy Medigap or employer-sponsored supplemental coverage consume more 
Medicare dollars than beneficiaries covered by Medicare alone); Renee Mentnech et al., An Analysis of 
Utilization and Access from the NHIS: 1984–92, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1995, at 51 (similar 
finding with respect to a Medicare beneficiary’s likelihood of visiting a physician); Nadereh Pourat et 
al., Socioeconomic Differences in Medicare Supplemental Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 
186 (finding that lower-income individuals are less likely to enjoy supplemental coverage). 
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IV 
OVERREGULATION OF HEALTH CARE: IN WHOSE INTEREST? 
The previous discussion describes the surprising number of ways in which 
those working Americans who have health coverage bear, or appear to bear, 
excessive costs in supporting a health care system that serves the interests of the 
health care industry and its higher-income customers better than it serves 
themselves.  This Part IV shows how industry practice, public policy, health care 
law, and government regulation are all structured at the most fundamental 
levels to ensure that this regressive allocation of benefits and costs remains the 
pattern in U.S. health care.  The story told here is largely about how the 
political process and the legal system operate in tandem to limit, de facto and de 
jure, consumers’ opportunities to economize, thus ensuring that their money 
will continue to flow, without their consent (if they want health coverage at all), 
to the benefit of elite interests. 
A. Prescription Versus Consumer Choice 
A crucial question is why Americans do not treat health care as an ordinary 
consumer good in the sense that they buy more or less of it (both in quantity 
and quality) as their personal preferences and financial situations dictate.128  To 
be sure, health insurance and the tax subsidy make consumers less cost-
conscious than they normally would be, thus shifting outward the margins at 
which most choices are made.  But these influences do not explain why, at these 
new margins, consumers’ choices are still not free, but are instead narrowly 
cabined by industry convention and practice on the one hand and by law and 
regulation on the other.  Nor are the limits on freedom of contract adequately 
explained—as so many seem to think—by health care’s special significance.  
Although health care can often make the difference between a healthy life and 
death or disability, it is not itself risk-free, nor is it all equally important to well-
being.  Moreover, when the special character and importance of health care are 
clear, government and the legal system have long supplied specific protections 
for patients—for example, the legal duty of hospitals to provide emergency care 
without regard to ability to pay.129 With the special importance of health care 
 
 128. On the macroeconomic consequences, indirectly adverse to Americans working outside the 
health sector, of limiting consumers’ opportunities to economize on health care, see supra note 99. 
 129. Both federal and state laws require hospitals with emergency departments to stabilize emergent 
conditions without regard to commercial considerations.  See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying 
text; Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 610–11 (Ariz. 1984) (enforcing the statutory 
duty to treat an indigent’s emergency at county expense).  Although these laws stop short of imposing a 
duty to provide free extended care or other services, federal, state, and local governments also provide 
subventions, public hospitals, and public clinics as additional safety nets for those with serious health 
needs and no health insurance.  See supra note 38.  Also, in the same spirit as laws requiring emergency 
care, common-law courts do not permit a health care provider having an established relationship with a 
patient to terminate it at will if doing so would place the patient in peril.  E.g., Surgical Consultants, 
P.C. v. Ball, 447 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (holding that although her doctor’s office had 
told the plaintiff she was no longer a patient because of an unpaid bill, a valid claim for “abandonment” 
could be proved by “evidence that the physician has terminated the relationship at a critical stage of the 
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recognized in these specific respects, it might seem acceptable for freedom of 
contract to prevail with respect to less crucial, though still consequential, 
matters.  Our question here is why health care is mostly provided under very 
costly prescriptions of a regulatory and professional nature, not under 
conditions reflecting consumer preferences freely revealed in the marketplace. 
To be sure, health care is a paradigmatic example of a so-called merit good, 
something that society does not wish to see distributed solely on the basis of 
individuals’ ability and willingness to pay.  But characterizing health care in 
general as a merit good does not preclude its being treated as a consumer good 
at the margin.130  The two characterizations are not mutually exclusive.  Thus, it 
is possible to visualize a health policy under which public subsidies would 
enable each consumer to purchase a contractual entitlement to at least essential 
services of decent quality and no one would receive more or better health care 
than he or she prospectively purchased with that assistance.  Yet the nation has 
never treated health care this way, nor has it ever seriously considered doing 
so.131  Moreover, because the health care marketplace does not make low-cost 
options available, millions of Americans go without any coverage at all despite 
the financial subsidies available to them, and many millions more pay 
substantially more for health care than they would rationally choose to pay if 
they had good information and a full range of choices.  Parts II and III of this 
article showed how the bargains offered consumers in the current marketplace 
are, for the great majority of them, bad ones.  Not only are lower-income 
consumers denied the chance to take marginal risks (which might be their best 
bets in spending limited resources), but the premiums they pay for coverage 
defray many costs unrelated to their own care. 
The most obvious reason why low-cost health care—provided, for example, 
by less highly trained professionals or with only restricted access to expensive 
technology—is unavailable to American consumers is government intervention 
and the U.S. legal system.  Many such options are simply excluded from the 
 
patient’s treatment, that the termination was done without reason or sufficient notice to enable the 
patient to procure another physician, and that the patient [was] injured as a result thereof.”).  In 
addition, insurance law provides special protections against such dangerous insurer practices as bad-
faith denials of claims for benefits.  See generally WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD 
FAITH LITIGATION (1984 & Supp. 2006); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party 
Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1996). 
 130. See supra note 102. 
 131. The Clinton administration’s proposed Health Security Act of 1994 was first presented to the 
public with the claim that it “empowers consumers to make more cost-conscious choices by choosing 
among health plans on the basis of price and quality.  Consumers reap the savings from enrolling in a 
health plan that delivers the guaranteed benefits for a lower premium.”  Press Release, The White 
House, Health Security Preliminary Plan Summary (Sept. 22, 1993), available at 
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/092293-press-release-on-health-care-security-plan.htm.  But 
although this and other rhetoric implied that competition and consumer choice would primarily drive 
the projected system, the plan’s details, by specifying seemingly generous “guaranteed benefits,” 
greatly limited consumers’ options and the role of private contracts in particularizing rights and 
obligations.  In fact, the proposal’s egalitarianism quotient (and thus its probable cost) was quite high.  
See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 29–89, for a thorough review of the 
Clinton proposal in this light. 
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market by legal doctrines, rules, and regulations ostensibly designed to uphold 
the quality of the health services people receive or the health coverage they 
enjoy.  Other options, although not explicitly precluded by law, would present 
the first innovator with enough legal risk and uncertainty to make the cost of 
introducing them prohibitive.132  However well-intended and protective the legal 
regime may seem to be, any marginal benefits it yields are, of necessity, of 
greater value to some people than to others.  Without questioning the need for 
basic legal protection against bad quality, misrepresentation, and overreaching, 
we first observe here the general propensity of our legal and political 
institutions to lay down and maintain rules that serve elite interests at the 
expense of everyone else and, then, show some ways in which the legal 
environment of U.S. health care manifests this regressive propensity.  Although 
the legal regime does not directly redistribute income from the have-lesses to 
the have-mores, its biases and influences add significantly to our picture of a 
system rigged for the latter’s benefit.  Our interest here is the political economy 
and legal environment of health care and how they effectively deny consumers 
opportunities to economize when it would be in their interest to do so.  
Although the discussion below covers some familiar ground, it also identifies 
some special, under-recognized reasons why, under current circumstances, 
popular government cannot be trusted to treat lower- and middle-income 
consumer-voters fairly in making health policy. 
B. Legislating for Health Care 
Political theorists and realists alike have long appreciated that legislation on 
economic matters is hardly ever the product solely of objective reasoning about 
what the overall public interest requires.  Instead, it emerges from a complex 
political struggle in which special interests and factions compete, often behind 
the scenes, to induce government to employ its taxing, spending, prescriptive, 
and coercive powers in ways advantageous to themselves.  Even in theory, the 
democratic process of majority voting provides little basis for confidence that 
legislation will improve aggregate welfare.  Indeed, with so few constitutional 
limits on what a majority can do, majority rule is pregnant with the possibility 
that significant minority interests will be sacrificed for small majority gains.  
Although some minorities (the affluent, for example) are well positioned to 
protect their interests in the political arena, others are highly vulnerable to 
legislation that worsens their position, whatever its net effect on society as a 
 
 132. As a thought experiment, it is instructive to ask why Americans cannot buy Canadian-style or 
U.K.-style health care, both substantially cheaper than the U.S. variety though in some respects 
(waiting time, for example) probably less good.  Cf. Chaoulli v. Quebec, 2005 S.C.C. 35, 29272, [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 33 QUICKLAW (June 9, 2005).  It is our sense that such innovative offerings, even if not 
actually barred by law, would face enough legal uncertainty to make them untenable despite their 
potential attractiveness to many consumers.  No single firm could afford to defend its innovation 
against the inevitable legal challenges if its competitors could follow at no cost any trails it succeeded in 
blazing.  It would be hard to argue, though, that what is good enough to satisfy a political majority of 
Canadians or Britons is not good enough for many Americans. 
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whole.  More ominously (and as next explained), the political process provides 
few guarantees that even majority interests will not frequently be sacrificed for 
the benefit of especially powerful minorities.  In the health care field, the net 
effect of such failures of the political market is a systematic overburdening of 
those at the lower end of the income scale. 
1. The Political Power of Influential Minorities 
Social (or public) choice theory and research have shown that majority rule, 
despite its logic, does not prevent powerful minorities from frequently using the 
legislative process to their own advantage, even at the expense of the electoral 
majority.  The paradigm case is one in which a small number of participants in 
the political process have large individual stakes in a legislative measure about 
which members of the majority care little, either because each individual’s 
interest is very small or because they have not taken the trouble to inform 
themselves about it.  The small, more homogeneous group has a comparative 
advantage in solving the collective-action problem—that is, the tendency of 
some members of an affected group to hang back (as free-riders) in the hope 
that others will take the actions needed to identify, protect, and advance their 
collective interest.133  Even if a voting member of the majority recognizes his 
potential stake in a particular matter, he must also realize that neither his vote 
nor any other action he might take has much chance of affecting the legislative 
outcome—a circumstance that lessens his incentive to inform himself fully in 
the first place or to act on whatever information he may have.134  Thus, 
whenever a legislative struggle pits a smaller group with large interests against 
the mass of consumers or taxpayers, the minority is likely to win.  Moreover, the 
rent-seeking minority’s gains, while substantial, may easily be less than the net 
costs imposed on the majority, thus diminishing aggregate welfare. 
 
 133. As an interest group becomes larger and more diverse, the practical problems of organizing for 
political or other collective action become greater.  See generally  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971); Mark A. Peterson, From Trust to Political Power: Interest 
Groups, Public Choice, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1145, 1154–57  (2001) 
(describing the declining political effectiveness of the American Medical Association and the rise of 
competing interest groups in the health care field). 
 134. A perennial problem in policy analysis is the quickness with which some analysts endorse a 
larger role for government than for markets on the ground that consumers, on whose choices markets 
depend, are ignorant, powerless, and easily manipulated.  See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of 
Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market 
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999).  Yet those same consumers, precisely because they have so little 
hope of protecting themselves successfully in the political process, are apt to be even more ignorant, 
individually powerless, and manipulable in their capacity as voters—to whom democratic government is 
supposed to be accountable.  Moreover, some consumer-voters are better equipped to participate in 
and influence the political process than others, compounding the potential for harm to the most 
ignorant and least politically effective.  On the other hand, an attractively democratic feature of free 
markets is the absence of majority dictation to the minority and the incentives they therefore create for 
participants to cater specifically to minority tastes and needs.  Whatever need there may be for law and 
regulation to protect against real abuses, it too often serves as an excuse for disenfranchising consumers 
and for empowering government and those whom it serves best. 
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Political scientists and some others will rightly say that things are not as 
simple as social-choice or interest-group theory suggests.135  But even when the 
legislative struggle is complex and features a large number of competing 
interests and factions interacting over time, the likelihood of coalitions against 
poorly organized consumers and taxpayers remains high.  Thus, even conceding 
that legislators and public servants sometimes rise above opportunism and act 
in the interest of higher values, political outcomes, if scrutinized with care 
(including due skepticism about the values politicians profess to serve), are very 
often consistent with the theory.  Indeed, even proposals that seem unarguably 
progressive on their face are regularly tailored for special interests before they 
emerge from the legislative process.  Such failures of the political market 
appear to be especially common in the health care field, manifesting themselves 
both in explicit regulation and in other measures that tilt sharply in the 
direction of elite interests.136 
2. The Political Consequences of Hiding Costs from Those Who Pay 
Although public choice theory alone can explain much of the cost-
increasing, rent-generating regulation found in the health care sector, such 
regulation has been much easier to enact and maintain because the cost of 
health care is so well hidden from consumers as a direct and indirect 
consequence of the tax subsidy.137  Because health coverage is paid for mostly 
through employers’ undisclosed reductions of employees’ taxable income, 
consumers have seen little reason, as voters, to question legal restrictions that 
purport to uphold the quality of care.138  Certainly employers have some interest 
in health care costs as well as significant political influence that they might use 
to contest regulatory excesses.  But employers’ attitudes toward health care 
regulation are heavily influenced by the perceptions and expectations of their 
workers and by their own awareness that, in the last analysis, their employees, 
 
 135. See, e.g., Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002). 
 136. For an example of special-interest influence over seemingly benign legislation in the health 
care field, see Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, 
Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1980), which shows how hospital and 
insurance interests supported early certificate-of-need laws that were promoted as cost-containment 
measures but in fact served to curb competition and to legitimize, rather than prevent, cost increases.  
Although our overview cannot do full justice to all the specific regulatory programs and legal rules 
touched upon, our survey adds weight to our claim that U.S. health care is systematically arranged and 
governed to take unfair advantage of the lower- and middle-income majority.  We have already 
suggested in Part II the breathtaking magnitude of the injustice that concerns us. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 84–92. 
 138. Many of the most questionable regulatory policies, moreover, are maintained well out of public 
view and are even more rarely seen as controversial.  Although federal regulators are now required to 
provide benefit-cost comparisons when adopting new regulations, similar requirements rarely govern 
health-sector regulation at the state level.  See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing use of regulatory impact 
analyses by federal agencies).  For a discussion and comparison of regulatory impact statements by 
state agencies, see Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 873 (2000). 
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not themselves, will pay any higher costs.  Consumer-voter complacency about 
their own health care costs thus removes a vital counterweight to the political 
advantages usually enjoyed by regulated interests, creating a political economy 
in which legal and regulatory standards are set with little regard for the costs 
they cause consumers to bear. 
The conventional justification for many kinds of government regulation is 
consumers’ inability to distinguish in the marketplace between good and bad 
quality.  Additionally, it is generally thought self-evident that the extra 
complexity of health care, together with its extra potential for causing serious 
harm, justifies heavy regulation of the health sector.  But when consumers for 
the most part are not—or think they are not—spending their own money, the 
situation is fraught with new hazards.  Such consumers, fully cognizant of the 
special riskiness of purchasing health services in ignorance, will want both 
health coverage that virtually eliminates temptations to economize and rigorous 
regulatory measures to exclude risky options from the market.139  Because the 
insured population represents such a large voting bloc, their weak cost-
consciousness combined with their nervousness about economizing virtually 
ensures political choices that err on the side of overspending.  Only the interest 
of the federal and state governments in the costs of their own health programs 
provides a countervailing interest in keeping costs in hand.140  The irony, of 
course, is that most consumer-voters tend—in their ignorance—to support 
policies contrary to their true self-interest. 
The inability of consumers to see what they are spending on their health 
coverage is no accident but has long been a keystone of U.S. health policy.  
Although fortuity may explain the original decision in the 1940s to subsidize 
health coverage through the tax system, for two generations powerful interests 
resisted making costs visible in ways that might cause consumers to consider 
how much, given their other needs, they wished to spend on marginal health 
 
 139. In a classic 1963 article on medical economics, economist Kenneth Arrow speculated that 
consumers’ fears about purchasing in ignorance alone were a sufficient explanation for health-sector 
regulation: 
The general uncertainty about the prospects of medical treatment is socially handled by rigid 
entry [i.e., physician licensing] requirements.  These are designed to reduce the uncertainty in 
the mind of the consumer as to the quality of product insofar as this is possible.  I think this 
explanation, which is perhaps the naive one, is much more tenable than any idea of a 
[medical] monopoly seeking to increase incomes.  No doubt restriction on entry is desirable 
from the point of view of the existing physicians, but the public pressure needed to achieve the 
restriction must come from deeper causes. 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 
966 (1963).  Writing before Medicare and Medicaid and at a time when the public was both less 
insulated from and less concerned about the cost of health services, Arrow had no reason to be 
concerned about the possibility of overregulation. 
 140. Even here, state governments, which are responsible for some of the most restrictive regulatory 
controls, see none of the costs of Medicare and only a fraction of their own Medicaid costs, which are 
paid in substantial measure with matching federal funds.  See James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, 
Health Care Reform Through Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a 
Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125, 136–49 (2000). 
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care.141  The most obvious beneficiary of the cost-hiding policy was the health 
care industry itself, which wanted as little resistance as possible when indulging 
its propensity for higher spending.  In addition, however, high-income 
consumers of health care have also benefited from policies and practices that 
consumer-voters supported only because they did not appreciate the effects on 
their own finances.  The tax subsidy also gave union leaders an opportunity to 
earn credit with the rank and file by negotiating expensive health benefits 
seemingly provided at employers’ expense; more important to the powers that 
be, it also reduced the labor movement’s interest in promoting national health 
insurance, as trade unions had successfully done in other western countries.142  
As the specific needs of the less well-off were neglected, the health care 
industry and its affluent allies enjoyed many happy returns. 
For a variety of reasons, therefore, the tax subsidy remained untouchable in 
the political system for many years even though no one could defend it on its 
policy merits.  To be sure, one might argue (1) that the public really wanted (a) 
as much health care as doctors advised patients to consume, and (b) not to 
know how much they were paying for that care; and (2) that the nation 
accordingly made a political choice to have the system that emerged.143  But 
market and political choices made by a public that is kept in almost total 
ignorance about costs can legitimize nothing, certainly not the systematic 
exploitation of the majority by affluent minorities that we observe in U.S. 
health care. 
3. Will Shifting Overt Cost Burdens to Consumers Change Things? 
Over time, and particularly recently, employers have increased the share of 
health care costs that employees pay directly, making them more cost-
conscious—and consequently, we presume, somewhat less dependably 
supportive of public policies limiting their opportunities to economize on health 
care.  Consumers, however, still see only the tip of the iceberg of health care 
costs.  And they have no way of knowing the opportunity costs the system 
forces them to bear by restricting their economizing options to a relatively 
 
 141. Although proposals to “cap” the tax exclusion have been offered from time to time, they have 
always fallen on deaf political ears.  See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 103 
(“[C]apping the tax subsidy is a notion that only a policy wonk could love, a meritorious policy idea 
with no natural political constituency.”). 
 142. See generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR, BUSINESS, AND 
THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 42–44 (2000) (observing how, after World 
War II and the introduction of the tax subsidy, the labor movement divided its efforts between 
bargaining for health benefits and advocacy of national health insurance, but failing to highlight the tax 
subsidy as a key explanation for the movement’s priorities). 
 143. For the view that “[c]onsumers have sought the kind of health insurance they have . . . precisely 
because they don’t wish to be forced to make rational trade-offs when they are confronted with medical 
care consumption decisions,” see Bruce C. Vladeck, The Market v. Regulation: The Case for Regulation, 
59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 209, 211 (1981).  Although it is true that people buy coverage to 
avoid difficult choices, Vladeck’s statement begs the question whether people have in fact been offered 
either market or political choices requiring them to face the high marginal cost of the extra levels of 
protection he says they demand. 
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narrow range.  Thus, while the movement to make consumers more cost-aware 
may be creating market and political demand for new cost-saving options, the 
shell game by which the health care system hides its costs from those who pay 
them still results in a market failure cum political failure especially 
disadvantageous to less-than-affluent payers of health insurance premiums.144 
One way in which employers have overtly shifted health care costs to their 
employees is by increasing the share of the employer’s premium for health 
coverage that employees pay via explicit deductions from their take-home 
pay.145  Since 1978, it has been possible for an employer to arrange for its 
employees’ share of the premium, as well as its own, to be paid with untaxed 
dollars.146  This change made it possible for individuals whose employers would 
not pay, or pay in full, for family coverage to obtain such coverage with pre-tax 
dollars.  Moreover, many employers now offer their workers a menu of 
coverage options, requiring them to contribute, usually from pre-tax income, 
some or all of the added cost of the more expensive packages.  Surprisingly, a 
number of employers that have increased their employees’ share of their 
premium cost have done so without enabling them to pay that share with pre-
tax dollars, thus making the employees’ contributions more costly, after taxes, 
than they have to be.  Analysts have found evidence that some employers 
following this strategy have done so in order to induce employees, who for 
some reason do not value coverage very highly, to forgo it altogether, thus 
saving money for the employer.147  In any event, as consumers become 
increasingly responsible for paying for their own health coverage, demand for 
health insurance may become more price-elastic, inspiring more cost-reducing 
innovation in both insurance and health care itself and perhaps even voter 
interest in deregulatory moves facilitating more such innovation. 
The recent CDHC reforms are also notable in this context because they are 
expressly intended to make consumers pay more of the cost of their own health 
 
 144. For recent survey data demonstrating the increasing salience of costs in consumer attitudes 
toward health care, see EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2006 HEALTH CONFIDENCE 
SURVEY: DISSATISFACTION WITH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM DOUBLES SINCE 1998 (2006), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/publications/notes/index.cfm?fa=notesPrint&content_id=3758. For fuller 
elaboration of the “shell game” metaphor, see Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 
24, at 78–80. 
 145. Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, Why Did Employee Health Insurance Contributions 
Rise?, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 1085, 1085 (2003) (observing that between 1982 and 1998 the percentage of 
employees whose employers paid the full cost of their coverage fell from forty-four percent to twenty-
eight percent). 
 146. I.R.C. § 125 (LEXIS 2005) (providing for so-called cafeteria plans). 
 147. Helen Levy, Who Pays for Health Insurance? Employee Contributions to Health Insurance 
Premiums 9–10 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 398, 1998); see also 
Gruber & McKnight, supra note 145, at 1088–89.  Although the latter source suggests that this strategy 
may cause employees simply to seek coverage available under a spouse’s plan or to rely on Medicaid to 
provide for their dependents, the decline in the rate of employee “take-up” of employer-offered 
coverage has also contributed to the growth of the uninsured population.  See MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, 
PRICE SENSITIVITY IN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY 36–37 (2d ed. 2005) 
(summarizing evidence that decline in take-up rates, rather than in the number of employers offering 
coverage, is principally responsible for the increased number of uninsured). 
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care—in this case, at the point of service rather than in purchasing health 
coverage.  To be sure, the CDHC reforms were not adopted in the interest of 
consumers of moderate means,148 and they may, at least in the short run, 
exacerbate some of the regressive tendencies noted in earlier discussion.149  On 
the other hand, as high-deductible coverage and increased cost sharing of other 
kinds cause consumers to be more aware of health care costs, there may be 
more market pressure on health plans to discover new (or rediscover old) ways 
of counteracting moral hazard and less public support for cost-increasing 
regulation.150 
C. Distributive Consequences of Substantive Health Care Law and Regulation 
There are numerous identifiable ways in which political and legal systems in 
the United States directly or indirectly foreclose opportunities for lower- and 
middle-income consumers to enhance their own, as well as aggregate, welfare 
by purchasing low-cost, arguably lower-quality health care and health coverage.  
It is no coincidence that the various laws and policies criticized here all tend to 
restrict consumers’ freedom of contract for the benefit of influential minorities, 
principally industry stakeholders and high-income users of health services.  The 
overregulation summarized below is objectionable in large part because, in 
markets for both health services and health coverage, it impedes what has been 
called disruptive innovation—that is,  offering new products that, while they 
might be less good, or in some other way out of keeping with conventional 
standards, put competition on a different, perhaps more affordable plane, 
thereby serving many consumers better.151 
 
 148. See supra notes 96 & 108 on distributional implications of the CDHC reforms. 
 149. Some purport to fear that high-deductible coverage will cause healthier, often wealthier 
employees to contribute less than they currently do to the support of coworkers with more or chronic 
health problems.  See generally BETH FUCHS & JULIA A. JAMES, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, 
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: THE FUNDAMENTALS (2005), available at http://www.nhpf.org/ 
pdfs_bp/BP_HSAs_04-11-05.pdf (reviewing arguments for and against HSAs).  Yet, as noted previously 
in Part III, our conjecture is that, when people with disparate risks and preferences are arbitrarily 
pooled in the same health plan, subsidies may actually run the other way, with higher-income insureds, 
as a class, getting more out of the plan than their lower-income coworkers.  See supra note 107 and 
accompanying text. 
 150. See Hall & Havighurst, supra note 97 (arguing that HSAs and other innovations could make 
the public more comfortable with health plans’ predetermination of benefits and other methods of 
rationing coverage). 
 151. For an overview of disruptive innovation and the view that competition to create radically 
different, often lower-cost, alternative products has been crucial in destabilizing and ultimately 
improving the performance of many industries, see CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S 
DILEMMA (1997).  In our view, many potential innovations stymied by overregulation in the health 
care sector would be helpfully destructive of conventional paradigms and beneficial from the 
standpoint of efficiency and consumer welfare.  For an application of disruptive innovation theorizing 
to the health care sector and to the thesis of this article, see Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin A. Schulman, 
Overregulation of Health Care: Mustings on Disruptive Innovation Theory, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 195, 197–206 (Autumn 2006). 
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1. Overregulating Providers 
The most pervasive kind of regulation of the health care sector is entry 
control through occupational licensure.152  In theory at least, exclusionary 
licensure, barring from the market individuals who do not meet minimum 
standards of competence in the regulated field of endeavor, can enhance 
consumers’ welfare by minimizing both their exposure to risks of bad service 
and their uncertainty in purchasing complex services, thus reducing what 
economists call their “search costs.”153  Entry controls also raise costs, however, 
by excluding providers who might serve some clients adequately and cheaply, 
thus forcing those clients (mostly lower-income individuals) to pay higher prices 
for arguably more reliable services.  Nevertheless, despite these costs, entry 
regulation could be calibrated in such a way that, according to one theory at 
least,154 overall welfare is improved.  Indeed, regulation may arguably be 
efficient even if the resulting higher prices cause some consumers to forgo 
needed services, with adverse health consequences.155  But, whatever economic 
theory may say, it is relevant for present purposes that the lower-income 
segment of the population, even if protected against costly mistakes, bears 
many more of the costs of exclusionary licensure than more affluent interests. 
Even though exclusionary licensure may in theory sometimes be 
economically efficient, the nature of majoritarian politics makes it predictable 
that in any field in which government regulates entry, entry standards will be 
inefficiently high, causing more hardship than is even arguably optimal.  Indeed, 
if consumers feel at significant risk in purchasing some good or service on their 
own, then the political majority they constitute can be expected to demand 
more “consumer protection” and more peace of mind than is consistent with 
 
 152. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, ch.2, at 25–28; 
Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (2000) (overview of economic 
literature on licensure, with emphasis on the need for empirical studies of cost and other impacts); 
Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kudrle, Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes?: The Case of 
Dentistry, 43 J.L. & ECON. 547 (2000) (estimating that state licensure causes thirty percent increase in 
dentists’ fees). 
 153. See supra note 139.  An alternative to exclusionary licensure is public certification, sometimes 
called title licensure.  This intermediate form of regulation, which addresses the information problem 
by limiting not who may practice in a field but who may use certain titles, was famously advocated by 
economist Milton Friedman.  MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 144–49 (2d ed. 1982). 
 154. In economic theory, regulation is not deemed inefficient as long as the gains to the winners 
exceed the losses to the losers, whether or not the losers are compensated in some way.  See RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13–15 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing this so-called Kaldor-
Hicks definition of efficiency).  Even if regulation passes this test, however, social justice is obviously 
implicated if lower-income persons are regularly on the losing end.  See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can 
Efficiency Be Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 967, 984 (2001) (admonishing that 
“Kaldor’s expedient normative dictum is never an excuse for setting aside moral thought”).  Moreover, 
even in the event that lower-income wage earners are not net losers once all social programs (which 
serve mostly the poor) are taken into account, there is no good reason why the health care system 
should be organized and regulated to their disadvantage. 
 155. See, e.g., Sidney L. Carroll & Robert J. Gaston, Occupational Restrictions and the Quality of 
Service Received, 47 SO. ECON. J. 959 (1981) (stressing that social costs of regulation, which must be 
compared to benefits, include harms resulting from consumers’ forgoing of valuable services because of 
regulation-induced higher prices). 
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aggregate welfare, let alone the welfare of those with less than median income.  
Public choice theory, of course, anticipates that members of a regulated 
industry will organize themselves and lobby effectively for high standards that 
limit supply and increase both the duration and market value of their 
incumbency.  But majority rule is alone sufficient to explain the unfair burdens 
imposed on those below the middle of the income spectrum.156  In the health 
care sector, moreover, as we have previously observed, the welfare of the 
sub-affluent is in special jeopardy because the middle-class majority tend not to 
appreciate the economic costs of regulation even to themselves and therefore 
regularly lean against their own self-interest.157  Indeed, occupational licensure is 
a paradigm case illustrating how policies effectively obscuring the incidence of 
health care costs from consumer-voters, when combined with tendencies 
captured by public choice theory, consistently and systematically produce 
distributive injustice. 
Occupational regulation has other costs besides those flowing from state-
imposed restrictions on entry.  State legislatures typically also delegate 
responsibility for regulating practice of a licensed occupation to its licensing 
board, which is usually staffed by members of the licensed occupation itself.  In 
the nature of things, such boards discharge these responsibilities very much as 
state-chartered cartels, making rules not only curtailing the supply of 
competitors but also suppressing advertising, corporate or commercial practice, 
and other practices that might intensify competition and foster consumer 
choice.158  Moreover, at the same time that they largely control the regulatory 
apparatus, the licensees in each field generally organize themselves privately 
not only to advance their political objectives, but also to set private standards 
for professional practice, educational programs, and institutional providers of 
services.  Although such private entities may not directly enforce the standards 
they set, these standards and their accompanying certifications of compliance 
usually carry decisive weight in the marketplace and with state regulators.159  
With the public generally unaware of the cost and competitive implications of 
such publicly sanctioned self-regulatory regimes, the interests of the regulated 
are commonly advanced at consumers’ expense, with cost increases a natural 
result.  Because the actions taken are always rationalized by reference to quality 
concerns, elite observers tend to be generally supportive and, in any event, less 
 
 156. For further discussion and a graphic bell curve illustrating how majority rule is likely to yield 
overregulation, see Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 82–86. 
 157. See id. (illustrating how majority rule under conditions of systematic consumer-voter ignorance 
about the incidence of health care costs might produce “hyper-regulation”). 
 158. See Clark C. Havighurst, Contesting Anticompetitive Actions Taken in the Name of the State: 
State Action Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 585 (2006) 
(discussing the limited extent to which federal antitrust law limits state authority to immunize 
anticompetitive actions by state licensing and regulatory boards). 
 159. See generally Symposium, Private Accreditation in the Regulatory State, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (Autumn 1994). 
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concerned about higher costs than lower- and middle-income consumers should 
be. 
Institutions in the health care field, particularly hospitals, also frequently 
enjoy substantial benefits from the regulatory regimes to which they are subject 
and from the activities of private standard-setting and accrediting organizations.  
Once again, although quality-enhancing standards limit opportunities for cost-
reducing innovations, they are rarely controversial politically, both because the 
rank-and-file electorate fails to see any connection to their own pocketbooks 
and because elite consumer-voters tend to value disproportionately the added 
security they supply.  In addition, institutional providers may enjoy the 
protection of certificate-of-need regulation, which operates to curb new market 
entry threatening to their market power.  Though repealed in some states after 
Congress repealed, in 1986, the federal law that compelled states to enact them, 
certificate-of-need requirements still operate in many places.160  Originally put in 
place under the rationale that competition could never work in medical care,161 
these laws remain on the books today largely to prevent competition (with, say, 
freestanding ambulatory surgery centers or specialty hospitals) from 
undermining the ability of hospital monopolies to cross-subsidize unspecified 
good works that hospitals presumably do.162  As noted earlier, to rely on 
monopolist providers to carry out public responsibilities is to impose the 
equivalent of a regressive head tax on premium payers. 
2. Overregulating Health Plans 
Financial oversight of insurance companies is essential to obviate, or at least 
to deal with, the problem of insolvency, and consumers certainly need 
substantial tort as well as contract remedies to deter insurers from stonewalling 
valid claims in the hope that the claimant will go away.  Also, the complexity of 
insurance contracts is such that consumer welfare can be enhanced by having at 
least individual policies vetted by insurance regulators.  Some features of 
current insurance regulation and insurance law, however, are less clearly 
advantageous for all premium payers as a class.  Fortunately, state regulation, 
which can clearly provide helpful protection for individual insurance 
purchasers, is far less intrusive in the case of group health insurance, where 
employers act as agents for their employees and can be assumed to have (or be 
able to hire) the requisite sophistication.  In addition, some HMOs, and all 
health plans in which the employer itself bears the insurance risk, are 
 
 160. See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 709–52 (2d 
ed. 1998). 
 161. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLANNING 
FOR COMPETITION (1982); see also supra note 136. 
 162. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry et al., Specialty versus Community Hospitals: What Role for the Law?, 
2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-361 (proposing certificate-of-need regulation to protect 
community hospitals against opportunistic competition from specialized providers); Clark C. 
Havighurst, Monopoly Is Not the Answer, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-373 (criticizing 
Choudhry et al. proposal). 
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significantly protected by federal law against burdensome state regulation and 
state-created liabilities.163  But many aspects of the legal environment prevent 
modern health plans from selling low-cost coverage that many consumers would 
find well suited for their situations. 
A common feature of insurance regulation is mandated coverage for certain 
services, including mental health care, substance-abuse treatment, home health 
care, certain organ transplants, treatment of jaw disorders, infertility treatment, 
minimum hospital stays following normal births, and post-mastectomy breast 
reconstruction.164  State laws also frequently require that health plans permit 
certain covered services to be provided by non-physician providers to the extent 
of their authorized scopes of practice.  Each such mandate is a different story, of 
course, and there may be an arguable rationale for some of them based on the 
possibility that minority needs or preferences will be neglected in designing 
health coverage for heterogeneous employment groups.  But the usual story is 
one of special-interest lobbying—often a combined effort of provider and 
patient-advocacy groups—in an atmosphere of general consumer-voter 
disinterest.165  In any event, the overall tendency of mandated benefits is to raise 
costs unnecessarily. 
The backlash against managed health care in the 1990s resulted in 
significant cutbacks in health plans’ use of administrative methods—previously 
employed with mixed results—to contain the effects of moral hazard.166  Not 
only did employers, responding to new employee fears and complaints, rapidly 
retract their early support for HMOs employing limited provider networks or 
aggressively rationing financing for marginally beneficial services, but 
consumers themselves supported legislative efforts to rein in health plans’ 
economizing efforts.  These legislative measures included new coverage (for 
example, length-of-stay) mandates, “any-willing-provider” laws limiting health 
 
 163. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–03 (LEXIS 2005) 
(preempting state laws relating to employee health benefits); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 
(2004) (finding certain health plans immunized by ERISA from state-imposed liability for wrongful 
denials of health benefits). 
 164. See generally Gail A. Jensen, Regulating the Content of Health Plans, in AMERICAN HEALTH 
POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM 167 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993). 
 165. Ironically, only small employers and their workers are affected by such cost-increasing benefit 
mandates because employers large enough to self-insure their employees’ health benefits are exempted 
from such state requirements by federal legislation.  See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  A 
recent federal legislative proposal to exempt health plans offered to pools of small businesses from 
various state coverage mandates, S. 1955, 109th Cong. (2006), was opposed by a broad-based coalition 
of health care providers, patient-advocacy groups, insurance regulators, and state attorneys general.  
See From the CQ Newsroom: Industry Group Backs Health Association Bill as States Push for Their 
Rights, http://www.cmwf.org/healthpolicyweek/healthpolicyweek_show.htm?doc_id=370240#doc370242 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2006). 
 166. See generally Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 427 (2005) (concluding that health plans scaled back earlier efforts to manage health 
care costs less because of new regulation than for other reasons); Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell 
Short, supra note 24 (extensive account of reasons, both legal and non-legal, for the failure of the 
1970s–1990s movement to empower consumers to make health care choices through competing health-
plan agents). 
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plans’ ability to reward with increased volume providers who would reduce 
their fees, and new “external review” procedures for challenging health plans’ 
denials of coverage.167  This outpouring of “patient-protection” legislation led 
many to conclude that the majority of voters, as well as physician interests, 
rejected an active role for health plans in deciding how health care dollars 
should be spent.  But the backlash provides a near-perfect illustration of how 
consumer-voters’ unawareness of their own stake in cost-saving measures can 
yield market and political outcomes contrary to their interests.168  Ever since the 
virtual demise of managed care, health care costs have risen at staggering 
rates,169 causing many employers to require their employees to shoulder a bigger 
share of the premium and other costs. 
A major obstacle to meaningful economizing by consumers in the purchase 
of health coverage has been the near-universal acceptance by the health care 
industry and other elite interests of the medical profession’s preferred paradigm 
of medical care.  This perspective treats health care as a non-economic good 
and questions the wisdom of giving patients opportunities to make 
consequential choices with costs or prices in view.  To be sure, the professional 
paradigm is not exactly incorporated in law.  But its influence remains pervasive 
in part because the tax subsidy has for so long minimized the chances that 
consumers would come to defy the dominant paradigm or that health plans 
would strive to customize coverage to fit, not the paradigm, but the 
pocketbooks of the consumers they seek to serve.  Thus, instead of 
differentiating their products in meaningful ways, health plans universally 
undertook, as the paradigm dictated, to pay for any service that was both 
medically necessary under professional standards and of sufficiently proven 
effectiveness to be accepted by the medical profession.  De facto, therefore, if 
not de jure, health care is delivered and paid for under standards set by 
professional interests, not in contracts with consumers.  Notably, some external 
review statutes have flirted with finally enshrining the professional standard in 
substantive law by having coverage denials reviewed by medical experts 
applying their own professional knowledge to the case without reference to the 
language of the insurance contract.170 
 
 167. See Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of 
Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Fall 2002) (reviewing so-called patient-protection 
legislation). 
 168. See Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 86 (extending bell-curve 
illustration, see supra notes 156–57, to the account for the “hyper-regulation” of managed care). 
 169. Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004: Recent Slowdown Led by Prescription 
Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 187 exh. 1 (2006) (showing health care expenditures as stable 
around 13.8% of GDP from 1993–2000, when managed care was dominant, but rising to 16% of GDP 
in 2004). 
 170. Cf. Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, H.R. 2563, § 104, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposal 
to mandate external professional review of any coverage decision based on “medical necessity or 
appropriateness” would have freed external reviewers from honoring contractual limits unless the 
applicable exclusion is categorically or numerically “exact”); see also supra note 110. 
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Freedom of contract has also languished in health care because of the 
immense difficulty of writing unambiguous contracts specifying patients’ 
entitlements in the myriad situations that can arise.  But it is possible to imagine 
economizing contracts with coverage criteria other than “medical necessity”—
perhaps incorporating by reference, for example, specific clinical guidelines 
developed by reputable medical experts with economizing as a principal 
objective.171  Although there is no solid legal obstacle to courts’ enforcing 
economizing contracts with primary regard to the intentions of the parties 
rather than to professional standards, one cannot count on courts to cooperate 
with such a project.  Instead, under the interpretive principle of contra 
proferentem, a court might feel constrained to interpret any contractual 
ambiguity against the party that drafted the contract, regardless of whether a 
significantly less ambiguous contract could have been written.  Although it is 
certainly not too late to resurrect freedom of contract in the health care field, 
the regulatory and legal environment has long limited, both de jure and de 
facto, the options available to consumers, forcing them to pay for the Cadillac 
coverage designed by professional interests and preferred by the industry’s elite 
customers as well as some academic critics.172  It remains to be seen whether the 
CDHC movement, by making consumers pay for much of the coverage they 
enjoy and for many of the services they consume, will change perceptions 
enough to widen the range of economizing options available to consumers.173 
3. How the Malpractice Liability System Overburdens Consumers 
Typical trial-lawyer rhetoric paints America’s tort system as a venue in 
which the ordinary citizen can obtain justice against the wealthy and powerful.  
But, in reality, the nation’s system for redressing injuries resulting from medical 
malpractice is another cornerstone of an overall health policy that 
disproportionately benefits elite classes at the expense of middle- and lower-
income consumers of health services.  It is, of course, not obvious how a system 
that permits injured patients to recover large amounts of money from 
professionals and elite institutions might ultimately serve the interests of the 
latter groups.  But the rules defining medical malpractice are in the last analysis 
made by the health care industry itself and consequently embody the medical 
 
 171. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 222–64. 
 172. See generally id.  Economists and other policy analysts rarely recognize the unavailability in the 
market of economizing choices and the legal risks that inhibit the offering of such choices as the serious 
policy problems they are.  See supra note 65.  But see Pauly, supra note 24, at 1528 (recognizing that, for 
legal and other reasons, “[p]eople cannot generally choose knowledgeably among a variety of plans 
characterized by explicitly different policies toward new technology.”).  Although Pauly’s discussion 
focuses principally on encouraging private rationing of “new” technology, it concludes, wisely, that 
“some type of legal safe harbor has to be created for insurers that implement well-designed plans for 
limiting technology [in general], and [that] the ‘community or standard practice’ and ‘medical necessity’ 
concepts need to be jettisoned.”  Id. at 1534. 
 173. See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION: WHAT’S 
HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 69, 116 (2005) (advocating still greater tax 
incentives for HSAs and suggesting that federal law widen consumer choice by enabling consumers to 
purchase health coverage from insurers regulated by states other than their own). 
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explicitly evaluated to determine their soundness as public policy.  Yet, to the 
extent such standards require more than just the exercise of appropriate care 
and skill and presume to dictate what specific services providers must not omit 
to prescribe, they are suspect from an efficiency standpoint, having developed 
and evolved in a market fraught with moral hazard.  In addition to not being 
vetted in the democratic policymaking process nor validated in a smoothly 
functioning marketplace, the standards constituting the legal standard of care 
are nowhere published to inform practitioners authoritatively of their specific 
obligations—contrary to an elementary due-process requirement of government 
regulation.175  Moreover, because its standards must be discovered case-by-case 
through the adversarial efforts of well-compensated private lawyers and 
medical experts, the malpractice system is also far more costly to administer 
than a regulatory program presumably would be.  Finally, tort rules are 
enforced more haphazardly than regulatory requirements since they can be 
invoked against a practitioner only after an injury has occurred, not whenever 
negligent behavior is detected.176  Despite these many problems, our principal 
objection to the malpractice system as a regulatory program is the same as our 
objection to other forms of health-sector regulation: By motivating providers to 
prescribe services with only minimal regard to cost, it forces consumers either to 
 
 175. Indeed, the standard of care applied in any given lawsuit is rarely apparent even after the case 
is decided, but is instead merely implicit in a general jury verdict based on conflicting expert testimony 
about what the standard should be.  Although a movement to create so-called clinical practice 
guidelines began in the 1980s and has evolved into widespread insistence that physicians practice so-
called evidence-based medicine, practice guidelines, however well grounded they may be in evidence of 
efficacy and appropriateness (cost is still largely left out of the calculus), do not generally have official 
status but are only evidence of prevailing practice standards that juries may consider without being 
bound by them.  See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: 
Collision or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 67 (1991); Mark Hall, The Defensive Effect of 
Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (Spring 1991); 
Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (Spring 1991); Andrew L. Hyams et al., Practice Guidelines and Malpractice 
Litigation: A Two-Way Street, 122 ANNALS OF INT. MED. 450 (1995) (reporting survey of guideline use 
in actual cases); Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-based 
Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 327 (2001). 
 176. Although the licensure system might seem to provide protection for consumers against 
negligent physicians, discipline is only rarely administered because of simple incompetence.  Gary L. 
Gaumer, Regulating Health Professionals: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 62 MILBANK 
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 380, 407 (1984) (“[R]esearch on credentialing shows that contemporary 
credentialing procedures may not be reliably screening actual practice competence.”).  On the other 
hand, private credentialing and other measures in well-run hospitals provide some assurance of quality.  
Significantly, however, neither these efforts nor the tort system itself—the high cost of which seems 
justifiable only if it effectively deters numerous patient injuries—has worked well enough in preventing 
or deterring patient injuries to preclude some strong, authoritative adverse criticism of the overall 
quality of U.S. health care.  E.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS 
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (1999).  Recent industry efforts to respond to this 
embarrassing criticism have yet, it appears, to yield substantial improvements.  See Lucian L. Leape & 
Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After TO ERR IS HUMAN: What Have We Learned?, 293 J.A.M.A. 2384, 
2384 (2005) (“[L]ittle evidence exists from any source that systematic improvements in safety are 
widely available.”). 
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pay for costlier care than many of them would otherwise choose or to go 
without health coverage, and possibly health care, altogether. 
Most of the foregoing shortcomings of malpractice law as a system for 
regulating medical practice would largely disappear, of course, if consumers and 
providers were free to negotiate, particularly through health-plan 
intermediaries, for a less costly set of patient rights and provider obligations 
than the law prescribes.  For example, to obtain reduced health insurance 
premiums, consumers might agree to a less demanding rule governing the 
prescription of services of only marginal value177 or a less extensive set of 
remedies if malpractice should occur.178  But freedom of contract is not the rule 
in health care.  Indeed, the regulatory character of the malpractice regime is 
founded on the legal system’s monopoly over the definition and administration 
of patients’ rights, a monopoly that persists in large part because common-law 
courts are hostile to claims by malpractice defendants that the injured plaintiff 
waived, by contract, some right that the law confers.179  Being concerned 
primarily with the rights of injured plaintiffs ex post, judges rarely acknowledge 
that some consumers, in order to save money, might rationally elect ex ante a 
less demanding standard of care or less lucrative remedies for injuries they 
suffer.  Despite the many objections that can be raised to the legal system’s 
insistence on its own rules, there is little chance that the courts can be 
 
 177. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 284–302 (suggesting various 
strategies for modifying overly demanding standards of care, including dispensing altogether with fault 
as the basis for liability).  For the suggestion that selected clinical practice guidelines could be 
incorporated in health care contracts to establish the standard of care, see supra text accompanying 
notes 171–72; Havighurst, supra note 175. 
 178. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 271–84 (suggesting various 
modifications of remedies for negligence and malpractice). 
 179. Virtually the only contractual modifications of traditional tort rights that courts have shown 
much willingness to enforce are arbitration clauses.  E.g., Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 
1996) (enforcing agreements with two different patients undergoing knee reconstructions and finding 
that although the agreements were contracts of adhesion because presented by the physician on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, they were not unconscionable or oppressive); Hawkins v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. 
Rptr. 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding arbitration agreement signed by husband as part of 
comprehensive contract with Kaiser plan was binding on his enrolled spouse).  But see Obstetrics & 
Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985) (holding arbitration agreement offered by a clinic 
on take-it-or-leave-it basis was an adhesion contract, unenforceable in absence of evidence of plaintiff’s 
knowing assent).  This exception to the usual hostility to contractual reforms helps to prove the general 
rule, however, since an arbitration clause changes no more than the forum in which a claim is heard, not 
the substance of the claim nor the remedy available.  See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 
552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976) (enforcing arbitration clause in HMO contract because it “does not 
detract from Kaiser’s duty to use reasonable care in treating patients, nor limit its liability for breach of 
this duty, but merely substitutes one forum for another”).  Interestingly, arbitration clauses have been 
uncommon in health-plan contracts because, by lowering the cost of suing, they tend to increase the 
number of suits—hardly a result a health plan would desire.  Cf. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 
Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (finding Kaiser arbitration system cumbersome and costly, contrary to 
how it was represented to consumers, suggesting that Kaiser did not want arbitration to make its 
doctors any easier to sue than in the civil courts).  On the other hand, HMOs might offer arbitration 
clauses more widely—for the mutual benefit of both the plan and its subscribers—if such clauses could 
be accompanied by other contract terms limiting substantive rights and obligations. 
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persuaded to treat malpractice law as a set of default rules—that is, as the point 
of departure for negotiating different arrangements if the parties so desire.180 
Why courts so effectively deny consumers freedom of contract in this field is 
unclear.181  Explanations no doubt vary with individual judges, but probably 
include ignorance of, or unconcern for, the cost and other welfare consequences 
of judicial actions for ordinary people; attachment to things as they have always 
been; moral discontent with any but a nominally egalitarian health care system 
in which all citizens enjoy on paper the same rights as judges would want for 
themselves; acceptance of the medical profession’s own paradigmatic view that 
health care is too important to be left to consumer choice; a belief that the legal 
system of which he or she is a part knows best what is good for people;182 or 
simply an unacknowledged interest in maintaining the legal system’s lawyer-
enriching, judge-empowering monopoly.183  In addition to having an elitist 
flavor, all of the foregoing possible explanations for courts’ treatment of 
malpractice rights and obligations as matters of positive law rather than implied 
contract, variable by explicit agreement, betray an element of moral hazard, as 
 
 180. For scholarly discussions of the merits of letting consumers, with basic protections against fraud 
and overreaching, choose alternative liability regimes, see Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the 
Private Sector Find Relief?, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143–320  (Spring 1986); see also Richard A. 
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976). 
 181. Of course, the ostensible justification for the legal system’s skeptical attitude toward contracts 
limiting consumers’ rights is the well-documented inability of consumers to make well-informed, 
rational choices.  See supra note 134.  It has never been clear, however, why consumers’ difficulty in 
wisely choosing for themselves entitles privileged elites, with values, preferences, and economic 
interests of their own, to choose for them, thus forcing them to accept a legal regime in which they have 
virtually no voice at all.  In our view, the often-impressive findings of psychology and behavioral 
economics should not be used only to discredit law-and-economics theorizing but should instead be 
seen as enriching it.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (providing an overview of ways experimental 
psychology can inform thinking about legal rules).  For example, findings about the limitations of 
consumers as decisionmakers can be seen to strengthen the case for letting consumers select and rely 
upon more disinterested agents and for reforming legal procedures to assist consumers in making 
consequential choices by simplifying and clarifying options, “framing” issues, responsibly shaping 
perceptions, forcing reconsiderations, and otherwise.  See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 199 (2006).  On the phenomenon and pervasiveness of the 
framing effect, see Norbert Schwarz, Self-Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 93 (1999). 
 182. Note the strong similarity between such a belief on the part of the legal profession in its own 
benignity and the medical paradigm under which physicians deem themselves to be, as ethical 
professionals, superior makers of spending decisions. 
 183. Many state courts have been so protective of their authority over the tort system that, using 
various somewhat strained constructions of the judiciary’s powers under their state constitution, they 
have invalidated numerous efforts by state legislatures to reform malpractice law.  E.g., Ferdon v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (finding a cap on non-economic 
damages unconstitutional and reviewing cases from other jurisdictions); see also HAVIGHURST ET AL., 
supra note 160, at 941–89 (2d ed. 1998) (reviewing case law on state malpractice reforms); Carly N. 
Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional? An Overview of 
State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 515 (2005).  One might expect contractual reforms, being 
consensual, to fare better than legislative prescriptions, but they have not.  A possible justification for 
maintaining the inalienability of tort rights is to preserve the integrity of the tort system as a public 
good, a vital deterrent to future malpractice.  But, whereas one might be concerned that those opting 
out of the tort system are free-riding on its continuing beneficial effects on the quality of care, the 
evidence that the system serves that useful purpose is not strong.  See supra note 176. 
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legal decisionmakers indulge their own elite preferences or advance their own 
interests with other people’s money.  In any event, as currently administered, 
the legal system provides powerful support for the health care industry’s undue 
claims on consumers’ limited resources. 
Unfairness is also detectable in the way the medical malpractice system 
spreads financial risk, collecting wealth on the one hand and redistributing it on 
the other in the form of administrative expenses and damages.  On the 
collection side (who pays?), the malpractice regime’s revenue is generated 
ultimately, as noted above, in roughly equal amounts from individuals who, 
directly or indirectly, pay health insurance premiums.  As in our earlier 
exploration of possible disparities in health insurance, we are interested here in 
whether equal contributions, regardless of income, give rise to equal 
entitlements, not just on paper but in fact.  Once again, significant unfairness to 
those lower on the income scale seems clear. 
On the distribution side (who benefits?), the beneficiaries of the malpractice 
system include the lawyers and expert witnesses needed to ascertain fault in 
each case under vague legal standards.  Most prominent in this elite class of 
beneficiaries are plaintiffs’ attorneys, whose take is generally a substantial 
percentage of each settlement or award and whose political ability to defend 
their traditional domain is legendary.  The rewards to all these stakeholders are 
substantial.  Indeed, something less than half of liability insurance premiums 
collected remain available to compensate injured individuals after the system’s 
heavy administrative costs are paid.184  It would be hard to imagine a less 
efficient mechanism for compensating injured persons.  Moreover, in 
accordance with previous discussion, we would reject the usual claim by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers that, whatever it costs, the malpractice system deserves to be 
maintained in its present regulatory form because it deters negligence and 
ensures care of appropriate quality.185 
 
 184. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE 
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 17 (1993) (“[E]ven when one leaves aside the cost of 
securing and investing insurance funds and focuses simply on the process of claims administration and 
distribution, only about 40 percent of the total amount expended in the claims process actually reaches 
injured patients as compensation for their injuries.”). 
 185. But see Mello & Brennan, supra note 174 (mildly defending current system while suggesting 
modest reforms).  For suggested ways of making the tort system pull more helpfully in the direction of 
quality assurance, see Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and 
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1996–98 (2003) (arguing that “entity-level 
liability” for physician torts, rather than traditional liability rules, would come closer to creating 
optimal incentives for quality); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for 
the Quality of Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2000) (arguing that making organized health plans 
vicariously liable for the torts of their participating providers would both inspire integrated efforts to 
improve quality and restore needed legitimacy to managed health care by making plans responsible for 
the quality, as well as the cost, of care); Randall Bovbjerg & Lawrence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform 
Should Make Patients Safer: “Avoidable Classes of Events” Are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 478 (2005) (expanding earlier proposals to impose automatic, i.e., strict, liability for certain, 
normally preventable adverse outcomes as a way both to ensure fair compensation at low 
administrative cost and to strengthen incentives to avoid such compensable events); Clark C. 
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To the extent the money that malpractice victims finally receive as damages 
is intended to compensate them for lost employment income, higher-income 
victims stand to receive larger awards than victims whose income loss is less.186  
In addition, because the willingness of a plaintiff’s lawyer to accept a case 
depends heavily on the size of the potential award, some lower-income victims 
of malpractice will find it harder to get lawyers to prosecute their claims.  On 
the other hand, the largest tort awards, while relatively few compared to the 
incidence of malpractice injuries, are intended to cover the future medical 
expenses of severely disabled individuals, who may be disproportionately 
poorer rather than richer because the care they receive may be 
disproportionately poorer as well.  Nevertheless, we still hypothesize that 
lower-income premium payers stand, on average, a poorer chance of benefiting 
from the insurance funds collected partly at their expense to compensate for 
patient injuries.  It seems evident, for example, that, whereas a few lower-
income patients may receive substantial recoveries under the tort system, 
working-class individuals are less likely to pursue claims aggressively because 
of, say, their lesser ability to discover that a bad medical outcome resulted from 
negligence, a lesser willingness to sue powerful authority figures or institutions, 
a greater willingness to accept a low settlement offer, or greater difficulty in 
getting a competent lawyer to take their case. 
Although empirical evidence on which income classes benefit most from the 
tort system is thin, we suspect that lower- and middle-income consumers, whose 
health insurance premiums include roughly equal contributions to support the 
malpractice insurance system, do not enjoy equivalent, or equally valued, 
protection against losses they might incur from a negligence-caused injury.187  To 
the extent that this is true (or perceived by providers to be true), providers 
might provide better and more costly care for higher-income patients because 
they perceive them to be generally in a better position to bring a legal action in 
 
Havighurst & Lawrence R. Tancredi, “Medical Adversity Insurance”—A No-Fault Approach to Medical 
Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK Q. 125 (1974) (earlier proposal to the same effect).  
 186. To be sure, reforms in roughly half the states now allow juries to reduce damages for income 
losses to the extent that the plaintiff has been compensated for such losses already by various so-called 
“collateral sources” (public or private income-replacement programs, for example). See generally 
NAT’L ASS’N OF MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES, COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM, 
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) 
(summarizing collateral-source reforms by state).  But, whereas some such reforms appear to diminish 
regressivity, many reforms focus only on denying double recovery for medical expenses, thereby 
increasing the relative significance of lost income as an element of tort damages.  Under some new 
rules for calculating damages, therefore, higher-income persons stand to profit even more from the 
malpractice system than lower-income premium payers. 
 187. There is unfortunately only limited empirical evidence supporting our perception here.  
Nevertheless, some research finds disparities in malpractice awards correlated with race, gender, and 
age, factors that may also correlate with income.  See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-
Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994) (finding evidence that the tort system’s emphasis on economic over non-
economic damages enables white men to recover more in tort awards than women and minorities); 
Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1263 (2004) (concluding that elderly plaintiffs and young children rely disproportionately on non-
economic damages and would be adversely affected by certain tort reforms). 
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the event of injury.188  Disparities of this kind, if they exist, would add physical 
injury to financial insult, providing yet another basis for questioning the welfare 
effects of the tort system on those lower on the income scale. 
Finally, past and present moves to cap the amount of non-economic 
damages that an individual plaintiff may recover seem likely—indeed, seem 
intended—to further reduce the prospects that injured patients with relatively 
less lost income will find lawyers willing to take their cases.  Indeed, it would 
seem fairer to lower-income premium payers for a legislature to cap economic 
damages, expecting those at risk for greater income losses to protect themselves 
by purchasing life and disability insurance.  In addition to causing compensation 
funds to be distributed more fairly, such a cap would help to equalize providers’ 
incentive to exercise care in treating all patients rather than encouraging 
treatment disparities based on an income-correlated disparity in access to the 
tort system.189  In any event, capping non-economic damages seems likely to 
make the malpractice system even more regressive than it already is.  By the 
same token, addressing the medical malpractice system’s regressive features 
would reduce both monetary and non-monetary injustices, bringing more 
fairness both to the distribution of compensation and the distribution of medical 
mistakes.  At the very least, this discussion has identified another series of 
important questions in need of more examination and research. 
V 
CONCLUSIONS, WITH POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Some readers may think that, in purporting to discern unfairness in the form 
of “distributive injustice” in American health care, we have entered the domain 
of philosophy and must prove, rather than simply assume, that one particular 
distribution of wealth is definitively less just than another.190  But there should 
be little disagreement, philosophical or otherwise, with the two main premises 
of this article: (1) that the burden of paying for public goods such as health care 
for the uninsured, medical education, and pharmaceutical research should not 
fall disproportionately on those with less ability to pay and (2) that persons with 
lower incomes should not be compelled to pay, as part of the price of having 
 
 188. See text accompanying supra notes 109–11. 
 189. No court, it appears, has ever been asked to consider whether a statutory cap on non-economic 
damages denies equal protection—or its equivalent under a state constitution—to lower-income 
citizens.  See Kelly & Mello, supra note 183, at 521–23 (outlining arguments accepted and rejected in 
state litigation).  The usual equal-protection objection to damage caps—that they particularly 
disadvantage the most seriously injured victims—is hardly credible, one would think, when, ex ante, all 
consumer-patients are similarly situated.  On similarly close analysis, however, there would seem to be 
merit in the argument that caps disproportionately affect lower-income persons and are particularly 
unfair to those who, having purchased standard health coverage, have reason to expect that a 
legislature will not deny them equal value for their money. 
 190. But see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (purporting to prove logically, by 
reasoning behind a “veil of ignorance,” that economic inequality can be justified only as a necessary 
side effect of an incentive system beneficial to the least advantaged).  As noted supra note 18, 
economists’ work on distributional effects is generally descriptive rather than judgmental. 
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any health insurance at all, either for coverage designed by and for elite 
interests or for health care that is consumed disproportionately by the well-to-
do.  This article has observed many ways in which, under these premises, the 
U.S. health care system unfairly exploits ordinary payers of health insurance 
premiums. 
To be sure, the health care system’s unfairness also extends to those whom 
the high cost of health coverage has priced out of the insurance market 
altogether.  Our analysis suggests, however, that lower-income premium payers 
deserve equivalent sympathy.  The uninsured, after all, are generally not the 
poorest of the poor, and many of them are, in varying degrees, uninsured by 
choice;191 moreover, by virtue of not paying thousands of dollars in health 
insurance premiums, the uninsured have more money in their pockets to spend 
on health care and other things, while also being eligible for charitable care or 
personal bankruptcy in many worst-case scenarios.  The overriding fact, 
however, is that the lower-income insured and the uninsured are both victims of 
a system that denies them reasonable choices.  And, with premiums continuing 
to rise faster than incomes, many of today’s insured will be among the 
uninsured tomorrow. Unfortunately, current sympathies focus 
disproportionately on the uninsured and clamor only for expansions in coverage 
when concern should also extend to premium payers and the causes of excessive 
costs that victimize both groups.  Although in the last analysis the plight of the 
uninsured and the plight of the lower- and middle-income insured are two sides 
of the same coin, this article has emphasized the cumulatively large and 
seriously unfair financial burdens the U.S. health system imposes on working 
people having private coverage, arguing that these burdens merit far more 
attention than they have been given by researchers and policymakers alike. 
A. Impositions on Working Families 
In essence, the U.S. health care system causes payers of health insurance 
premiums to bear two kinds of excessive costs without their knowledge or 
consent—except insofar as the decision to insure at all can be deemed 
voluntary.  First, they pay excessive prices for many goods and services, mostly 
because U.S.-style health insurance makes it relatively easy for sellers of 
insured services or products to exploit dominant market positions.  Indeed, 
health-sector monopolists are able to charge prices much higher than an 
equivalent monopolist could charge in the absence of such insurance and thus 
to capture substantially more of (and possibly even more than) the surplus that 
consumers would enjoy in purchasing at the competitive price.  As earlier 
discussion showed, the enhanced redistributive effects of monopoly in the 
health sector would be objectionable even if hospitals and other providers spent 
all their monopoly profits in socially worthwhile ways and even if the prospect 
 
 191. See Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding Medicaid’s 
Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 705, 715 (2005) (concluding that “for [certain] individuals, insurance 
status is a choice variable much more than an unavoidable consequence of poverty”). 
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of monopoly returns stimulated only socially worthwhile innovative activity; 
that wasteful spending is also induced only adds additional insult to the injury.  
In our view, the high costs of meeting the health care system’s alleged needs 
should not fall like a (regressive) head tax on the subset of the working 
population that bears the costs of private health insurance. 
Although it is difficult to quantify the total burden that falls on U.S. 
premium payers because their health insurers facilitate the exercise of 
providers’ and suppliers’ market power, Gerard Anderson, Uwe Reinhardt, and 
coauthors have suggested that the very large excess of per-capita health care 
spending in the United States over similar spending in other countries (totaling 
more than a half trillion dollars per year192) “is mostly attributable to higher 
prices of goods and services.”193  A more direct estimate of the “tax” burden that 
consumers must bear for the privilege of being insured would begin by 
identifying hospitals’ “community service” costs, a large part of which they 
cover from surpluses earned at the expense of private insurers.  These costs 
have been roughly estimated to be “as much as $80–95 billion a year (in 2003), 
or a little more than 15 percent of the total economic activity of this $500 billion 
industry”;194 even after taking account of state and federal subventions to cover 
such costs, the burden on premium payers remains substantial.195  Another, 
more problematic, factor in the total “tax” on premium payers is the inflated 
prices paid by U.S. health insurers for some prescription drugs and medical 
devices.196  Although monopoly profits yielded by such prices serve to motivate 
and finance future innovation, the burden on premium payers may substantially 
exceed any resulting benefits they can expect to enjoy. 
The second way in which lower- and middle-income premium payers 
overpay for health care in the United States is by being forced to buy more of it, 
or better quality, than they can reasonably afford.  A variety of regulatory and 
legal requirements incorporating high minimum standards developed and 
favored by industry interests—and supported without question by elite policy 
advocates and higher-income consumer-voters—foreclose many low-cost 
options.  In addition, the almost universal convention of covering any medical 
service that qualifies as “medically necessary”—a professional standard that 
 
 192. See supra note 8. 
 193. Anderson et al., supra note 13, at 90.  To be sure, these authors compare U.S. prices only with 
prices that are depressed in some measure by government-sponsored monopsony power, not with 
competitive prices equal to marginal cost.  Moreover, some of the higher charges in the U.S. may be 
borne—not altogether fairly, see supra note 1—by taxpayers rather than by premium payers as such.  
Nevertheless, these authors’ observation of substantially higher prices in the U.S. system strongly 
supports our concern about the redistributive effects of U.S.-style health insurance. 
 194. Vladeck, supra note 36, at 41. 
 195. See supra notes 36–38 & 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 196. For data on the significant extent to which U.S. prices for brand-name pharmaceuticals exceed 
prices in other OECD nations (except Japan), see Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, Prices 
and Availability of Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCLUSIVES) W3-521 (also noting that generic drug competition, when patents do not preclude it, is 
generally stronger in the U.S. than in other countries).  See also supra note 27. 
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takes virtually no account of benefit-cost ratios—prevents consumers wanting 
health insurance from buying low-cost versions of it.  Finally, the legal system’s 
propensity to appraise health insurance contracts and their consequences ex 
post rather than ex ante effectively precludes consumers from minimizing the 
consequences of moral hazard by agreeing in advance to unconventional 
restrictions on their freedom to dip into common premium pools.  Although 
there is no sure basis for estimating the actual gap between the cost and quality 
of health care that today’s consumers enjoy and the choices they would make if 
a full menu of choices were available,197 the unfairness of limiting their choices 
should be apparent from the high proportion of their family incomes that most 
consumers must spend if they are to have any health coverage at all.198  
Essentially, the median family faces a Hobson’s choice: either to pay a 
significant fraction of its total income for standard health coverage199 or take its 
chances with the safety net. 
Consumption patterns also suggest regressivity in the U.S. system because 
lower-income premium payers appear to get less out of their health plans than 
do higher-income persons paying the same premiums.  Part III presented our 
hypothesis that lower-income insureds are systematically subsidizing the health 
care of their higher-income coworkers because the latter are in a better position 
to meet cost-sharing requirements and otherwise take maximum advantage of 
the available coverage.  Although our reasons for suspecting that equal nominal 
benefits do not equate to equal value for equal outlays are quite plausible, 
evidence to establish this particular unfairness remains to be collected.  
Confirmation of our suspicions on this point is not necessary, however, to 
establish our broad claim that U.S.-style private health insurance has seriously 
regressive effects on premium payers below the high end of the income 
spectrum. 
Most of the defects in U.S. health insurance that produce the consumer 
burdens noted here flow both directly and indirectly from the way the nation 
subsidizes the purchase of health coverage through the tax system.  Unlike most 
 
 197. Anderson et al., supra note 13, provide evidence that, even as the United States spends far 
more than other nations on health care, the rates at which Americans consume many important health 
services are generally no higher than in several other countries.  Although these authors suggest that 
their data shows that overutilization is not a serious problem in the United States, evidence on national 
averages is not helpful in answering the question whether some Americans whose private insurance 
enables them to consume more and better than average health care are in fact buying more of it than is 
good for them in welfare terms.  See supra text accompanying notes 79 & 80. 
 198. Antitrust law treats so-called tying arrangements as unlawful when used by a seller of a unique 
and valuable product to force consumers desiring it to purchase an additional, perhaps unwanted good.  
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (deeming a hospital’s 
maternity and anesthesia services to be separate products that, if bundled, might be subject to antitrust 
law’s prohibition on tying and stating that “the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement 
lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase 
of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase 
elsewhere on different terms”).  Antitrust doctrine thus supports our view that consumers wanting basic 
health coverage should not also have to pay for unnecessary bells and costly whistles. 
 199. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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other commentators on the tax subsidy, we have emphasized how, by fostering 
employer purchasing, the subsidy systematically hides the true cost of health 
coverage from those who ultimately pay it, thus not only distorting market 
choices—there is implausibly little discernible demand for radically low-cost 
health coverage200—but also enabling the political system to make regulatory 
and other policy with virtually no regard for the costs imposed on consumer-
voters.  The net result is a U.S. marketplace in which consumers are effectively 
denied important opportunities to economize in purchasing health care.  On the 
other hand, if public policy encouraged (and allowed) middle- and lower-
income premium payers to economize in reasonable ways, the great majority of 
them would be able to substantially improve their welfare, both by reducing 
their support of the larger health care enterprise (through involuntary indirect 
payments to providers possessing market power) and by agreeing to reasonable 
limits on their own access to costly, marginally valuable care.  Not only would 
freedom to economize enable ordinary insured consumers to make their 
incomes, increasingly lagging behind the affluent classes, go further, but it 
would also put the cost of health insurance back within reach of many of the 
uninsured.  It would also reduce the cost to government of reducing the ranks of 
the uninsured still further with new public subsidies.201 
B. The Indifference of Elite Interests 
We anticipate great difficulty in persuading stakeholders in the American 
health care industry to share our concern that the health system is imposing a 
huge, unjustified cost burden on ordinary premium payers and payroll-tax 
payers.202  Although provider interests regularly profess distress over the plight 
of the uninsured, we suspect that many of them are troubled at least as much by 
the failure of uninsured Americans to contribute their share of the health care 
system’s finances as by their reduced access to care.  As to the burden on those 
who do pay premiums, the health care industry and its allies usually 
acknowledge only that the industry has a duty to act responsibly in incurring 
 
 200. Occasional experiments with “barebones” coverage have found few takers for it.  See MARK A. 
HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 57 (1994); FAMILIES USA, NO SALE: THE 
FAILURE OF BAREBONES INSURANCE (1993). The apparent explanations are several.  One of these is 
the difficulty that employers would face in offering potentially controversial coverage to workers who 
do not see the trade-off with their take-home pay.  Second, low-cost options must compete with the 
safety net, which, though deficient in many respects, carries no up-front price tag at all.  Third, 
“barebones” offerings, such as they were, were designed with most of the usual legal and conventional 
constraints intact.  Thus, even when a state waived some mandates with respect to benefits, the effect 
was only to allow some additional categorical exclusions; “medical necessity” continued to govern basic 
coverage, and providers, partly because of legal compulsions, continued to practice in their usual costly 
ways.  See Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 71 (“Unless and until a critical 
mass of employers offer benefits in forms that invite real economizing at the core of clinical practice, 
consumers whose welfare would be enhanced by purchasing revolutionary low-cost coverage will find 
no health plans offering it.”). 
 201. See supra note 75. 
 202. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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costs—by practicing only “evidence-based” medicine, for example.203  
Otherwise, industry leaders appear to take comfort in the belief that insured 
Americans have access to the world’s best health care and to focus their 
attention on improving quality204 and reducing racial and class disparities in the 
way care is delivered.205  Although such efforts to justify the public’s trust may 
be praiseworthy, noblesse oblige is not the answer to the large and regressive 
redistribution of wealth wrought by today’s health system.206 
Whereas industry stakeholders’ disinterest in distributional concerns is 
understandable, it is harder to explain why so few of the industry’s progressive 
critics have ever questioned the large amounts of money taken 
disproportionately from ordinary working people to support the health care 
system.207  To be sure, the high cost of health care in the United States is a 
matter of frequent comment and concern, and for-profit enterprises regularly 
draw populist fire.  But the unfair degree to which high health care costs are 
paid unknowingly by lower- and middle-income premium payers is almost 
never observed as the specific injustice it is.  Instead, progressive complaints 
about unfairness in U.S. health care focus almost exclusively on government’s 
refusal to spend more on the poor and the uninsured and on socioeconomic 
inequalities in health status and treatment patterns.  But those who urge 
coverage of the uninsured ought to appreciate that many who lack health 
coverage are uninsured more or less by choice and that their decisions to go 
bare are a direct reflection of the unfair cost burdens against which this article 
protests.  Similarly, those who support legal and regulatory moves to equalize 
entitlements and to narrow treatment disparities should be careful that they, 
too, are not simply advancing the health care industry’s interest in spending 
ever more money at the expense of working people. 
Both industry stakeholders and progressive critics may discount consumers’ 
cost burdens because they assume that all consumers attach the same high value 
to the right to spend freely on costly health care as the elite classes themselves.  
But the truest tests of preferences generally come in markets in which people 
 
 203. See, e.g., David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9 
(2005) (summarizing industry reactions over time to revelations of widespread, unexplained variations 
in medical practice and of shortcomings in the way clinical policies are developed and implemented).  
The cited article appears in a symposium showing the field’s current efforts and mixed success in 
improving medical decisionmaking.  Symposium, Putting Evidence into Practice, 24 HEALTH AFF. 7 
(2005). 
 204. See Symposium, The Quality Conundrum, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2002, at 12. 
 205. See Symposium, supra note 111. 
 206. Although the various activities reviewed in the cited symposia, supra notes 203–205, illustrate 
how the medical profession and health care industry as a whole regularly respond to revelations of 
inadequate performance, such efforts to do better, however sincere they may be, are also well 
calculated to maintain the profession’s and the industry’s elite status and to head off radical, exogenous 
reforms that would introduce real accountability to either government or consumers in the 
marketplace. 
 207. For a recent example of how even thoughtful commentators focus single-mindedly on how 
fairly health services are distributed while neglecting to consider where the cost burden falls, see 
POWERS & FADEN, supra note 86. 
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with limited resources must choose among many desirable things, each with its 
own price tag.208  In health care markets today, the sobering reality is that more 
and more consumers are revealing a preference far different from the one 
imputed to them by elite interests—by dropping health coverage altogether.  
Indeed, the force of our observation that U.S. health policy is unfairly designed 
and operated by and for elite interests, though powerful in itself, is significantly 
amplified by the income-elasticity of consumer demand for health care.209  
Precisely because ordinary consumers necessarily attach relatively less value to 
the added services and better quality they may enjoy by virtue of good, 
egalitarian intentions expressed in legal mandates and industry standards of 
practice, a health care system tailored to the values, preferences, and resources 
of higher-income consumers does a special disservice to those who would prefer 
to spend less.  This observation multiplies the significance of everything we 
have said in this article about how the divergence of the interests of lower-
income and high-income consumers results in unfairness to the former in both 
the marketplace and the political process. 
In our view, the cumulative inequity that results from the many discrete 
unfairnesses we have observed in this article should be the dominant concern of 
health policymakers today, to be addressed either before or in conjunction with 
the problems of the uninsured and disadvantaged.  Those who dispute this 
priority need to say exactly why.  We doubt that maintaining egalitarian 
appearances alone, however morally satisfying to some, can excuse the 
injustices we see. 
C. Implications for the Policy Debate 
The ability of the U.S. health care system to finance itself by loading ever-
higher costs on unsuspecting premium payers may finally be reaching its high-
water mark.  Most of the resistance to paying higher costs will probably not 
come, however, from insurers finally acting as consumers’ cost-conscious agents 
and refusing to pay health-sector monopolists’ extraordinarily high prices or to 
cover every health service that medical experts will not declare medically 
unnecessary.  Nor will consumers spending their own money with the backing of 
health savings accounts be a major force in curbing rising costs.  Instead, the 
nation may be nearing a point at which continuing to raise health insurance 
premiums faster than consumers’ incomes grow will actually generate less, not 
more, revenue for the industry because of the rate at which employers or 
consumers drop health coverage altogether.210  If this point is finally reached, the 
 
 208. To be sure, consumers are generally ill-informed and cognitively challenged, and their 
preferences, as expressed in either market or political choices, are often incoherent.  See supra note 
181.  But these circumstances do not automatically qualify elites, with interests of their own as well as 
different values, to make choices on their behalf. 
 209. See supra note 101. 
 210. See Todd Gilmer & Richard Kronick, It’s the Premiums, Stupid: Projections of the Uninsured 
through 2013, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-143 (predicting very substantial increases in 
number of uninsured as cost increases continue to outpace increases in personal income).  Once they 
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nation would confront a far greater health care “crisis” than any previously 
declared, because burgeoning health care budgets could no longer be balanced 
on the backs of the working population.211 
The day of reckoning in U.S. health policy could be hastened if populist 
politicians (liberal or conservative, as the case may be) would tell consumer-
voters the truth about the extortion-like protection scheme being practiced on 
them by the health care system—which essentially forces them to choose 
between paying what the system demands and putting their families’ health in 
danger.  This unpleasant truth has heretofore been kept from consumer-voters 
for complex reasons.  Certainly, politicians have reason to fear that voters 
would react badly if asked to think of health care as an economic good which 
they, rather than someone else, must pay for and make choices about.  
Nevertheless, once the health care industry and the political system no longer 
have the luxury of seeing rising costs passed on to unresisting premium payers, 
some members of the political class might  begin to see a partisan advantage in 
appealing to the large subset of consumer-voters that the system has exploited 
so successfully for so long.  Indeed, this article’s greatest contribution to the 
health policy debate may be to translate arcane, seemingly technical concerns 
about moral hazard and the misallocation of resources into more human terms 
that stand some chance of arousing the body politic.  Allocative inefficiency 
naturally provides a poor rallying cry for health reform, to such an extent that 
even health economists rarely express concern about it in health policy 
discussions;212 instead, one finds mostly articles discussing whether rising costs 
 
become uninsured, of course, patients are much less likely to pay providers’ bills, as the increasing 
number of bankruptcies caused by health-care-related liabilities reveals.  See supra note 51. 
 211. See Altman et al., supra note 34 (predicting economic instability for hospitals as demands for 
uncompensated care grow and revenue sources dry up).  Other articles in the same symposium make 
similar predictions.  E.g., Dobson et al., supra note 40, at 30 (“This secular trend in combination with 
technology-driven health care cost increases has the potential to destabilize the U.S. health care 
financing system to the extent that low-wage (if not median-wage) workers will no longer be able to 
afford health care coverage.”); Vladeck, supra note 36 (noting potential for a “death spiral”). 
 212. There are other reasons, to be sure, why economists are slow to assert that resources are being 
under- or over-allocated to a particular sector of the economy.  For one thing, demand curves, while 
useful in theory, are a poor indicator of social welfare in markets for merit goods—which, by definition, 
should not be distributed solely on the basis of ability and willingness to pay.  See Reinhardt, supra note 
154, at 978–90 (noting the questionable social implications of relying exclusively on willingness-to-pay 
criteria, which demand curves incorporate, and of employing so-called Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit 
criteria to evaluate welfare effects in health care markets).  Another reason why allocative efficiency is 
problematic for economists is the so-called “problem of second best.”  See generally F.M. SCHERER & 
DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 38 (3d ed. 1990) 
(“[O]ne might conclude that the whole question of allocative efficiency is so confused and uncertain, 
once second-best considerations are introduced, that policy-makers would be well advised to give up 
trying to achieve the best possible allocation of resources.”); Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell 
Short, supra note 24, at 80–81 (suggesting that, despite its force in weakening confidence that 
competition is always allocatively efficient, “second-best theorizing” should magnify, not diminish, 
concern that the nation is allocating excessive resources to underpriced health care).  Despite the 
reasonableness of economists’ hesitancy about relying on economic theory, however, this Article has 
shown that health insurance, especially as we know it in the United States, creates a situation with 
serious misallocative tendencies.  But see supra note 68 (“Whatever its magnitude, inefficiency that is 
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are affordable by society, are worth worrying about, or require government 
intervention.213  In our view, however, a responsible reform movement might 
gain political traction if middle-class consumers were given some sense of how 
much they are paying to support a health care industry essentially 
unaccountable for its cost-increasing actions.214 
Although this article has made our general policy preferences reasonably 
clear, it takes no firm position on the particular health policy that should 
replace the one we criticize for giving ordinary premium payers a horrendously 
bad deal while also serving inadequately those without any insurance 
protection.  Indeed, we would not object if our observation of the major 
burdens imposed on consumers by private health insurance were cited as a 
reason to adopt a monolithic national health program, scrapping private health 
insurance altogether (except insofar as it might supplement the national 
system’s coverage).  We hope, however, that populists and progressives 
invoking our concerns in such a cause will not simply claim that that market-
oriented policies have proved unworkable and that big government is therefore 
needed to do the job.  We have, after all, stressed that it is not private insurance 
as such but “U.S.-style” health insurance and government policy itself that 
generate the problems that concern us.  Moreover, we have some confidence 
that, with altered subsidies and incentives for consumers, some deregulation of 
insurers and providers, substantial redesign of insurance products, and some 
tweaking at a few other points, the market would soon evolve so as generally to 
give consumers, in actuarial terms, both no more and no less than they choose, 
with limited public subsidies, to pay for.  All we ask here, however, is a fair 
hearing for proposals to let consumers, with as much financial and other help as 
public institutions and private agents can give them, choose more or less freely 
the style of health care they want to purchase for their families. 
Of course, no public policy (and no market) can be perfect, and much might 
be said against as well as in favor of our preferred strategy.215  We are not overly 
 
already embedded in the economy is simply never going to be viewed as a problem by the political 
class.”). 
 213. E.g., Michael E. Chernew, Increased Spending on Health Care: How Much Can the United 
States Afford?, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2003, at 15; Henry J. Aaron, Should Public Policy Seek to 
Control the Growth of Health Care Spending?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-28; Mark 
V. Pauly, Should We Be Worried About High Real Medical Spending Growth in the United States?, 2003 
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-15.  The Pauly article, however, does address concerns similar 
to ours.  See also Pauly, supra note 24.  On the importance of focusing on marginal, rather than the 
more politically potent aggregate, benefits of health care spending in appraising allocative efficiency, 
see supra note 68. 
 214. For reasons why any such hope may be unrealistic, see David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to 
Come out Behind: Fixing the Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 265, 273–82 (Autumn 2006). 
 215. Some health economists, for example, like to emphasize the limitations of both economic 
theory and markets in general and to criticize advocates of market-oriented policies for having 
simplistic, theory-driven views.  E.g., THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED 
(2d ed. 2003); Reinhardt, supra note 154.  Yet to argue, as so many non-economists also do, that 
markets should not be trusted simply because they do not satisfy the rigorous conditions necessary to 
achieve Pareto optimality is also to use the unrealistic textbook model as the benchmark for a policy 
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concerned, however, as so many purport to be, that consumers might have to 
make market choices in some ignorance, both of their future health needs and 
of health plans’ or providers’ characteristics.  It would be seriously destructive 
of insurance markets, after all, if consumers knew too well what their future 
health needs would be; indeed, the risk of adverse selection makes it actually 
preferable that they purchase behind a veil of ignorance about such matters and 
not be free to upgrade their coverage when a serious need arises.  As for other 
informational difficulties that consumers face, we anticipate that they could be 
significantly ameliorated by limited regulation defining new contract terms, by 
comparative information available from private and public sources, and by 
consumers’ continued reliance on purchasing agents (including employers in 
purchasing health plans and health plans in purchasing services).  The potential 
benefits of a policy based on the principles of managed competition216 seem to us 
to be great and uncontroversial enough that responsible policymakers of 
different ideological persuasions should be able to find common ground on 
which to build bipartisan reform.217  Although highly threatening to special 
interests, such a policy would not be radical in itself but would instead, we 
think, be entirely in keeping with American values. 
It is highly possible, of course, that influential members of the body politic 
will never be permanently comfortable in the presence of explicit, income-
correlated disparities in insured individuals’ legal entitlements to medical 
care—even if those inequalities result from reasonable choices by consumers, 
spending not just their own limited resources but also whatever earmarked 
subsidies democratic legislatures choose to provide.  For some observers 
(apparently), the symbolic significance of any such disparities will always trump 
efficiency and welfare concerns, overriding respect not only for private choices 
 
prescription.  In fact, real-world markets do many things quite well despite their limitations, particularly 
in comparison with real-world government.  Moreover, government can improve the market’s 
performance by such measures as providing information, strictly policing fraud, and enforcing private 
contracts and the antitrust laws.  Ideally, health policy debates should focus on such practical, rather 
than ideological, considerations.  See supra note 181. 
 216. This model, which features menus of health-plan options maintained and explained to 
consumers by employers or other “sponsors,” has been described most helpfully by its principal 
architect, Alain Enthoven.  See generally ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE FINANCE (1988) (outlining the structure of a system of 
managed competition based on the principle that “cost-conscious consumer choice is necessary to 
create incentives for people to develop and demonstrate less costly alternative ways of organizing 
medical care of acceptable quality”); Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice 
Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and 
Economy, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. pt. 1, at 29 & pt. 2, at 94 (1989). 
 217. See supra note 131, recalling the Clinton administration’s proposed Health Security Act, which 
was based, ostensibly at least, on the managed-competition model and might have had a better chance 
of enactment had it been truer to that model.  An easy way to ensure near-universal participation might 
be to offer a substantial, refundable tax credit to those who could demonstrate that they (or their 
employer) had spent at least that much on acceptable health coverage; then, anyone going uninsured 
would, by forgoing the tax credit, be effectively financing his share of the safety net (perhaps a residual 
public financing program) rather than free-riding on the health system’s charitable impulses and 
capacity. 
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but also for government’s legitimately established budgetary priorities.218  Faced 
with such inequalities, legislators wanting popular credit for good intentions 
may continue to enact quality- and access-enhancing measures for which 
consumers, mostly, must pay, and the legal system may too often be tempted to 
discover and vindicate individual rights without concern for costs or due 
recognition of the legitimacy of other decisionmaking mechanisms, private or 
public.  If such cost-increasing, destabilizing forces seem too likely to frustrate a 
sound market-based reform strategy, it may be necessary to embrace a second-
best alternative,219 perhaps a government-defined, government-financed basic 
entitlement with consumers able to supplement that coverage as they see fit.  In 
any event, we hope that our observation of the serious unfairness of the 
burdens that the current system imposes on the majority of consumer-voters 
will help both to inflame and to enlighten a political debate leading to a more 
responsible national health policy—whatever that policy may turn out to be.  
The crucial thing is to find a fairer way to distribute the costs of health care.220  
Other nations, it seems, have more or less arranged their health care systems so 
that those who want more or better care than is deemed suitable for the median 
citizen must pay more for it.  The United States, on the other hand, has 
structured things so that lower- and middle-income premium payers bear heavy 
burdens so that elite interests can continue to provide or enjoy, as the case may 
be, the style of health care that best satisfies their needs.  This is the situation 
that needs to be corrected. 
 
 218. Perhaps what we have witnessed in the last thirty years, and what is in store for the indefinite 
future, is a continuous playing out of the cycle that Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt observed some 
years ago in public policies affecting so-called “tragic choices.”  See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP 
BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).  Their insight was that there are some situations (tragic choices) in 
which, even though economic efficiency may clearly dictate that unlucky individuals should bear some 
serious hardships rather than having them prevented or alleviated by public action, our political and 
legal institutions cannot, and will not, indefinitely accept such apparently avoidable tragedies.  Instead, 
they predicted, public policy in such cases is destined to evolve endlessly in cycles, emphasizing at each 
stage some value—efficiency, compassion, fairness, or openness, for example—that previous policy had 
neglected.  Under the Calabresi–Bobbitt hypothesis, it may be that seriously consequential choices 
about health care can never be permanently removed from the public agenda and placed finally (even 
with public subsidies) in private hands.  On the other hand, there are other factors, including the tax 
subsidy, special-interest politics, and the peculiar division of policymaking responsibilities among 
federal and state legislatures and courts, that may account for the nation’s failure, over many years, to 
put a coherent health policy permanently in place.  Our hope is that this long-standing gridlock can be 
broken by publicizing the serious unfairnesses of the present system. 
 219. For the observation that a system based on private financing may not justify its high 
administrative and other costs unless it enables consumers to make consequential, welfare-enhancing 
choices, see Havighurst, supra note 12.  Because the costs of a private system include those associated 
with legal and political uncertainties, it may be simply impossible for the American polity to adopt 
successfully and for all time the policy that strikes us not only as the ideal one but also as the one best 
suited for the diverse American people. 
 220. Given our emphasis on distributional issues, it is relevant to ask how a new public financing 
program, whatever its form, would be financed.  The options include increasing progressive rates under 
the income tax, a flat tax on payrolls or total income, and a consumption tax. Although any of these 
would be fairer than the methods by which the health care industry currently finances the production of 
many public goods, a recent proposal by Victor Fuchs and Ezekial Emanuel sounds especially fair to us.  
Ezekial J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Vouchers—A Proposal for Universal Coverage, 352 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255 (2005) (suggesting value-added tax as revenue source). 
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Finally, we acknowledge that some of our observations of unfairness in U.S. 
health care, although seemingly well grounded in theory and observation, lack 
as much empirical confirmation as responsible observers might like to see.  
Although we doubt that further research could significantly weaken the case we 
have made against the current system’s unjust impositions on premium-paying 
American workers, we conclude by inviting health services researchers to 
pursue the extensive agenda for new investigations that this article provides. 
